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When possible, Husserl’s works are quoted in German according to their
publication in the volumes of the Husserliana. However, I also use the following
abbreviations to refer to the texts: CM=Cartesianische Meditationen; Ideen=
Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie;
Krisis= Die Krisis der eusopänische Wisseschaften und die transzendentale
Phänomenologie; AzpS= Analyses zur pasiven Synthesis; FTL= Formale und
traszendentale Logik; Prolegomena= Prolegomena zur reinen Logik; LU= Lo-
gische Untersuchungen.
I generally refer to the english translations of Husserl’s works (cf. Bibliog-
raphy). Sometimes I prefer to use different terms and translations. When this
happens I usually indicate it in the footnotes. The following abbreviations are
used for the english translations of the Husserlian works: LI= Logical Investiga-
tions; EJ= Experience and Judgment; FTL Engl.= Formal and transcendental
Logic; Ideas I= Ideas pertaining to a pure Phenomenology and phenomenolog-
ical Philosophy; Passive Syntheses = Analyses concerning passive and active
Syntheses (cf. Bibliography).
In this work I make use of some graphical representations. This is due to my
conviction that phenomenology is a philosophy that for its nature can be easily
schematized. However, these schema cannot be exhaustive and their task is to
make the discussion clearer. The same holds for the tables in the Appendix.
v
Introduction
Phenomenology and Philosophy. It is extremely difficult to define phe-
nomenology1. What are the elements that make phenomenology so difficult to
define? First, the nature of phenomenology itself as a philosophical method
that claims to start – and always to re-start – from the things themselves, and
to avoid all the presuppositions (are they metaphysical, empirical or psycholog-
ical). There are two different and complementary phenomenological methods
– static and genetic phenomenology –, but also different ways of accessing
phenomenological philosophy and transcendental phenomenology2. However,
there are important elements that remain constant in the rich variation of
methods: the rigor (strength) of the phenomenological enterprise; the absence
of presuppositions; the fact that phenomenology provides an analysis of con-
sciousness and of the world starting from the things themselves; the fact that
phenomenology is a method to investigate the rich and all-encompassing field
of consciousness. In its original vocation, phenomenology is philosophy of con-
sciousness and the phenomenological method adapts to the particular field of
consciousness in question. According to this, for the analysis of the ‘combi-
nation’ of the acts, static analysis is enough. By contrast, for the analysis of
time, which is discovered to be the essential condition of consciousness, genetic
analysis is required.
1Husserl himself wrote many introductions to phenomenology. Indeed, many of his pub-
lished works were introduction to phenomenology with always new approaches and results.
There is nothing such as a representative phenomenological method. On the contrary, there
are different methods that are all connected, that are all expression and forms of the same
basic theoretical instance.
2An example of this are the three famous ways to phenomenology and phenomenological
reduction described by Kern (cf. engl. transl. [Kern, 2005]).
1
INTRODUCTION 2
Second, it is difficult to to span the entire spectrum of Husserl’s production.
Not only the great number of books, articles and lectures, but also the huge
amount of unpublished texts of the Nachlass. This enormous production not
only has as result the above mentioned plurality of ‘forms’ of investigation,
but also an impressive richness of topics, problems and questions that, even
within the phenomenological perspective, do not always find a solution.
Third, consciousness, as necessary counterpart of the world, still remains
quasi-unkown. Phenomenology aims to discover the essential (transcenden-
tal) conditions of consciousness. It is precisely an investigation on the all-
encopassing universe of consciousness, where everything is somehow connected,
but none of these connections are immediately visible. Furthermore, phenomenol-
ogy aims to identify the universal laws and conditions of consciousness and not
only to describe it. But phenomenology is not only a technique of conscious-
ness, as for example psychology is. Phenomenology is a philosophy that starts
from the investigation on the inner ultimate conditions of consciousness but
then aims to the solution of more general philosophical problems like that of
reason. Phenomenology is essentially and intrinsically transcendental philoso-
phy, since it discovers the ultimate transcendental conditions of consciousness.
Not only the conditions of knowledge or those of the constitution and combi-
nations of acts, but the transcendental conditions of consciousness itself.
All these elements make it not only difficult but perhaps impossible to
define a unique and particular phenomenology. What is important is then to
single out a fixed point around which one can develop a phenomenological
investigation, a fixed point from which one can start. In this case, the fixed
point is the phenomenological theory of knowledge.
Phenomenological Questions. In philosophy, it is important to pose the
questions one intends to answer in the right way. Let me try to simply list
the questions that I try to answer in this study. What does it mean that we
know something in the phenomenological perspective? What is really Husserl’s
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theory of knowledge? What are the differences between the theory of knowledge
of the Logical Investigation and that of the last period of Husserl’s philosophical
work? What are the conditions of Husserl’s definition of knowledge, and in
which sense are they also transcendental? What is Husserl’s theory of genetic
constitution and how is it articulated? What is the relation between logic in
its various forms and the phenomenological method? Given Husserl’s theory of
knowledge, what are the fundamental features of consciousness? All these items
represent general philosophical questions, to which one can give an answer in
phenomenological philosophy. My attempt is not to analyze Husserl’s work,
but rather to answer this philosophical questions starting from the Husserlian
approach.
Phenomenology and the Problem of Knowledge. The problem of knowl-
edge is a crucial problem not only of phenomenology, but of philosophy as a
whole. The answer to the question about what and how we can know is the
preliminary question for all other field of philosophical investigation. One can
think for example of Kant’s first Critique, where the answer to this question
is preliminary for all the discussion of the tasks and features of pure reason.
In phenomenology this is even more important. In fact, what we know be-
comes stable in consciousness and offers the possibility to investigate on the
conditions of consciousness. In what follow, I start from the question about
knowledge, but I try to identify two transcendental conditions of conscious-
ness itself (of consciousness as a whole, not only theoretical consciousness).
Starting from the question about what and how we can know, I single out
the two transcendental conditions of consciousness: the synthetical structure
of consciousness (at the basis of which there is the synthesis of time as funda-
mental formal synthesis) and the openness of the consciousness to the world.
These two are present in some forms at all the level of genetic constitution.
In other words, albeit phenomenology is not exclusively theory of knowledge,
this latter is the first step for the rest of the phenomenological investigation,
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since it allows to identify the transcendental conditions of knowledge.
The epistemological Dualism. The negative reference point for this work
is what I call the epistemological dualism. This is the rigid separation, which
is present in modern forms of theory of knowledge (according to me also in
Kant)3, between understanding and sensibility. These two are seen as two dif-
ferent sources of knowledge. The former is synthetic, whereas the second is
merely receptive and requires the syntheses of the first one in order to obtain
some fixed order.
Phenomenology has the merit of overcoming this dualism. Sensibility and
understanding are now on the same transcendental plane. Not only Husserl
moves the axis of the synthesis in sensibility, but he is also able to show which
the syntheses of sensibility are. Moreover, he is able to show that the synthe-
ses of the understanding find their origin in the syntheses of sensibility and
this because both ultimately refer to the synthesis of time, which is at the
basis of Husserl’s constitution. The overcoming of the epistemological dualism
would already be possible in the discussion of categorial intuition, of which I
try to give an original reading. But the effective overcoming of it is obtained
only within genetic phenomenology, where Husserl is able to show the inner
structure of consciousness.
Genetic phenomenology and theory of knowledge. Genetic constitu-
tion is not only the representation of the inner structure of consciousness at all
its levels. Genetic constitution is also theory of knowledge, i.e. the transforma-
tion (the development) and the deepening of the theory of knowledge of the
Sixth Logical Investigation. It is a vertical theory of knowledge that ‘explains’
3To be noticed that in what follows I do not really refer to Kant, but to a particular
‘Kantian theory of knowledge’, i.e. to a particular ‘reading’ of the first Critique. According
to this, which is a legitimate reading but not the only possible, in Kant we have two different
separate sources of knowledge: on the one side sensibility (passive receptivity); on the other
side understanding. A fundamental role is played by the synthesis of imagination that has
the task of ‘joining’ and making homogeneous the two sources cf. below, ch. 4.
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and singles out the most essential conditions of the theory of knowledge of
the Sixth Logical Investigation. Genetic constitution is a constitution of sec-
ond degree, through which it is possible to show which the conditions for the
horizontal constitution of the Logical Investigations are. What is important,
but often remains neglected, is that genetic phenomenology is still somehow
theory of knowledge. As a result, there is an intrinsic particular connection be-
tween static and genetic phenomenology that makes all the discussions about
the ‘continuity’ or ‘discontinuity’ between the two methods meaningless.
In static phenomenology – in the phenomenology of the Logical Investi-
gations – the basis of Husserl’s theory of knowledge is based on the schema
empty act of meaning–fulfillment in the act of intuition. By contrast, in genetic
phenomenology the proper origin of this schema is explained. In particular, the
structures of sensibility that guarantees the lawfulness of the proper structures
of sensibility are those that provide sensibility with its characteristic fulness.
Two important moments of genetic constitution in which this can be seen are
affection and explication. In the first, it is possible to identify the peculiar di-
alectic structure and succession of the moment of the presence and that of the
synthesis, i.e. of the two characteristic moments of consciousness. Through the
second, it is possible to fully appreciate a micro analysis (a genetic analysis
that makes clear the ultimate conditions) of perception. In this the particular
role of the synthesis of time is clear and brings to different form of perception.
Furthermore, it is clear what it means for Husserl that the logical categories
find their origin in pre-predicative experience.
Phenomenological theory of knowledge is composed of two parts: first, the
phenomenological method; second, the particular form of logic in the frame of
which the phenomenological method works. We have consequently the follow-
ing couple: pure logic–static phenomenology and transcendental logic–genetic
phenomenology. What I try to stress is the particular connection between the
method and the logic. In fact, logic and methods are not the same thing,
although they are strictly and intrinsically connected.
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Time. In this work the question of time is a central one, albeit it is not the
proper focus of the discussion. A central thesis of this work is that time is
the ‘measure’ of the constitution. This means that time remains in some form
in all the levels of constitution, starting from the original synthesis of time,
which is purely formal and represents the basis to which the other syntheses
refer. The forms of time indicate the different levels of constitution. Good
examples of this function of time are the particular orientation toward the
future in affection and the diverse modifications of the retaining in grasp that
characterizes explication and contemplative perceptions. Together with the
necessary presence of the thing itself, time is the transcendental condition
of consciousness. In particular it is the ‘internal’ transcendental condition of
consciousness, i.e. the a priori origin of the synthetical form of consciousness.
Phenomenology and ‘decomposition’. A fundamental feature of phe-
nomenology is stressed in this work. This is the particular power of phe-
nomenology to ‘decompose’ the monolithic traditional concept of philosophy.
Indeed, phenomenology translates the traditional notions and relations estab-
lished in the course of European philosophy and makes for them a more detailed
analysis possible, through a new more precise and powerful philosophical lan-
guage. Examples of such fundamental operations that are considered in this
work are the following notions and couples of notions: synthesis; intuition; for-
mality; materiality; formal logic; form/matter; empty/full; meaning/intuition;
passivity/activity; present/absent and so on. All these notions and relations,
that in traditional philosophy are treated as unitary problems, become in phe-
nomenology the title for more complex and articulated ‘micro-problems’. In
this sense, phenomenology is to be thought of as a philosophy of the ‘decom-
position’. Sensibility/Understanding is to be considered the general title of this
series of problems.
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Sensibility and Understanding. Sensibility and understanding are the
two synthetical poles of consciousness. They have in common an original syn-
thetical structure, but their syntheses work in a very different way. The syn-
theses of sensibility work in the presence (with a certain degree of presence) of
the object and are unrepeatable, unstable but very rich in vivacity, details and
information. By contrast, the syntheses of understanding are repeatable as the
same, but they work in absence of the object4. They are less vivid and provide
less information, although this is stable and always repeatable without loss
of information. Furthermore, these syntheses can be formally combined in the
form of the form of the derivation. The particular dialectic between sensibility
and understanding, both from a macro (static) and a micro (genetic) perspec-
tive are the focus of the present study. It could be said that, whereas Kant’s
critical philosophy teaches us that there is no knowledge without an ‘interplay’
of sensibility and understanding, Husserl’s phenomenology shows us in detail
how this ‘interplay’ work. Starting from a problem of theory of knowledge,
Husserl is able to single out a very dynamic structure of consciousness, which
is based on two transcendental conditions. Among other things, two problems
are important for a further development of this study. First, a new compari-
son to Kant and a detailed investigation on the nature of time and its role in
constitution. Second, an investigation that leads phenomenology outside phe-
nomenology, i.e. that could concretely make phenomenology something more
than theory of knowledge.
4This means that in the understanding the same synthetical process, with the same result,
can be repeated and not only a similar one.
Chapter 1
Knowledge in the Logical
Investigations
1.1 The notion of pure Logic in the Prolegom-
ena
The opening problem of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen (LU) is among
his interests already in the Philosophie der Arithmetik1. This is a question
that stems from an investigation on philosophy of mathematics but actually
concerns the deductive systems of the sciences, namely those sets of ‘rational
systems’ (and laws) that confer to a theory – to a set of knowledge – the
peculiar status of scientific theory. At a higher level, this same rationality allows
to establish the articulation and the consistency of every singular science in a
broader frame, that of ‘knowledge in general’. In a few words, the same that
Husserl uses in the first preface to LU, this is a problem of ‘inadequacy’, i.e.
inadequacy of logic as it has historically developed to satisfy its historical task:
Was nach der Darstellungen der traditionellen oder wie immer re-
formierten Logik hätte leicht verständlich und durchsichtig erscheinen
müssen, nämlich das rationale Wesen der deduktiven Wissenschaft mit
ihrer formalen Einheit und symbolischen Methodik, stellte sich mir beim
Studium der wirklich gegebenen deduktiven Wissenschaften dunkel und
problematisch dar ([Hua XVIII], Vorwort I, p. 5).
1On the Logical Investigations see: [Mohanty, 1977], [Zahavi, 1992], [Dahlstrom, 2003],
[Fisette, 2003], [Mayer, 2008], [Fisette and Lapointe, 2003], [Sokolowski, 1971].
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This problem is immediately to be recognized as a problem of theory
of knowledge. According to Husserl, the traditional logic, but also the logic
founded on psychology typical of his time, cannot be a theory of knowledge.
In other words, it cannot play any role, neither in the clarification of the unity
that characterizes particular sciences as rational systems, nor regarding the
correctness of the methods of the single sciences and their position in the
broader frame of human knowledge.
Later on, Husserl mentions two issues that led him to a new survey, whose
aim is precisely to bring logic back to its ‘original’ vocation as theory of science:
on the one hand, a certain formal feature of arithmetic, i.e. the demand for
a sort of formality also in the field of theory of knowledge, on the model of
arithmetical formality; on the other hand, the inadequacy of the psychological
approach (with respect to the foundation of the sciences as well as of logic
in general) that Husserl himself adopted in the Philosophy of Arithmetic with
regard to the explanation of the origin of mathematical objects. One could
say that mathematics offers to Husserl the ‘measure of the formality’, i.e.
it indicates a safe way through which one can access theory of knowledge. In
fact, the first issue concerns the possibility to extend to the broader field of the
theory of knowledge two features typical of formal mathematics: the possibility
of the generalizations and the formal transformations of arithmetic. Indeed,
these two elements allow mathematics to overcome the field of pure quantities,
i.e. they make mathematics not only a pure science of quantities, but also a
qualitative formal science of relations.
The second issue concerns a problem of foundation: the single sciences,
their structure and unity, are to be founded on a more stable, definitive and
universal ground than their own particular methods. This is in fact the task of
pure logic as universal doctrine of science, which can justify and provide the
ultimate explanation of the most basic principles of science, as the notions of
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truth, evidence, scientific laws, form and so on2. From the questions on the
‘general essence of mathematics‘ and the related problem of justifying and
explaining the origin of mathematical entities, Husserl moves to the analysis
of theory of knowledge or, with his own words:
Naturgemäß mußte ich von hier aus weiter fortschreiten zu den fun-
damentaleren Fragen nach dem Wesen der Erkenntnisform im Unter-
schiede von der Erkenntnismaterie und nach dem Sinn des Unterschiedes
zwischen formalen (reinen) und materialen Bestimmungen, Wahrheiten,
Gesetzen ([Hua XVIII], Vorwort I, p. 6).
In the Preface of the Prolegomena we already find the most important ele-
ments of the Husserlian enterprise: the criticism to psychologism, the demand
for a foundation of the sciences, the question of the unity of deductive systems,
the critique of logic as a particular method or discipline, the guiding role of
the formality of mathematics. All these elements, as Husserl tells us, are part
of a general critical reflection on the essence of logic and ultimately on the
relationship between the subjectivity of the knowing and the objectivity of
the contents of what is known3. In fact, for Husserl the investigation on the
foundation of the unity of knowledge implies the reconciliation of the subjec-
2One finds here two instances that lead the most part of the Husserlian investigation (not
only in the development of LU, but also in later phenomenology): the demand for formality
and generality that could provide a common and safe basis for the foundation of the sciences,
i.e. the need to justify the unity of the sciences through a more general unity guaranteed
by a pure and formal discipline. The development of Husserl’s thought, this continuous
and uninterrupted exploration of consciousness, is by no means linear, never complete or
accomplished. But these two elements that we find thematized in the Prolegomena and
founded through the following six investigations, will always be two dominant characters
of phenomenology: the orientation toward a pure all encompassing logic and the aversion
to various forms of reduction of theory of knowledge to empirical or merely psychological
theory.
3“Allgemeinen kritischen Reflexionen über das Wesen der Logik und zumal über das
Verhältnis zwischen der Subjektivität des Erkennens und der Objektivität des Erkennt-
nisinhaltes gedrängt.” ([Hua XVIII], Vorvort I, p. 7). All these elements are part of the
general task of the LU, namely the attempt to reconcile the ideal and the real, the sub-
jective and the objective in knowledge and, more particularly, in theoretical knowledge. It
is precisely on this point that psychologism fails, since the psychologists: “verkennen die
grundwesentlichen und ewig unüberbrückbaren Unterschiede zwischen Idealgesetz und Re-
algesetz, zwischen normierender Regelung und kausaler Regelung, zwischen logischer und
realer Notwendigkeit, zwischen logischem Grund und Realgrund. Keine denkbare Abstufung
vermag zwischen Idealem und Realem Vermittlungen herzustellen.” ([Hua XVIII], §22, p.
80).
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tive side and the objective side of knowledge4. Precisely in this reconciliation,
the psychologist fails, tipping the balance on the side of the mere (empirical)
subjective formation of the idealities.
In the Introduction to the Prolegomena, after the description of the situ-
ation of the contemporary philosophy of logic in terms of a “bellum omnium
contra omnes” (cf. [Hua XVIII], §1), Husserl tries to put toghether all the
istances of the Preface in a more detailed description of the purpose of the
Prolegomena:
In der Tat hofft die folgende Untersuchung es deutlich zu machen,
daß die bisherige und zumal die psychologisch fundierte Logik der Gegen-
wart den eben erörterten Gefahren fast ausnahmslos unterlegen ist, und
daß durch die Mißdeutung der theoretischen Grundlagen und durch die
hieraus erwachsene Gebietsvermengung der Fortschritt in der logischen
Erkenntnis wesentlich gehemmt worden ist5.
Whereas the quotations above were addressed to the LU as a whole, this
passage is referred to the Prolegomena and to the role of this text in the broader
framework of the LU. It might be worth to notice two things: on the one hand,
the negative character of the Prolegomena. Indeed, they are to be considered
as the pars destruens of the LU, where Husserl criticizes psychologism and lays
the groundwork for his own theoretical proposal. On the other hand, in this
operation of deconstruction, Husserl must already have in mind, at least as a
guiding idea, what will take the place of the criticized theory. This is in my view
one of the most important roles of the notion of pure logic in the Prolegomena.
In fact, it cannot find its proper foundation in this part of the text, since
4This is at the basis of the following discussion on kategoriale Anschauung and, in Hus-
serl’s later investigation on genealogy of logic, will culminate in the characteristic two-
sideness of logic, which on the one side is formal logic, but on the other side has also a
subjective side.
5[Hua XVIII], §2, p. 22. The dangers that Husserl mentions here are those already ex-
plained in the previous part of the paragraph, i.e. the danger of the confusion of the limits
and fields of the sciences (Gebietsvermengung, die Vermischung von Heterogenem zu einer
vermeintlichen Gebietseinheit) (cf. [Hua XVIII], §2, p. 22.). Very meaningful, for the present
discussion, is that Husserl in this same paragraph quotes Kant: “Speziell in Beziehung auf
die Logik hat Kant das berühmte Wort ausgesprochen, das wir uns hier zu eigen machen : ‘Es
ist nicht Vermehrung, sondern Verunstaltung der Wissenschaften, wenn man ihre Grenzen
ineinanderlauf en läßt’ ” ([Hua XVIII], §2, p. 22).
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there is need of the concrete phenomenological foundation of the notions of
evidence and truth, which will come only with the accomplishment of the
single investigations and in particular with the Sixth Investigation. However,
as we see in chapter XI, in the Prolegomena Husserl has already a quite precise
idea of what pure logic is and how its structure is to be thought of. It should
be added that this structure remains the same in the later investigation on the
genealogy of logic (cf. below, 2.5).
In the next paragraph Husserl’s purpose is made clearer and presented
through a succession of four important questions:
1. Ob die Logik eine theoretische oder eine praktische Disziplin (eine
„Kunstlehre”) sei.
2. Ob sie eine von anderen Wissenschaften und speziell von der Psy-
chologie oder Metaphysik unabhängige Wissenschaft sei.
3. Ob sie eine formale Disziplin sei, oder, wie es gef aßt zu werden
pflegt, ob sie [es] mit der „bloßen Form der Erkenntnis” zu tun
oder auch auf deren „Materie” Rücksicht zu nehmen habe.
4. Ob sie den Charakter einer apriorischen und demonstrativen oder
den einer empirischen und induktiven Disziplin habe ([Hua XVIII],
§3, p. 23).
This is the framework within which Husserl develops his interests in the
Prolegomena: the criticism to psychologism aims to find an answer to all these
complementary questions. In fact, the sense of the notion of pure logic that
Husserl is seeking in his investigation can be obtained by following the thread
of the first of the two alternatives that every of the four questions presents6.
6A detailed investigation would require to analyze all the questions both independently
and in their correlation with the others. In particular, the third question is problematic.
Indeed, at a first glance it could seem clear that pure logic must be a purely formal discipline.
In fact, this is also Husserl’s idea in LU. However, and this will be clear with the transition
from pure logic to transcendental logic (i.e. with the full discovery of the subjective side of
logic) theory of science cannot be only purely formal, but it must have to do with some
particular contents (matter of knowledge). These are not the contents (matter) of the single
sciences, but the ‘contents’ of those pre-conditions for the foundation (genealogy) of logic
that are to be found already in pre-predicative experience. In this sense, transcendental logic
also deals with the ‘contents’ of knowledge.
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1.1.1 Incompleteness and foundation of the sciences
Single sciences are incomplete, even mathematics, physics and astronomy make
no exception, though they are are characterized by a formal and rigorous
method. These sciences too cannot carry out all the tasks of clarification re-
quired by a truly rational system of knowledge. With Husserl’s metaphor, as
an active artist cannot explain and make clear the principles of his art (cf.
[Hua XVIII], §4), the scientist (i.e. science within the partiality of its particu-
lar method) cannot shed light on the principles of his science7:
Wir meinen hier nicht die bloße Unvollständigkeit, mit der sie [the
single sciences] die Wahrheiten ihres Gebietes erforschen, sondern den
Mangel an innerer Klarheit und Rationalität, die wir unabhängig von
der Ausbreitung der Wissenschaft fordern müssen. In dieser Hinsicht
darf auch die Mathematik, die fortgeschrittenste aller Wissenschaften,
eine Ausnahmestellung nicht beanspruchen ([Hua XVIII], §4, p. 26).
It is therefore necessary to draw new attention to the questions of principle
(cf. [Hua XVIII], §2), to the question regarding those principles that legiti-
mate the correctness of the single scientific theories. Whereas psychology and
traditional metaphysics fail, logic as Wissenschaftslehre, as a discipline that
can found and justify the principles on which all the individual sciences are
ultimately based, can be successful. Logic is therefore to be thought of as a
discipline that makes theoretically complete the single sciences, providing an
ultimate justification of the principles on which their methods are founded. To
say it in other words, the object of pure logic is properly what makes it possible
for a mere complex of knowledge (a mere unification of partial knowledge) to
be really a science. This is in fact the possibility of extending the ‘evidence’
that characterizes the most simple parts of a certain theory to the more com-
plex and abstract consequences (derivations) of that same theory. Only pure
7This is not to say that sciences need philosophy (theory of knowledge) in order to work or
to be successful with their own investigations. By contrast, this means that only philosophy
(phenomenology as a universal Wissenschaftslehre) can justify and explain some notions and
principles – like those of evidence, law, truth – that are fundamental and necessary for every
science. These principles and notions are general and hold for all rational and deductive
systems.
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logic can justify those laws that allow to maintain evidence and truth within
the deductive systems of the single sciences. And this is in fact what ensures
the deductive systems to have their proper form of unity. Moreover, pure logic
aims also at the explanation of the general notions of evidence and truth, of
which evidence and truth of the single theories are a special case.
In order to have scientific knowledge (real knowledge) the mere knowing
based on a simple evidence is not sufficient. By contrast, there is need of a
‘systematic theoretical nexus’, i.e. of a foundation (Begrundung)8:
Zum Wesen der Wissenschaft gehört also die Einheit des Begrün-
dungszusammenhanges, in dem mit den einzelnen Erkenntnissen auch
die Begründungen selbst und mit diesen auch die höheren Komplexio-
nen von Begründungen, die wir Theorien nennen, eine systematische
Einheit erhalten. Ihr Zweck ist es eben, nicht Wissen schlechthin, son-
dern Wissen in solchem Ausmaße und in solcher Form zu vermitteln, wie
es unseren höchsten theoretischen Zielen in möglichster Vollkommenheit
entspricht ([Hua XVIII], §6, p. 30).
Pure Logic deals with foundations because foundations are what allow the
passage from merely knowing something (Wissen schlechthin) to the ‘Knowl-
edge’ (Kenntnis) of that something. But there is also a further transition from
the single sciences to Wissenschaftslehre. Indeed, this represents a more gen-
eral discipline that allow to put order among the foundations of the single
sciences and consequently to establish relations among them according to uni-
versal laws. For example, mathematics as rational knowledge is founded on
certain principles, physics on others9. But the principles of mathematics are
in a certain sense more general than those of physics, since physics adopts
8In [LI] one finds grounded validation for Begrundung. “Systematischer Zusammenhang
im theoretischen Sinne”, which I translate with “systematic theoretical nexus” is: “system-
atic coherence in the theoretical sense”. In general, I use “nexus of foundation” for “Be-
gründungszusammenhang” and “nexus” for “Zusammenhang”. Cf. [Hua XVIII], §7, which is
entirely devoted to this question. In particular, one finds here the three main characteristics
of foundations: 1) they have the character of fixed structures with respect to their content,
2) each foundation has a unique and peculiar character, both in relation to its form and to
its content, 3) they have no essential reference to a particular field of knowledge, i.e. they
are general and universal.
9As already noticed, mathematics is very important for Husserl. As FTL will show,
mathematics is formal ontology, i.e. or from another perspective formal logic “ontologically
oriented” (cf. below 2.7).
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some of them together with its own more particular principles. The order of
generality of the principles on which deductive sciences are founded, as well as
their ultimate foundation, can only be the task of pure logic (cf. [Hua XVIII],
§8). To put it simply, we deal here with a particular hierarchy: actual knowing
provided with simple evidence; possibility of extending evidence through a nexus
of foundation (i.e. establishing the unity of a particular theory); articulation of
the order of the nexus in a doctrine of the sciences and ultimate justification
of them.
From now on, the Prolegomena continue with the radical criticism of log-
ical psychologism. By means of specific and targeted argumentations, Husserl
shows that the theory of science can be neither based on psychology nor jus-
tified through a phsychological approach. According to my attempt to draw a
profile of pure logic, let me skip to the ch. XI of the Prolegomena10.
1.1.2 The idea of pure Logic
Husserl wants to reach at least a ‘temporary idea’ (a guiding idea, vorläufiges
Bild) of the aim of the following Investigations that follow (cf. [Hua XVIII],
ch. XI, p. 230). We are now at the last stage of that process of demolition that
animates the Prolegomena: in addition to the critical and negative inquiry on
psychologism that animated the previous part of the text, one finds now a
clearer, although not entirely positive and developed idea of what pure logic
is and how it is structured. The chapter has a very particular development, it
is very dense and it might be worth to point out the main steps. In the first
part (§§62-66), Husserl speaks in general of pure logic in relation to the unity
of scientific theories, bringing to light some aspects that in chapter 1 remained
only implicit. In the second part (§§67-72), Husserl describes in detail (from a
technical point of view) the tasks of pure logic, pointing out the three layers
10Before considering this final chapter one should also consider ch. X, which is of vital
importance. Here Husserl compares his position with that of the great logicians of the past.
Mostly important is the relation to Kant and Leibniz. Following this discussion, however,
would lead us a little too far.
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of its composition.
Husserl is still interested in what makes it possible for a science to be a
science, i.e. in that particular interconnection (Zusammenhang) (objective or
ideal) that confers to the different single and particular parts of a science a uni-
tary reference to the object of the science itself and, consequently, an ideal va-
lidity of that theory (cf. [Hua XVIII], §62). In order to make this passage clear,
one must explain what the term interconnection means. According to Husserl,
there are two possible meanings of the term: “Der Zusammenhang der Sachen,
auf welche sich die Denkerlebnisse (die wirklichen oder möglichen) intentional
beziehen, und auf der anderen Seite der Zusammenhang der Wahrheiten, in-
dem die sachliche Einheit als das, was sie ist, zur objektiven Geltung kommt”
([Hua XVIII], §62 p. 231). In other words, Husserl identifies two kinds of unity
that are actually inseparable, or separable only by abstraction. Interconnection
of the things and interconnection of the truths are inseparable but not iden-
tical, and therefore still distinguishable. Both these forms of unity are given
(are the proper character of) in the act of judging or, more precisely, in the
act of knowledge (cf. §62).
With act of knowledge one refers to the objective interconnection and deals
with objectualities (cf. §62). In particular, in the most basic form of knowl-
edge (judging with evidence) the objectuality is somehow co-given originally
(cf. 2.5.3). That the object is effectively known (erkannt), and not merely in-
tended (merely judged), means “daß er so ist, ist aktuell gewordene Wahrheit,
vereinzelt im Erlebnis des evidenten Urteils” ([Hua XVIII], §62, p. 232). Then,
through an abstractive idealization (ideirende Abstraktion) one can single out
the notion of truth itself. In other words, in judging with evidence one deals
with the interconnection of things but indirectly also with interconnection of
truths, which can be isolated only in an abstract way, in order to obtain “die
Wahrheit als das ideale Korrelat des flüchtigen subjektiven Erkenntnisaktes,
als die eine gegenüber der unbeschränkten Mannigfaltigkeit möglicher Erken-
ntnisakte und erkennender individuen” ([Hua XVIII], §62, p. 232).
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In light of this, science can be understood as a system within which ‘the
truth is unified’, i.e. where the single truths are taken to a certain unity through
a system of laws. This argumentation, which is based on the correlation be-
tween truth and objectivity, is precisely the explicit form of the previous dis-
course on the ‘extension of the evidence’ of a single moment of knowledge to
the whole system of knowledge, that is to the validity of the theory. In other
words, science is a sort of projection of the basic act of knowing at a higher
level of the hierarchy of knowledge and it is characterized by a particular in-
terconnection that, from one perspective is the interconnection of truths (the
truth unified with respect to whole system of the particular science); from the
other is the interconnection of the things (i.e. the particular unity of the field
of the science).
We have scientific knowledge only insofar we have a foundation, i.e. if we
can show with evidence that the premisses of a particular science are regulated
by certain laws, which are conform to the general principles of pure logic. This,
and the lawfulness of the transmission of evidence within the single systems,
guarantees that the particular truths of a science are valid. In other words, at
the basis of a scientific theory, as nexus of foundation, there are some general
truths (evidences) that in turn need some more general laws in order to be
justified. These laws, according to their own essence, cannot be justified in that
particular scientific theory. They are, using Husserl terminology, fundamental
laws:
Die systematische Einheit der ideal geschlossenen Gesamtheit von
Gesetzen, die in einer Grundgesetzlichkeit als auf ihrem letzten Grund
ruhen und aus ihm durch systematische Deduktion entspringen, ist die
Einheit der systematisch vollendeten Theorie. Die Grundgesetzlichkeit
besteht hierbei entweder aus inem Grundgesetz oder aus einem verband
homogener Grundgesetze ([Hua XVIII], §63, p. 234).
In order to conclude this discourse on the validity of scientific theories, it
is still necessary to distinguish between those principles that are essential for
the unity of the science and those that are not. From another perspective, this
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means to distinguish between different kinds of science: abstract (theoretical),
concrete sciences and normative sciences (cf. §64). In this distinction, the first
kind has also a theoretical priority and allow the justification of the principles of
the other two kinds of system. Pure Logic, that purely logical theory whose aim
is the foundation of the possibility of a theory, is then the discipline in which
the basic principles and laws of theoretical sciences find their justification. In
other words, the final task of pure logic as Wissenschaftslehre is to find out
the nexus of foundation of the sciences, i.e. to justify the possibility of the
deduction in general as well as of those purely formal and primitive principles
that make deductions possible. This means, from another perspective, to found
truth (and evidence) in general.
At the end of the Prolegomena we find the internal division of pure logic in
three parts and the description of the peculiar tasks of these (Cf. [Hua XVIII],
ch. XI )11. This structure of formal logic remains substantially the same also
in FTL, but whereas in LU Husserl is accessing phenomenology through the
question of the meaning and the explanation of the act of knowledge, in FTL he
will access phenomenology (that now is transcendental phenomenology) start-
ing from the formality of logic itself, i.e. through a particular way of explaining
the structure of the judgment from a genetic perspective. The LU, although
they have a development that can seem distant from the programmatic decla-
ration of the Prolegomena, aim to the clarification of the fundamental structure
of pure logic through the phenomenological foundation of the notion of ‘mean-
ing’ and ‘knowledge’. From this perspective, LU VI is the most important place,
where all the results of the previous Untersuchungen are collected and used to
explain how the act of knowledge work. These results are now considered in a
new light 12, in order to explain how the contraposition between subjective and
11I will not discuss this division now because it will return, although in a slightly different
form, in FTL. Cf. [Hua XVII]; below, 2.5 and App. fig. 2.
12Especially the results of the First and Fifth Investigation, respectively on the notion of
meaning and on the structure of consciousness and of intentional act. But also the result of
the Third on parts and wholes. cf. [Sokolowski, 1971] on the four tasks of LU.
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ideal can be overcome in the act of knowledge, by means of a particular inter-
play (a particular dynamis) of understanding (act of meaning) and sensibility
(act of intuition).
1.2 Husserl and the epistemological Dualism
The ‘story’ that Husserl tells us and the contents of LU VI are impossible
to grasp in one glance13. On the contrary it is quite easy to get lost in the
discussion, which is long, articulated and very complex. Not only it is difficult
to follow the detailed analyses of the investigation, but sometimes it is also
problematic to keep in view what Husserl is precisely aiming to. It appears
even more difficult to place the analysis in the whole Husserlian project14.
The risk is that LU VI loses some of its strength and its real meaning is
misunderstood. On the contrary, this is one of the key points of the whole
Husserlian philosophy. In order to avoid confusions one needs to find some
reference points to keep always in mind. What is precisely the aim of LU VI?
Which are its fundamental passages?
The title of the Investigation is already of some help: “Elemente einer
phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis”. It seems clear that the Husser-
lian analysis focuses here mainly on knowledge. Going on through the text, one
can immediately notice that the investigation is divided in two parts. The first
part is entitled: “Die objectivirenden Intentionen und Erfüllungen. Die Erken-
ntnis als Synthesis der Erfüllung und ihre Stufen. Here one finds a further
bifurcation. First, Husserl focuses on two correlative topics. On the one side,
13I am not pursuing a complete analysis of RL VI, since this would require an inde-
pendent discussion. On LU VI see: [Sokolowski, 1974]; [Bernet, 1988]; [Sokolowski, 2003];
[Bernet, 2008]; [Lohmar, 2008a], ch. 2-3.
14As Sokolowski writes: “The Logical Investigations seem to be a loosely connected series
of studies. The appearance of disconnection is illusory and has two causes: Husserl goes
into such exhaustive detail in examining aspects of his main themes that the identity of
the theme itself can easily be forgotten; and he sometimes circuitously approaches his own
position through examination and correction of other opinions, many of which are now less
known and of minor importance” ([Sokolowski, 1971], p. 319). This holds in particular for
LU VI, which can be considered as the core of convergence of the analyses that animate the
previous Investigations.
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he deals with two particular kinds of intentional act: the objectifying acts and
the acts of fulfillment. On the other side, he properly deals with the question
of knowledge. In particular, it is very interesting to notice that already the
title of the first part of LU VI provides a powerful definition of knowledge:
knowledge is a synthesis, a synthesis of fulfillment. Moreover, knowledge has
different degrees.
The second part of the investigation is entitled “Sinnlichkeit und Verstand”.
In these two terms, one finds the echo of the classical (modern) investigations
in theory of knowledge. These two terms are, from Descartes to Kant, the ti-
tles of a peculiar dualism. Both sensibility and understanding have been seen
as essential components of knowledge albeit as components of a very different
type. The problem was to provide an explanation of how these two components
could be combined in knowledge, given the fact that in the traditional philoso-
phy they had always been considered as two heterogenous sources. It might be
worthy to stress that in the context of LU VI the discussion on sensibility and
understanding comes after the discussion on knowledge, i.e. after a discourse
on what knowledge is and in which a precise, clear and exhaustive definition
of knowledge is provided. In other words, whereas, for example in Kant, sen-
sibility and understanding are the initial points on which the discourse on
knowledge is built, here the relation between sensibility and understanding is
investigated in the light of a very precise definition of knowledge. Indeed, at
the very beginning of the investigation, Husserl attempts to answer directly
the question: what is knowledge?
In LU, it often happens that in small and quick passages Husserl explains
clearly his project and says in advance how this will be developed. This is the
case for the Introduction to LU VI where one can find important reference
points. Among other things, Husserl here declares what he did not achieve in
the previous Investigations, and particularly in LU V, i.e. the clarification of the
logical concepts of presentation (Vorstellung) and judgment (Urteil)15. Indeed,
15Cf. LU VI, Einleitung, [Hua XIX/2], p. 538. In other words, Husserl is speaking of the
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the final result of LU V was the individuation of different forms of presentation,
which were commonly confused in the philosophical tradition (cf. 1.3.5 and
App. fig. 1). However, this discovery is only a part, though a fundamental and
preliminary one, in Husserl’s new approach to theory of judgments: whereas
LU V was dedicated to the analysis of the general structure of the acts of
consciousness, LU VI can be seen as the application of those analyses to the
particular matter of logic. In other words, Husserl is still trying to supply
all the preliminary elements for the foundation of logic as presented in the
Prolegomena.
The first step in order to develop his project of foundation of pure logic is
that of the full clarification of the idea of (logical) meaning. This was already
the peculiar task of LU I, but now Husserl must reconsider it, in the light of
the results achieved in LU V:
Selbst das näherliegende Ziel, den Ursprung der Idee Bedeutung
klarzulegen, haben wir noch nicht zu erreichen vermocht. Unverkennbar
liegt, und das ist eine wertvolle Einsicht, die Bedeutung der Ausdrücke
im intentionalen Wesen der betreffenden Akte; aber die Frage, was für
Arten von Akten zur Bedeutungsfunktion überhaupt befähigt oder ob
nicht vielmehr Akte jederlei Art in dieser Hinsicht gleichgestellt sind,
ist noch gar nicht erwogen (LU VI, Einleitung, [Hua XIX/2], p. 538).
Pursuing this direction of investigation requires the detailed analysis of the
relationship between the meaning intention and the fulfillment of the meaning
intention. Indeed, this is precisely the topic of the first part of LU VI. To
be noticed that the class of the acts in which one can find the distinction
between empty–fulfilled act is large and it does not coincide with the logical
field in which Husserl is now interested. This latter will be defined by means
of a particular class of acts: in fact, the logical field is defined by means of a
particular class of acts that Husserl calls objectifying acts. What is particular
in this class is that their synthesis of fulfillment is a synthesis of knowledge:
necessity to apply the discoveries of LU V to the field of logic and consequently to the theory
of knowledge.
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Dieses [das logische Gebiet] selbst grenzt sich durch die Besonder-
heit eines Erfüllungsverhältnisses ab. Eine Klasse von Akten – die objek-
tivierenden – sind nämlich gegenüber allen anderen dadurch ausgezeich-
net, daß die in ihre Sphäre gehörigen Erfüllungssynthesen den Charakter
der Erkenntnis, der Identifizierung, der ‘In-Eins-Setzung’ von ‘Überein-
stimmendem’ haben, und demgemäß die Enttäuschungssynthesen den
korrelaten Charakter der ‘Trennung’ von ‘Widerstreitendem’ (LU VI,
Einleitung, [Hua XIX/1], p. 539).
Here one finds already the most interesting aspects of Husserl’s theory of
knowledge. First, the already mentioned definition of knowledge as synthesis
of fulfillment of a particular class of acts. Second, it is interesting to notice
a further equivalence, which can also be seen as a further (parallel) defini-
tion of knowledge, i.e. knowledge is a ‘Identifizierung’, a ‘In-Eins-Setzung’ von
‘Übereinstimmendem’. In other words, Husserl means as knowledge those par-
ticular acts of synthesis of fulfillment that tend to put together (to unify)
what is already somehow concordant, although on two different sides (the side
of meaning and the side of intuition). As I will try to show later, this is what
the synthesis of coincidence will perform.
Another important fact to notice in advance is that not only the pure
signitive acts (the acts of meaning) can have a fulfillment. On the contrary,
intuitions, which constitute for Husserl the class of the fulfilling acts, can have
a fulfillment themselves. This is particularly meaningful, because it shows that
the schema ‘empty intention–fulfillment’ does not hold only for linguistic struc-
tures, i.e. it does not function only in order to explain what the meaning of a
sentence is. By contrast, this is a schema that in Husserl’s view yield a very
particular hierarchy of acts. Every act, even those that function as fulfillment
of other act (intuitions), can have a fulfillment of their own. This yields a very
dynamic structure of acts, which is governed by a structure that is not a simple
two-terms one, as it could seem at the first glance.
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1.2.1 The rediscovery of intuition
In LU VI, Husserl’s project of overcoming the ‘epistemological dualism’ be-
comes clear, not only as a general project, but also as an articulated plan.
It might be useful to present the discourse from another perspective. What
I am going to analyze in full details can be seen as a particular ‘rediscovery’
and redefinition of the role of intuition in the frame of knowledge16. In par-
ticular, the classical opposition between sensibility and understanding is to be
overcome through the particular role that intuition plays in cognition. The ar-
gumentation on categorial intuition is in a certain sense the first manifestation
of this characteristic shift in Husserl’s philosophy that will be then confirmed
in genetic constitution.
Already in RL VI one assists to the defragmentation of the rigid the-
ory within which intuition is a peculiar element (presentation) of sensibility,
through which the knowing subject simply acquires external data. In other
words, Husserl moves from what I would define a ‘horizontal’ conception of
the couple sensibility-understanding / intuition-concepts to a ‘vertical’ one. In
the first case, one has two parallel stems which at some point have to meet each
other in order to provide knowledge. In the second case, one has two ‘layers’
of knowledge which are different from each other but in some way interde-
pendent. Although they maintain their own identity, their different roles, their
peculiar structure and their ‘peculiar contents’, they originally have a ‘sur-
face of contact’, as the discourse about categorial intuition testifies: intuition
is not only simple sensible intuition as it was in the philosophical tradition,
intuition is also categorial, in the sense that it has a proper form and a proper
organization, independently from the laws and syntheses of the understand-
ing. In genetic phenomenology, Husserl will show that some particular kinds
of synthesis are already at work in the passivity of sensibility. Moreover one
16As Cobb-Stevens recalls, the notion of intuition is a primitive and therefore it is prob-
lematic to provide a definition of it. Nonetheless, Husserl is a good guide for such an aim
(cf. [Cobb-Stevens, 1990], p. 44).
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should take into consideration also the role of the notion of type, which provide
a particular form of organization and regularity to pre-categorial experience.
All these elements testify the break with the philosophical tradition, but the
possibility of categorial intuition can be considered the first step of the whole
process of development of the Husserlian theory of knowledge.
1.3 Empty and fulfilled acts
1.3.1 Expression, meaning and knowledge
The fundamental schema on which Husserl builds his theory of knowledge is
that of empty–fullfilled act17. The central idea is that knowledge (Erkenntnis)
consists in a synthesis of coincidence (Deckungssynthesis) between a signitive
intention (Bedeutungsintention) and an intuitive act which have the same in-
tentional essence18.
At the beginning of RL VI, one finds immediately an important passage:
Die Akte können nicht die zu ihnen passenden Formen finden, ohne
daß sie nach Form und Inhalt apperzipiert, erkannt würden. Das Aus-
drücken der Rede liegt also nicht in bloßen Worten, sondern in ausdrück-
enden Akten; diese prägen die korrelaten, durch sie auszudrückenden
Akte in einem neuen Stoff aus, sie schaffen von ihnen einen gedanklichen
Ausdruck, dessen allgemeines Wesen die Bedeutung der betreffenden
Rede ausmacht (LU VI, §1, [Hua XIX/1] 545).
17Cf. [Sokolowski, 1974]. Still in FTL Husserl thinks that this is the most important find-
ings of his philosophy: “Ich finde nicht, daß man der zuerst in den Logischen Untersu-
chungen, II. Teil durchgeführten und in meinen ‘Ideen’ vertieften Klärung der Evidenz und
der ganzen zugehörigen Verhältnisse zwischen bloßer ‘Intention’ und ‘Erfüllung’ eine hinre-
ichende Beachtung geschenkt hätte. Sie ist sicherlich sehr der Vervollkommnung bedürftig,
aber ich glaube doch, in dieser ersten Klärung einen entscheidenden Fortschritt der Phäno-
menologie gegenüber der philosophischen Vergangenheit sehen zu dürfen. Ich bin der sicheren
Oberzeugung, daß erst durch die aus ihr erwachsene Einsicht in das Wesen und die eigentliche
Problematik der Evidenz eine ernstlich wissenschaftliche Transzendentalphilosophie (‘Ver-
nunftkritik’) möglich geworden is [...]” ([Hua XVII], §60, p. 170). Cf [Heffernan, 1989], in
which the author gives a reading of formal logic from this standpoint.
18“Der Grundgedanke von Husserls Erkenntnisphänomenologie lässt sich sehr einfach for-
mulieren: Erkenntnis besteht Husserl zugolge in der Deckungsynthese zwischen einer Bedeu-
tungsintention und einem anschaulichen Akt desselben intentionalen Wesens, aufgrund derer
das im Bedeuten bloß signitiv Gemeinte mit dem Gegenständlichen identifieziert wird, das in
der Anschauung präsentiert und selbst gegeben wird. Die Erkenntnis ist also ein synthetis-
cher Vollzug, in dem zwei Vorstellungen eines Gegenstandes die einen verschiedenen Grad
von Anschaulichkeit aufweisen, durch ein “eigenartige[s] Übergangserlebnis” zur Einheit zu
kommen (582/A521)” ([Rizzoli, 2008], p. 115).
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Husserl distinguishes between two general classes of acts. On the one side,
one finds what Husserl calls, more or less with the same meaning here, ex-
pressive acts (ausdrückenden Akten), thinking expressions (gedanklichen Aus-
druck), thought-forms (gedanklichen Formen). On the other side, one finds
those acts that can represent the ‘object’ to which the acts of the first class
(the expressing act) refer. If one considers the very general meaning of express-
ing19, all the acts belong to this class, because all the acts, and therefore also
the acts that are already acts of expression, can be further expressed, i.e. ex-
pressed in a different form. By contrast, if one considers a more specific sense
of what expressing means, then also the class of acts that are expressions will
be refined and reduced to a particular class of acts of expression that belongs
to the class of the objectifying acts. For the moment, I just intend to notice
that the distinctions that Husserl uses are not absolute, but must be always
framed in a context.
Husserl claims that there is always an act of expression that transforms the
act to which it is referred into an expressive one. This means that for every
kind of act there is the possibility of a correlative act which brings ‘under the
form of expression’ the original one20. Husserl is describing here a particular
process of verbalization. Not only in the sense of assigning words – or particular
names – to the acts of consciousness, but in the sense of giving a meaning to
them, i.e. in the sense of tranforming them in a signitive act21. Considering
19Different meanings of the term expression are already described in LU I. For an ac-
count of Husserl’s theory of language (of meaning and expression) cf. [Mohanty, 1964] and
[Welton, 1983].
20Just before the quoted passage, Husserl says: “Wir können doch Akte jeder Art – Vorstel-
lungen, Urteile, Vermutungen, Fragen, Wünsche usw. – zum Ausdruck bringen, und indem
wir dies tun, liefern sie uns die Bedeutungen der bezüglichen Redeformen, der Namen der
Aussagen, der Frage-, Wunschsätze usw” ([Hua XIX/2], §1, p. 544). In other words, this
means that it is always possible to ‘express’ an act.
21Although every act can be taken to expression in the sense of being somehow verbalized,
not all the acts can be immediately transformed in an ‘authentic expression’ (Ausdruck),
i.e. in an authentic carrier of meaning. However, since all acts can be reduced to some
objectifying act, and this are alway expressible in a proper way, one can conclude that every
act can be expressed. In terms of LU I, “Jedes Zeichen ist Zeichen für etwas, aber nicht jedes
hat eine ‘Bedeutung’, einen ‘Sinn’, der mit dem Zeichen ‘ausgedrückt’ ist. In vielen Fällen
kann man nicht einmal sagen, das Zeichen ‘bezeichne’ das, wofür es ein Zeichen genannt
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the vocabulary that Husserl uses here, and also the strict connection between
the forms of speech and the forms of thinking, this can also be thought of
as a process through which intuitions can be acquired into thought. To put
it differently, every intuitive act can be expressed in a linguistic form (verbal
or in mere thinking) that transforms it into an act that carries a particular
meaning, a meaning that intends the same object as the original act but in a
different way, i.e. in an empty way.
I would like to insist briefly on this point and try to put the question
differently. This will be useful later, when I face directly the question of the
fulfillment of an empty act of meaning. In the rest of LU VI, Husserl focuses
on knowledge as fulfillment of empty intentions, i.e. he insistes on a particular
direction of the schema empty–fulfilling act. This strategy tends to put on
the background some peculiarities of Husserl’s notion of knowledge that are
intrinsically linked to what just said. In particular there are two things that
run the risk of being obscured. First, the fact that it is always possible to
obtain a meaningful expression (a signitive act) starting from an intuition, i.e.
that it is always possible to pass from an intuition (an act that presents things)
to thought, where things are not present but only merely intended. Indeed this
is the direction of the schema empty-fulfilled act that goes from the intuition
to the meaning, i.e. from sensibility to understanding. The possibility of this
direction is as important as the direction of the fulfillment: not only an empty
intention can be fulfilled, but an intuition (which is by its own nature full) can
be, so to say, emptied (made empty), in order to obtain an act of meaning,
i.e. an empty reference to the object. Second, this double movement between
empty and fulfilled intentions entails a characteristic virtuous circularity of
knowledge that often runs the risk of being neglected. It can be articulated in
wird. Und selbst wo diese Sprechweise statthaft ist, ist zu beobachten, daß das Bezeichnen
nicht immer als jenes ‘Bedeuten’ gelten will, welches die Ausdrücke charakterisiert” (LU
I, §1). Husserl establisches here the following relation: sign 6= denotation 6= meaning. In
other words, not all the signs stand for (denotate) something, and not all denotations are real
expressions, i.e. carrier of meaning. To indicate and to signify are for Husserl two different
functions. In particular the general use of expressing is that of indicating.
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the following way.
First, there is not a particular fixed starting point for knowledge, i.e. knowl-
edge does not move either exclusively from the signitive elements or exclusively
from intuitions. To say it differently, neither intuitions nor signitive inten-
tions (thoughts) play a predominant role in the acquisition of knowledge. By
contrast, they have the same importance, they are complementary and both
necessary.
Second, knowledge is a ‘complex process’. Not only because knowledge is
the result of a synthetical integration between intuitions and empty intentions.
In fact, once an intuition is transformed into a signitive intention, this becomes
independent from the intuition, in the sense that it can be further transformed
and developed according the internal rules of the understanding. Indeed, it is
possible to obtain a different signitive intention from another signitive inten-
tion, through a process of complication, modalization or modification, deriva-
tion, complication, abstraction and so on. At this point, the fulfilling intuition
for the new intention cannot be the original one that fulfills the original empty
intention. Nonetheless, in order to have knowledge, it is necessary to fulfill the
new intention as well, it is necessary to ‘verify’ it.
These two points bring to light a very interesting conformation of Husserl’s
theory of knowledge. If one starts from an intuition, then he needs to associate
this intuition to an appropriate linguistic structure. The role of the latter is to
provide a structure of repeatability22 for the intuition, which itself lacks of the
possibility of being repeated and even communicated. Indeed, an intuitive act
can be repeated in the sense of being ‘reproduced’ in intuition. For example,
a perception can be re-presented in imagination or remembering. This is of
course a form of repetition, but in this kind of repetition there is some con-
siderable loss of data, some essential loss of information. To put it differently,
22On repeatability , cf. LU I, §11 and [Sokolowski, 1974]. See also [Sokolowski, 1978]:
“Let us stipulate that ‘reporting’ means making statements about an object which is absent
from our perception, and ‘registration’ means making statements about an object which is
perceptually present” (p. 7).
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intuition is characterized by an intrinsic irrepeatibility and incommunicability
that depends on the vivacity (Lebendigkeit) of perception, i.e. from the fact that
intuitions must always present directly their objects: it is impossible to have
twice the same identical intuition of something23. Considering the complexity
of the phenomenon of perception, even the perception of the same object, is
impossible. Intuitions do not have the possibility of being repeated, but repeti-
tion, the possibility of repeating something and consequently to communicate
something, is a fundamental character of knowledge. On the other side, the
signitive acts (i.e. the acts of expression) can be repeated without any loss of
information or data from repetition to repetition. Empty acts can be repeated,
and hence the whole meaning that they carry is repeated and intended in the
same way. Oppositely, they do not present (nor re-present) the object to which
the meaning is directed, but they merely intend it. Whereas intuitions lack
repeatability, signitive acts lack the object itself, i.e. in the presence of the
object24. It could be interesting to describe the problem through the following
ratio, which recalls the one that Husserl introduces later in LU VI: R = s/i
and correlatively: F = i/s 25.
These remarks I have been presenting are developed in the framework of
23I can have two perception of the same object, but they will never be identical. Also
two images of the same object cannot be identical. Intuition is always connected to variable
factors due to the different degrees of presence of the thing in intuition. This can seem
a paradox, but also in order two compare two perceptions, there is need at some point
something that fixes what I perceive as what I perceive.
24Let me use an example from logic. The signs of language remain empty if not interpreted
in a structure (model). There are of course laws for the combination of language and parts of
the language in mathematics. For example, from a set of axioms and some rules, it is possible
to derives theorems. But until the language is not interpreted in a structure, the combination
of parts of the language does not have a full meaning. One can say for example whether the
manipulation is ‘consistent’ with the rules of the language or not, but not whether this is
true. Indeed, in logic that a theorem (something valid in the language, a derivation) is true
(valid in the structure or in all the structures) is not trivial and there is need of a proof. This
seems to be the situation for knowledge as well: the expressions of the signitive side (the
empty intentions) are meaningful combination of signs, but they do not posses the objects
to which they refer and therefore they do not have a real accomplished meaning, as long as
the object is taken to presence by some kind of intuition.
25In §23 of LU VI. Here, I only mean that repeatability (R) is the result of a combination
of the signitive and the intuitive. The more something is signitive, the more it is repeatable.
This means that the pure signitive acts are purely repeatable. On the contrary, for the Fülle
(F) holds an inverse relation.
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the definition of the class of those acts that can function as carriers of meaning
(Bedeutungsträger). The question to answer is important for the economy of
the schema empty–fulfilled act and goes back to some passages of LU I. What
Husserl has to show is that the acts that can be carriers of meaning belong
to a particular, well-defined class. The first step toward such a definition is to
provide a phenomenological explanation of what a signitive expression – an
act provided with a meaning – is (cf. below, 1.3.2). To be noticed that this is
not only – or better not mainly – a question of philosophy of language. This is
a purely phenomenological matter, because Husserl deals with the definition
of two classes of intentional acts and with their mutual relations. The second
step will be that of identifying the proper place of the meaning between the
expression and the expressed (cf. below, 1.3.3). The final step will consist in
the precise definition of knowledge (cf. below, 1.3.4 and 1.4).
1.3.2 Carriers of meaning
The argument that Husserl refuses is the following: being expressed means
carrying meaning, every act can be expressed, every act is potentially a carrier
of meaning. The key to refuse the argument lies in a particular notion of
expression according to which not all the expressions can be actual carriers
of meaning. Of course, there is a very general sense according to which every
act can be expressed. Indeed, all acts are expressible (ausdrückbar), in the
sense that they can be verbalized, taken to words26, expressed by means of a
complex of words, by a sound-complex (Lautkomplexion). Every kind of act
can be expressed in words and every of them has its proper form of expression,
its proper form of discourse. But the expressions that are obtained in this way
are not carriers of meaning. According to this general sense of expressing, one
says something about the act and perhaps the fact that he experienced the act,
but he does not say anything about the object of the act itself. With Husserl’s
26To be noticed that the previous remarks were already addressed to the analyses of the
relation between signification and intuition.
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own words:
Entweder es sind Akte gemeint, in welchen sich der Sinn, die Bedeu-
tung des betreffenden Ausdrucks konstituiert, oder andererseits Akte,
die der Redende, als von ihm soeben erlebte, prädikativ hinstellen will
([Hua XIX/2], VI, §3, p. 548).
These are two senses in which an act can be expressed27. The first sense is
the one that Husserl is trying to achieve in his analysis. The second sense is the
most general one, the one in which we express an act of our consciousness as
we are experiencing it, saying for example I ask that... in the case of questions,
I desire that... in the case of desire, and so on. In this cases, as Husserl says,
we name the acts that we are experiencing and we announce that we are
experiencing them (cf. [Hua XIX/2], VI, §2). Expressing in this sense is not
conferring a meaning because of the following main reason:
Die Hauptsache ist, daß der Akt, indem er genannt oder sonsterie
„ausgedrückt” wird, als der aktuell gegenwärtige Gegenstand der Rede,
bzw. der ihr zugrunde liegenden objektivierenden Setzung erscheint;
während dies bei den sinngebenden Akten nicht der Fall ist ([Hua XIX/2],
VI, §3, p. 548).
Husserl explains here which the difference between a mere expression and
an expression conferring meaning is. In order to clarify it, let me consider the
following two sentences: 1) the pen on my desk is red; 2) I judge that the pen on
my table is red. From an informal perspective, the difference between the two
sentences is clear. When I hear the former, the first thing I do is to look at the
pen on the table in order to check its color, whether it is really red or not28. On
the contrary, when I hear something like 2), I do not have such a reaction. At
27In LU I, speaking of the informative function of expressions, Husserl says: “Den Sinn
des Prädikates kundgegeben können wir in einem engeren und weiteren Sinne fassen. Den
engeren beschränken wir auf die sinngebenden Akte, während der weitere alle Akte des
Sprechenden befassen mag, die ihm auf Grund seiner Rede (und eventuell dadurch, dai sie
von ihnen aussagt) von dem Hörenden eingelegt werden. So ist z. B., wenn wir über einen
Wunsch aussagen, das Urteil über den Wunsch kundgegeben im engeren, der Wunsch selbst
kundgegeben im weiteren Sinne” ([Hua XIX/1], I, §1, p. 40).
28It is also possible to perform an act of imagination, and try to figure out the pen. In
any case, there is an immediate turn toward an act of intuition. To be noticed that in LU
imagination and perception are still very close. They are both acts of intuition and Husserl
makes no distinction, as he will instead do later, between imagination and phantasy.
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best I will fix on the speaker and I will ask back: why are you sayng that? This
is a very common situation and this is properly what Husserl wants to explain
phenomenologically. In the first case, I am judging on the base of a perception,
I am objectifying something that I can perceive or that I actually perceived,
something that is not in the discourse anymore. In the second case, I am not
objectifying something that I perceived, but the act itself. Better, I am just
bringing the act to the discourse. In this latter case, the act persists in the
discourse, it is still present; the expression of the act itself is the present object
of the sentence. This is why I do not turn to anything else in my reaction, the
object of what I express is already there, it does not refer to anything else than
to a part proper of its own.
What Husserl is interested in, where he properly finds the place of meaning,
is neither a judgment on the act, nor the case in which an act is named or
merely verbalized. On the contrary Husserl is aiming to the judgment grounded
on the acts, i.e. the judgment that does not objectify the act itself, but the
content (object) of the act:
[...] daß ich meiner Wahrnehmung Ausdruck gebe, kann heißen, daß
ich von meiner Wahrnehmung prädiziere, sie habe den oder jenen In-
halt. Es kann aber auch heißen, daß ich mein Urteil aus der Wahr-
nehmung schöpfe, daß ich die betreffende Tatsache nicht nur behaupte,
sondern wahrnehme und sie so behaupte, wie ich sie wahrnehme. Nicht
über die Wahrnehmung, sondern über das Wahrgenommene wird hi-
erbei das Urteil gefällt. Wo man kurzweg von Wahrnehmungsurteilen
spricht, sind in der Regel Urteile dieser eben charakterisierten Klasse
gemeint ([Hua XIX/2], VI, §3, p. 548).
1.3.3 Sinn und Bedeutung
The second step is now to establish in what the meaning of an expression
lies. Before going on with this analysis I would like to make a brief excursus,
in order to clarify some terminological questions29. In the Logische Untersu-
29It is difficult to analyze these passages on the notion of meaning and not to refer to the
work of G. Frege. First of all, there are some historical reasons to think of Frege. Indeed,
the letters between Frege and Husserl are quite famous and gave origin to a large number
of critical contributes, which aim to clarify the influence that Frege had on the develop-
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chungen, Husserl uses the word Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (meaning) almost
as synonymous (Cf. [Hua XIX/1], I, §15). These two terms are used to indicate
the meaning of an expression, i.e. the sense that the expression communicates.
Sinn and Bedeutung are to be opposed to what Husserl calls Gegenstand (ob-
ject) or Gegenständlichkeit (objectuality)30. Let me consider for example the
following two expressions: the morning star and the evening star31. These two
descriptions refer to the same thing, to the same object, but they have differ-
ent meanings. In other words, the reference of the expressions is in both cases
the same star, but the way they refer to it is different32. If, instead of proper
names or descriptions, one deals with sentences (Sätze) the situation does not
change. For example, the following two sentences this black bird is flying away
and this black animal is flying away, although with a different meaning, can
refer to the same perception, better, to the same state of affair33.
As Husserl writes already in LU I, there are different kinds of acts that
ment of the Logische Untersuchungen (cf. [Briefwechsel, 3.6], pp. 107-120. Among others,
important contributes are the following: [Føllesdal, 1958], [Mohanty, 1964], [Mohanty, 1982],
[Fisette, 1994], [Haddock, 2000b], [Hill, 2000b], [Brisart, 2002]. With different results, these
contributes tend to explain the influence that Frege had on Husserl. For example, Føllesdal,
who gave origin to this tradition of studies, claims for a strong influence. On the contrary,
more recent works, for example [Haddock, 2000b], tend to negate it. I do not want it to enter
in this debate, but some reference to Frege’s analysis of the differences between Sinn and
Bedeutungcan be an helpful counterpart to understand this part of Husserl’s philosophy. Cf.
[Frege, 1892a]; [Frege, 1892b]). See also [Tugendhat, 1970].
30To be noticed that in Ideen, Husserl will change his vocabulary, since he will introduce
the notion of noema which is related to the notion of sense, but is not exactly the same.
As I already mentioned, objectuality does not mean a single concrete object (a thing). In
fact objectualities to which an expression refers are for Husserl also the state of affairs
(Sachverhalt).
31These are famous example from Frege. To be noticed that Frege’s vocabulary is different
and Sinn and Bedeutung are used in a very different way. The first refers to the meaning of
an expression and is comparable to Husserl’s own use of Sinn and Bedeutung. By contrast,
Bedeutung is used to indicate what the expression refers to and it is comparable to Husserl’s
Gegenstand. An appropriate analysis of Husserl’s theory of meaning would require a close
comparison with Frege with regard to all the three parts of the theory: proper names,
conceptual words, sentence. In what follows, I will consider only the case of sentences.
32For Husserl, it is also possible to have the opposite situation, i.e. to have expressions
that have the same meaning but different references (Cf. [Hua XIX/1], I, §12).
33In Frege the reference of a sentence is a truth value ([Frege, 1892b], p. 48-49). While in
Husserl is an object, i.e. a state of affair (Sachverhalt) which is ‘built’ on a perception. Cf.
[Frege, 1892b] and the letter on 24.5.1891 in [Briefwechsel, 3.6]. On the difference between
Sachverhalt and Sachlage, see [Haddock, 2000a].
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are associated to an expression. There is the words-complex and the physi-
cal appearance of the expression (Ausdruckserscheinung), the sense-giving act
(sinngebend) and the sense-fulfilling (sinnerfüllend) (Cf. [Hua XIX/1], I, §9).
If I say: the black bird is flying away and I am currently seeing a black bird
out of my window and it is actually flying away, I will have all the three kinds
of act together. If, on the contrary, I enunciate the same sentence, but there
is not a bird out of my window, and I am not imagining or reproducing any
black bird, I will have only the first two acts. In other words, I will have an
act of expression and an act that confers meaning to the expression. Moreover,
if I say something like I wish I could see a black bird flying away in my gar-
den, I have properly only the expressive act, i.e. the expression in the sense of
communicating an information, but I will have not a meaning, because I am
just expressing a desire, i.e. taking to a communicative dimension an act of
my consciousness.
There is a further element concerning the expression, i.e. the object to which
the expression refers, by means of the act of meaning34:
Jeder Ausdruck besagt nicht nur etwas, sondern er sagt auch über Et-
was; er hat nicht nur seine Bedeutung, sondern er bezieht sich auch auf
irgendwelche Gegenstände. Diese Beziehung ist für einen und denselben
Ausdruck unter Umständen eine mehrfache. (LU I, §12, [Hua XIX/1],
p. 52)35.
The situation can be represented through the schema 1.1 below36.
In sum, there are four elements to be considered with regard to the notion of
expression and they also represent the senses in which in the common language
34[Sokolowski, 1964], where he talks of the double constitution of the object and of the
meaning; [Zahavi, 2008], p. 153 on constitution.
35“Im übrigen ist es klar, daß zwischen den beiden [Bedeutung und Gegenstand] an jedem
Ausdruck zu unterscheidenden Seiten ein naher Zusammenhang besteht; nämlich daß ein
Ausdruck nur dadurch, daß er bedeutet, auf Gegenständliches Beziehung gewinnt, und daß
es also mit Recht heißt, der Ausdruck bezeichne (nenne) den Gegenstand mittels seiner
Bedeutung, bzw. es sei der Akt des Bedeutens die bestimmte Weise des den jeweiligen
Gegenstand Meinens – nur daß eben diese Weise des bedeutsamen Meinens und somit die
Bedeutung selbst bei dentischer Festhaltung der gegenständlichen Richtung wechseln kann”
(LU I, §13, [Hua XIX/1] 54).
36cf. [Smith and Smith, 1995], ch. on language and knowledge.This description is to be
compared with the detailed tables in [Welton, 1983], ch. 1.
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an expression is said to express something. The phenomenologically relevant
question is now: where is the meaning of an expression to be found? To say it
differently: where does the meaning of an expression lie? According to Husserl,
the meaning is to be found in the signitive act connected to the expression. In
other words, the meaning lies in the act that bears the sense of an expression,
i.e. that intends something in a purely empty way. It is important that all these
aspects concerning the expressions are always distinguished. In particular, it is
fundamental to distinguish the act that confers the meaning and the perception
(the intuitive act) of the same object to which the meaning refer. As already
seen, the intuitive act can function as fulfillment of the sense, but in no cases
can be itself the place where the meaning lies. Confusing these two aspects
of the expression means to invalidate from the beginning the whole schema of
knowledge.
Still in LU VI, §4, Husserl insists on the fact that the meaning of an ex-
pression – in this case of a judgment of perception – cannot lie in perception,
but only in peculiar expressive acts37.
Zugleich liegt darin, daß zwischen Wahrnehmung und Wortlaut noch
ein Akt (bzw. ein Aktgebilde) eingeschoben ist. Ich sage ein Akt: denn
das Ausdruckserlebnis hat, ob von Wahrnehmung begleitet oder nicht,
eine intentionale Beziehung auf Gegenständliches. Dieser vermittelnde
Akt muß es sein, der eigentlich als sinngeber dient, er gehört zum sin-
37Husserl discussed the same thing already in LU I, ch. 2. Here he presents the same
thing from the point of view of the judgments of perception. These are particular expressive
acts which are built on perceptions, i.e. which say something on the contents of a possible
perception. This class of judgments is exemplar for the whole class of the objectifying acts.
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nvoll fungierenden Ausdruck als das wesentliche Bestandstück und bed-
ingt es, daß der Sinn identisch derselbe ist, ob zu ihm belegende Wahr-
nehmung sich gesellen mag oder nicht ([Hua XIX/2], VI, §4, p. 552).
Husserl’s main argument to show that the meaning does not lie in percep-
tion is quite simple. He analyses what happens with a perceptual judgment,
for example this pen is red, in the absence of a corresponding perception. As
Husserl says, the meaning of the expression does not change, the pen is red
even if I am not currently perceiving a red pen. Of course, when I express such
a judgment there can be, even if a proper perception is missing, some auxil-
iary act that intervenes as substitute of perception38. For example, an act of
imagination or remembering can be associated to the expressed judgment. But
these are not the places where the meaning lies, they only represent partial
degrees of fulfillment of the act of meaning. In fact, different intuitive acts can
correspond to the same expression without a change of meaning39. By contrast,
as I will discuss later, the auxiliary acts are the result of an intrinsic tendency
to the ‘fulfillment’ (Cf. [Bernet, 2008]). In other words, there is a characteristic
tendency of the empty act that requires a fulfillment of some type, even when
a proper intuition (a perception) is not possible, like in expressions such as:
the “golden mountain”. But the fact that an empty act ‘requires’ to be fulfilled
does not mean in any case that the meaning lies in the perception, or in the
intuitive act. Within this framework, Husserl can go further with the third step
of his reasoning, i.e. he can provide a precise definition of knowledge. In par-
ticular, if the meaning of an expression is not to be found in a corresponding
intuition, what is the relation between meaning and intuition? In other words,
what is the function of the intuitive acts connected to the expression?
38“Wir werden eine Auffassung bevorzugen müssen, welche diese Funktion des Bedeutens
einem überall gleichartigen Akte zuweist, der von den Schranken der uns so oft versagten
Wahrnehmung und selbst Phantasie frei ist und sich, wo der Ausdruck im eigentlichen Sinne
“ausdrückt”, mit dem ausgedrückten Akte nur vereint” ([Hua XIX/2], VI, §4, p. 551).
39In LU VI, §5, Husserl shows that perception determines the meaning but does not
embody it. This is an analysis that I am not going to present here. Here Husserl, going back
to LU I, is mainly interested in what he calls the occasional expression.
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1.3.4 Toward a definition of Knowledge
It is now possible to return to Husserl’s definition of knowledge as the ‘en-
counter’ of an act of expression and an act of intuition. So far, this notion has
been used as a guide to keep always in view what Husserl is aiming to. Now,
once Husserl’s theory of meaning has become clearer, it is necessary to analyze
in detail what this notion of knowledge precisely implies. In particular, it is
important to show what makes it possible that these two kinds of act (the act
of meaning and the intuition), taken together, provide knowledge and which
forms of syntheses occur between the two of them. In order to fully appreciate
this passage, it is fundamental to consider that Husserl’s theory of meaning
is not only a piece of philosophy of language, but a proper part (a moment)
of his philosophy of knowledge40. In other words, the both are proper parts
of a unitary investigation and each of them cannot be properly understood if
taken separately. On the side of the theory of meaning, one runs the risk of
interpreting it as a mere philosophy of language. But this is relatively weak, be-
cause, for example, it is appropriate to explicate the structure of a judgment (a
perceptive judgment), but not that of other forms of utterances. Furthermore,
there are several fundamental problems in philosophy of language, in which
Husserl is not interested. On the other side, and that is even more dangerous,
there is the impossibility to understand Husserl’s theory of knowledge, for the
notion of meaning is fundamental for the definition of it. Husserl’s definition
of meaning is much more than the definition of a linguistic entity. It is the
definition of an act of consciousness that is characterized by the fact of being
an empty act; i.e. an act that is characterized by the fact of intending an object
in an empty way. Like all the acts of consciousness, the act of meaning refers
to an object, but it has the very peculiar characteristic of being an empty act.
40Later, I will show that this is the case of the analysis of the structure of formal logic in
FTL as well. There, Husserl’s analysis of formal logic is not only philosophy of mathematics,
but a proper part of his theory of knowledge. As already mentioned the access through
the meaning (LU) and the way through logic (FTL) are two different ways of entering
phenomenology and transcendental philosophy.
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This does not mean that the reference of the act of meaning is an indirect
one: by contrast, it is direct but it is performed in the absence of the object
to which it refers. Later, when the notion of Fülle will be discussed (cf. 1.4.2),
it will be clear what empty means in this context. For the moment, in order
to approach the definition of knowledge without misleading presuppositions,
it can be useful to keep in mind the following two things.
First, the acts of expression are not the only empty acts. In fact, in a certain
perspective, also intuitions are empty. Indeed, they have ‘empty components’,
empty parts that need to be fulfilled (cf. 3.7). This does not mean that they
are acts of meaning. In fact, these latter have a peculiar form (a categorial
structure) that allows the repeatability of the act itself without any loss of
information. Moreover it must be added that an intuition is never completely
empty, i.e. it never intends the whole object in an empty way, but only ‘some
parts’ of it and these parts are fulfilled by other intuitions or by the continu-
ation of the same intuitive process. On the other side, an act of meaning can
never be full without a corresponding act of intuition. Also when an empty act
is performed in the presence of the object to which it refers, it can refer to the
object only in an empty way, still direct but empty. Emptiness does not mean
indirectness of the reference to the object, but absence of the object in the
reference, i.e. the fact that the act refers to something that is not in the act
itself. Of course the acts of expression are not immediate (unmittelbar) like the
acts of intuition. But according to Husserl, this does not mean that they refer
to the object through the intuition. In other words, they are not immediate,
because the object to which they refer is absent, but this does not mean that
they are indirect. Indeed, they refer directly to the objects, conferring them a
meaning and they do not need intuition to do this. In fact, intuition has a dif-
ferent role, the role of presenting the object and fulfilling the meaning. Above,
when the property of carrying meaning was discussed (cf. 1.3.2), an apparently
similar argument was used. The acts of the form I judge that..., I desire that...
are not properly acts of meaning because the object of the reference is already
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in the expression as the act of my experience that I mention. If we consider a
judgment of perception, even if the object is present at the moment in which
the judgment is expressed, it is never contained in the act of expression itself.
In other words, considering the acts of meaning, the reference is always to
something external (cf. fig. 1.1). By contrast, when I perceive something, the
object is present in the act. It might be not completely present, for example
the hidden side of a three-dimensional object is not present and can be seen as
an empty intention. But something is already present there, in every intuitive
act and it is this presence that leads the further fulfillment.
Second, this structure indicates a necessary complementarity of the two
kinds of acts. Indeed, they have in common that they belong to the same class
of act, i.e. the class of the objectifying acts (cf. below, 1.4.1)41. Once they
are considered within this class, the empty acts of meaning and intuitive acts,
assuming that they have the same intentional matter, differ for the degree of
Fülle.
Static Knowledge. for the first time In LU VI Husserl gives an explicit
definition of knowing (das Erkennen) as “static unity of expressive thought
and expressed intuition”. Two paragraphs later, he extends his analysis to the
case of the “dynamic unity of expression and expressed intuition”42. Husserl
analyses here the question of the relationship between the thought, which
confers the meaning, and the intuition, which presents what is meant, from
the perspective of their possible forms of unity (unification). To begin with,
41This is a reason why meaning acts are not only linguistic entities. In fact, from the
beginning Husserl intends to show how the class of objectifying acts is constituted. From a
phenomenological point of view, this operation has two important results: 1) the delimitation
of the class of those acts which provide knowledge, 2) the fact that they are fundamental
for the constitution of the other acts.
42Cf. [Hua XIX/2], VI, §§ 6 and 9. To be noticed that the word that Husserl uses here is
not Erkenntis, but das Erkennen. In the english translation of the Logische Untersuchungen,
it is translated with Recognition. I prefer here to use the word Knowing, in order to indicate
the act of knowing, i.e. the basic structure of those acts that provide knowledge. Knowledge
is in fact a set of knowing acts organized through a unitary structure, i.e. a structure that
gives an order on the basis of a unitary instance.
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Husserl considers the following case:
In diesem Kreise fassen wir zunächst das ruhende Einheitsverhältnis ins
Auge: der bedeutungverleihende Gedanke sei auf Anschauung gegrün-
det und dadurch auf ihren Gegenstand bezogen. Z. B. Ich spreche von
meinem Tintenfaß, und es steht zugleich das Tintenfaß selbst vor mir,
ich sehe es ([Hua XIX/2], VI, §6, p. 558)43.
Here Husserl deals with the simplest case of ‘constitution of knowledge’, the
case in which, starting from the intuition, one ‘names’ (nennt) the content, the
object, of the intuition itself44. Starting from the intuition, the thought gives
a sense to the intuition itself, i.e. it establishes a meaning, a particular way of
reference to the object of the perception. Although Husserl’s example is quite
clear, I would like to insist on this point. First of all, there is a preliminary
distinction to be considered, i.e. the distinction between simple or nominal
acts and complex or composed acts45. In the first case, one has to do with
acts that refer to the object in the proper sense, i.e. to a single object. In the
second case, the complex act refers to a state of affair. Husserl himself consider
this distinction and the example of the ink pot corresponds to the first case.
But also complex examples are possible in the case of static knowing. Let me
consider the judgment, which belongs of course to the second of the previous
cases: “the pen on the table is red” and, while I am saying that, there is red
pen on the table. In this case, one experiences at the same time two acts
that refer to the same object. On the one side, an act of expression, by which
43To be noticed that, whereas in the title of LU VI Husserl uses statische Einheit, here
he uses the expression ruhende Einheitsverhältnis. The two expressions are quite similar. In
particular the occurrences statische and ruhende seem to be used in the same way. In fact,
the english translator uses the word static for both (cf. [LI], p. 201).
44It is not like simply giving a name to something. This means conferring a meaning to the
intuition, i.e. creating the possibility to refer in an empty way to the object on the intuition.
45The distinction between simple and complex acts is typical of the whole sphere of the ob-
jectifying acts, i.e. both for signitive expressions and intuitive acts. As Sokolowski says: “Con-
cretely, the following combinations are possible: asserting/nominal, asserting/propositional,
non-asserting/nominal, non-asserting/propositional. This quartet of objectifying acts is ab-
solutely fundamental in intentional consciousness. No member is reducible to any other
member, and all four are necessary to talk about what consciousness does. All kinds of in-
tentional experience, such as imagining, remembering, making inferences, doing mathematics
or physical experiments, etc, either involve some form of objectifying acts or are reducible
to them ([Sokolowski, 1971], p. 327)”. To be noticed that, this schema will be particularly
meaningful for the discussion of the questions of kategoriale Anschauung.
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one says something on an object; on the other side, an act of intuition, by
which one perceives the object itself. Both refer to the object, but in different
ways. For Husserl, Their union (unification, relation of unity) is what provides
knowledge. Now, it is necessary to clarify some points: 1) why does Husserl
call this a static union? 2) in what does this differ from the mere assigning a
name to something? 3) what is precisely unified in knowledge? i.e. what aspect
of the two acts can be unified by the synthesis of coincidence (identification).
In order to answer the third question, a brief discussion of the results and
distinctions that Husserl achieves in LU V is necessary. For this reason, I will
leave the question aside for the moment and answer in the next paragraphs.
Furthermore, this is something that can be fully appreciated in the case of what
Husserl calls dynamic knowledge, which also represents the most pregnant and
strict notion of knowledge. By contrast, questions 1) and 2) can be answered
immediately.
1) What makes this a static union is for Husserl a temporal factor. The
answer to this question is to be found already in the passage just quoted: “Ich
spreche von meinem Tintenfaß, und es steht zugleich das Tintenfaß selbst vor
mir, ich sehe es”. I speak of my ink pot, I name it in an expression, ant it is
there while I am naming it. In other words, there are an act of expression and
an act of intuition at the same time. I speak of my ink pot and it is there
at the same time, it is present in perception, i.e. in that kind of intuitive act
where the object is really presentend. In this case, there is not a real passage
from the empty act to the fulfilled act, because both are at work at the same
time46. In particular, what is lacking here is a peculiar movement from the
assertion to the intuition, from the empty to the fulfilling, and this because
the fulfilling is already there, at the same time. In other words, the tendency
46“Eine statische Synthesis der Erfüllung unterscheidet sich von einer dynamischen Syn-
thesis der Erfüllung vor allem dadurch, dass die Intention und die sie erfüllende Anschauung
gleichzeitig und nicht nacheinander vollzogen werden. Die “statische” Synthesis der Erfüllung
nimmt mit anderen Worten das “bleibende Ergebnis” einer “dynamischen” Erfüllungseinheit
dadurch vorweg (567), dass sie den anschaulich gegeben Gegenstand unmittelbar “als” den
in der Aussagebedeutung gemeinten erkennt” [Bernet, 2008], p. 193.
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to the fulfillment is not a tendency in the real sense of the word, because
the fulfillment is already there. In this case the expression is founded on the
intuition and the intuition is a perception, i.e. an intuition which offers an
object as actually present. However, as Husserl notices, the situation is the
same when, instead of an act of perception, an act of imagination is performed
(cf. LU VI, §6). An interesting question could then be the following: to what
extent is it possible to have an act of pure thought without a connected act of
intuition? In other words, is it not the case that an act of pure thought goes
always together with an act of intuition, an act of imagination for example?
But this would be already another direction of investigation.
2) For Husserl, this is a process of denomination. It is important to stress
that this does not mean that we simply assign a name to an object, in the same
way in which would assign a name, for example, to a dog. The denomination
is something deeper, something that expresses (that can recall) a particular
relation between two acts, the intuitive and the signitive. In other words, it
is not a relation between the object and the verbal expression, but a relation
between the empty and the fulfilled act, which in this case are in play at
the same time. Using another vocabulary, Husserl speaks of ‘classification’. To
classify is different from the simple act of giving a name to something, because
here an application of a concept to the object is implied. Or oppositely, an
intuition is subsumed under a concept.
1.3.5 Matter, Quality and Essence
Let me consider the situation in which we have two acts that intend the same
object. One is empty, while the other presents either the object itself (or parts
of the object) or, like in the case of imagination, a particular presentation (im-
age) of the object. In order to understand what of these two acts is unified in
the synthesis of knowledge, it is necessary to understand what they have in
common from a phenomenological point of view. To do that, one must look at
LU V, where Husserl describes what an act of consciousness is and how it is to
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be analyzed also in terms of its components47. In particular, I am interested in
LU V §§20 and 21, where Husserl explains the notion of matter and quality of
an act of consciousness and, most of all, the notions of intentional essence (in-
tentionales Wesen) and significational essence (bedeutungsmäßiges Wesen)48.
These two, as I will show in the next paragraph, are directly involved in the
definition of knowledge and are to be considered together with the notion of
epistemic essence (erkenntnismäßiges Wesen), which Husserl discusses in LU
VI, §28.
Let me start from the definition of intentional essence (intentionales We-
sen)49. The intentional essence of an act is the unity (Einheit) of two compo-
nents that are inseparable and that can be distinguished only by abstraction.
These two components are what Husserl calls matter (Materie) and quality
(Qualität) of an act.
The quality of an act of consciousness shows the mode in which a determi-
nate object is intended by act of consciousness. In other words, the quality of
an act is the general character of the act (allgemeiner Charakter des Aktes),
which indicates the kind of act, i.e. the class to which an act belongs. It is
the component that makes it in turn an act of mere presentation, an act of
perception, an act of judgment, an act of desire and so on. On the contrary,
the matter is intended as the content (Inhalt), which characterizes the act as
47Of course I cannot discuss in full details the development of LU V, which is as long
and complex as LU VI. I will just try explain some notions from it, in order to understand
the definition of knowledge in LU VI. For LU V see: [Bernet et al., 1989], [Zahavi, 1992];
[Cobb-Stevens, 2003]; [Mayer and Erhard, 2008]; [Zahavi, 2008]; [Rizzoli, 2008], cap III. A
general schema of this Investigation is offered in App. fig. 1.
48In [LI] this is translated with semantic essence. I prefer to follow the indication of
[Cairns, 1973].
49Husserl discusses the notion of intentional essence in the framework of an attempt of dis-
tinguishing between the notion of descriptive content and intentional content (intentionnaler
Inhalt) of an act: “Wir werden vorerst drei Begriffe von intentionalem Inhalt unterscheiden
müssen den intentionalen Gegenstand des Aktes, seine intentionale Materie (im Gegensatz
zu seiner intentionalen Qualität), endlich sein intentionales Wesen” ([Hua XIX/1], V, §16, p.
413). What is important to notice already in this quick passage, is the fact that quality and
matter are not presented as two distinguished concepts of intentional content. By contrast,
they are the title of an opposition within the same regard to an act.
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presentation of what is presented (Vorstellung dieses Vorgestellten).
From this very general definition (cf. LU V, §20) it could seem that Husserl
is dealing here with the traditional distinction between form and content of
a presentation. From this perspective, the quality would provide the form of
an act (this is a mere presentation, a desire, a judgment, etc). By contrast,
the matter the matter would give the material content of it (the content of
this judgment is this). But this implies a difference of ‘character’ (a qualitative
difference) between the quality and the matter of an act. On the contrary, there
can be for Husserl only a distinction of degree between quality and matter, i.e. a
distinction of degree of abstraction. In fact, they are two inseparable moments
of the act50. For this reason, the traditional categories of form and content,
and the consequent view just described, are inadequate to describe Husserl’s
theory of acts. What are then precisely matter and quality of an act?
From a general point of view, the quality represents the answer to the
question: what is the general mode of an act? what is the very general character
of an act of consciousness? What is the class to which an act belongs? By
contrast, the matter represents the answer to the question: in which way an
act refers to an object? which is the basic presentation resulting from the act?51
In which particular way does the act refer to the object? The second group of
questions is at a different degree of abstraction than the first one, but there is
not a real passage from something that is purely formal to something that is
material. Both the notions have a certain degree of formality deriving from the
fact of being abstract moments of the concrete act52. The abstraction to the
50According to the theory of parts and whole of LU III.
51Cf. LU V, §32. Here Husserl explains in which sense the matter of an act is a presentation.
52There are further components of an acts. The Fülle and Räpresentat for example, which
are separable effective components. However, quality and matter are inseparable and taken
together they constitute the essence of the act. From a certain perspective the notion of
essence is prior to the notions of quality and matter. In other words what is important is
the essence of an act, that can be considered from the point of view of the general class
of belonging, or more closely, from the point of view of the proper way of reference to the
object. It is the essence that characterizes the act as that act and it is the essence, considered
as matter, that is involved in the synthesis of knowledge. Here, as I will try to show, the
difference in quality of the two acts (the empty and the intuitive) is cancelled by the fact
that they belong to the same class of the objectifying acts. However the essence of the two
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quality of the act gives as result a general mode of the act. The abstraction to
the matter of the act gives as result a particular mode of the act. A passage
from RL V is illuminating for the very comprehension of the difference between
quality and matter of an act:
Die Qualität bestimmt nur, ob das in bestimmter Weise bereits
„vorstellig Gemachte” als Erwünschtes, Erfragtes, urteilsmäßig Geset-
ztes u. dgl. intentional gegenwärtig sei. Danach muß uns die Materie als
dasjenige im Akte gelten, was ihm allererst die Beziehung auf ein Gegen-
ständliches verleiht, und zwar diese Beziehung in so vollkommener Bes-
timmtheit, daß durch die Materie nicht nur das Gegenständliche über-
haupt, welches der Akt meint, sondern auch die Weise, in welcher er
es meint, fest bestimmt ist. Die Materie – so können wir noch weiter
verdeutlichend sagen – ist die im phänomenologischen Inhalt des Aktes
liegende Eigenheit desselben, die es nicht nur bestimmt, daß der Akt
die jeweilige Gegenständlichkeit auffaßt, sondern auch, als was er sie
auffaßt, welche Merkmale, Beziehungen, kategorialen Formen er in sich
selbst ihr zumißt. An der Materie des Aktes liegt es, daß der Gegenstand
dem Akte als dieser und kein anderer gilt, sie ist gewissermaßen der die
Qualität fundierende (aber gegen deren Unterschiede gleichgültige) Sinn
der gegenständlichen Auffassung (oder kurzweg der Aufassungssinn)
([Hua XIX/1], V, §20, pp. 430-1).
The following things must be noticed: 1) the quality determines the class
of the act, but not the way in which the act refers to (represents) an object. In
other words the quality indicates to which class the act belongs. In Husserl’s
words, the quality indicates the general modality of reference of something that
is already made representable by some particular mode of reference of an act;
2) the matter is what in the act (in the essence of the act) confers first of all
the reference to an objectuality; 3) the matter not only establishes the general
reference to the object (the possibility of the reference itself), but also the way
(die Weise) in which the object is intended53. The way in which the matter
is taken to unity by a particular synthesis. Moreover, one must notice that the abstraction
whose result is the matter, encompasses to some extent the abstraction whose result is the
quality of the act (cf. fig. 1.2).
53In LU VI, Husserl claims: “Die Materie galt uns als dasjenige Moment des objektivieren-
den Aktes, welches macht, daß der Akt gerade diesen Gegenstand und gerade in dieser Weise,
d. h. gerade in diesen Gliederungen und Formen, mit besonderer Beziehung gerade auf diese
Bestimmtheten oder Verhältnisse vorstellt. Vorstellungen von übereinstimmender Materie
stellen nicht nur überhaupt denselben Gegenstand vor, sondern sie meinen ihn ganz und gar
als denselben, nämlich als völlig gleich bestimmten” ([Hua XIX/2], VI, §25, p. 617).
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establishes the reference to the object is not the very general way in which the
quality does. By contrast, it is ‘more concrete’, it consists of those relations,
features and ‘categorial forms’ through which the act refers to the objectuality.
This mode is less general than the mode of quality, which is obtained through
a more radical abstraction; 4) finally, and this gives the measure of the impor-
tance of the matter, it is the sense of the objectual apprehension and founds
the quality.
In the light of these considerations, quality and matter are two different
degrees of the mode of reference to the objectuality (der weise der gegen-
ständlichen Beziehung). As Husserl notices, it is important to pay attention to
this double sense in which one can speak of modality of reference (cf. LU V,
§20). To conclude, it is important to repeat that quality and matter are two
abstractions, two moments of the act and that they are concretely inseparable.
Quality and matter, although they do not complete the act, are the necessary
constitutive moments of every act. Two acts can have the same quality, the
same matter and still be different with regard to some of its components (for
example the Fülle). But matter and quality provide the fundamental consti-
tutive moments of an act, they are the essential components and this is why
Husserl calls their unity the intentional essence of an act (cf. LU V, §21).
In the same paragraph, Husserl introduces the notion of significational
essence, which is an important variation of the notion of intentional essence:
Soweit es sich nämlich um Akte handelt, die als bedeutungsverlei-
hende Akte bei Ausdrücken fungieren oder fungieren könnten – ob dies
alle können, werden wir späterhin zu erforschen haben –, soll spezieller
von dem bedeutungsmäßigen Wesen des Aktes gesprochen werden. Seine
ideierende Abstraktion ergibt die Bedeutung in unserem idealen Sinn
([Hua XIX/1], V, §21, p. 431).
According this definition, the significational essence is the intentional essence
of an act of meaning. We have already seen that the act of meaning is an act
associated to an expression54, which is directed to an object in an empty way.
54The previous quotation confirms this view. Of course if one intends expression in the
strict sense of being an expression that carries a meaning, the two elements coincide.
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This is a very important class of acts for Husserl and in fact, the particular
combination of matter and quality in this act requires the definition of a partic-
ular class of essences. The act of meaning refers to the object in an empty way,
but in doing it it also says something on the object, something that requires
to be verified (fulfilled) by an act of intuition and that has the possibility of
being repeated without any variation of meaning. This peculiar character is
due to the particular way in which the acts of meaning refer to the object,
i.e. it belongs to the matter of the acts of meaning. The quality of the act of
meaning can vary in a range of different species of act, from words to complex
expressions, from simple to complex judgment. The matter of the act of mean-
ing presents always the following features: it calls for the fulfillment, it says
something about the objectuality and it can be repeated without variation of
meaning. The union of these characteristics gives us the important notion of
significational essence. The centrality of the notion of significational essence is
due above all to the fact that through an abstraction one can obtain from it
the ‘Bedeutung’ (the meaning), in the ideal sense. This is a very central notion
for the LU, which, as we already saw, aim mainly to explain how ideality and
subjectivity can be conciliated. Furthermore, one must consider that the LU
begin with an analysis of the notion of meaning. Not only because LU I deals
concretely with the definition of meaning, but also because meaning is the way
through which in the LU Husserl accesses phenomenological analysis. As one
can see, this provides an internal coherence of the structure of the LU. Indeed,
It is not just a case that the book begins with an analysis of meaning and ends
with a deepening of that analysis in the Sixth Investigation.
1.4 Erkenntnis
We can now discuss in detail the notion of knowledge that Husserl presents in
LU VI §8. Before going on, in order to fully appreciate the potentiality of this
notion of knowledge, let us make a general example and think of the normal
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praxis of the sciences. For example, let us think to physics as developed from
the modern age until now. In this sense, physics is a continuous alternation
of theories, postulations of hypotheses, i.e. pieces of theories, and empirical
experiments. One goes continuously from the theory to the experiment that
can confirm or deny the theory, but also from the experiment to the theory, i.e
from a fact to the explanation of that fact in relation to other facts. This is a
double movement: on a vertical axis, both theories and experiments motivate,
confirm, confute respectively other pieces of theory or further experiments.
On a horizontal axis, theories call for experiments and experiments confirm or
confute the theory. To put is simply, this is a double and bidirectional move-
ment. Double because, on one the side, there is a movement internal to the
two spheres, the one of the theory and the one of the empirical praxis: from
theory to theory through deduction, from experiment to experiment through
‘induction’, generalization and so on. On the other side, there is a second
movement between theory and empirical praxis. Bidirectional because this lat-
ter movement is in fact bidirectional: not only theories require experiments,
but experiment can motivate theories.
On this basis, a scientist can elaborate theories and look back to the results
of the experiments, can make experiments and, on the basis of these, elaborate
new or different theories. Again, the scientist can work theoretically and then,
at a certain point of the theoretical investigation, compare the theoretical
results with the empirical results. This process can be seen as a good example
of a particular application of the schema empty–fulfilled intention. Here, the
experiment is to be located on the side of intuition and the theory on the
side of the signitive acts. Theory and experiment together provide scientific
knowledge. i.e. a knowledge of some degree and level. What is worth noticing
however the very dynamic character of the scientific enterprise.
To be precise, I am not claiming that this explanation of the scientific
praxis is what Husserl is aiming to. I just meant to give an example of how the
schema can work in a general context. In fact, Husserl’s point in LU was to
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give the more general foundation of this schema, i.e. to describe the essential
laws that make this schema possible with reference to the notion of meaning in
pure logic, which deals with ideal objects. In other words, Husserl was aiming
to the foundation of this schema for pure logic, which is Wissenschaftslehre, i.e.
the basis for every other possible form of theory. The place where the schema
is founded is precisely LU VI.
Dynamic Knowledge. A more meaningful definition of knowledge comes
in LU VI, §8, where Husserl describes what he calls the dynamic unity between
expression and expressed intuition55. Instead of static knowledge, we have now
a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, where the determining factor is the
temporal distance between the empty act and the fulfilling intuition. In other
words, the expression is not given together with the intuition, there is instead
a very particular consciousness of the fulfillment (Erfüllungsbewußtsein). In
this case, the passage between one act and the other, is noticeable, it is really
something like an act of transition (Übergangserlebnis) between two different
kinds of acts. As Husserl claims, the empty act of meaning finds its fulfill-
ment in the act that renders the matter intuitive (in dem veranschaulichenden
Akte)56. The dynamic unity is very important, because it makes clear that
the two acts, the empty and the intuition, belongs in a certain sense to each
other (Zusammengehörig). If in the previous discussion we saw that is always
possible to obtain an expression starting from an intuition, now the discussion
55“Statisch und dynamisch kann besagen: Das statisch satte, erfüllte Begreifen und das dy-
namische sich immer mehr Sättigen, das hier wohl immer einen synthetisch-identifizierenden
Deckungsprozess voraussetzt, ungleich der schlichten Anschauung. Hier haben wir ein
Dynamisches in der Kontinuität ohne Polythesis und ein Dynamisches der Polythesis”
[Hua XX/2], p. 141.
56In this case, I am following english translation of [LI]. However, it seems to me that
it does not render the fact that the empty intention finds the fulfillment not directly in
the act of intuition, but in an act of transition that allows it to obtain the Fülle of the
corresponding intuitive act. To put it differently, the act of meaning has for its own nature
no Fülle. There is however the possibility to ‘obtain’ the Fülle of the corresponding intuitive
act (perception, imagination, and so on). This is why Husserl considers this passage in terms
of a veranschaulichender Akt, i.e. it is as if this act renders the meaning act itself intuitive.
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of the dynamic union shows that it is always possible to ‘look for’ some kind
of fulfillment of the expression:
Wir erleben es, wie in der Anschauung dasselbe Gegenständliche in-
tuitiv vergegenwärtigt ist, welches im symbolischen Akte „bloß gedacht”
war, und daß es gerade als das so und so Bestimmte anschaulich wird
als was es zunächst bloß gedacht (bloß bedeutet) war. Es ist nur ein
anderer Ausdruck dafür, wenn wir sagen, das intentionale Wesen des
Anschauungsaktes passe sich (mehr oder minder vollkommen) dem be-
deutungsmäßigen Wesen des ausdrückenden Aktes an ([Hua XIX/2], VI,
§8, p. 566).
Husserl says from a more technical point of view what the coincidence con-
sists in. According to this definition, there are two interesting questions to be
discussed: 1) the first concerns the components of the acts that are involved in
the process of fulfillment; 2) Second, it is necessary to investigate more deeply
the character of the dynamic unity.
1) As seen in the previous paragraphs, the intentional essence of an act
is the unity of the quality and the matter of an act. The precise question to
answer is: what comes to coincidence in the synthesis of identification that
characterizes knowledge? According to its definition, the quality of the two
acts is different. For example, on one side one can have a judgment, a sentence
and on the other side a perception, an act of imagination, of remembering and
so on. By contrast, the intentional matter can be the same: the reference to the
object, and the particular mode of the reference itself, can be the same. It is the
intentional matter that calls for the synthesis of coincidence, thatmotivates the
synthesis of coincidence in its different degrees. In other words, the similarity
of the intentional matter of the two acts, the signitive and the intuitive, is an
essential condition for the synthesis of coincidence. Although Husserl is not
really explicit about this, it can be argued from the previous quotation and
others similar57. In fact, the condition for the synthesis cannot be the quality,
57“Als wir, ausgehend vom sprachlichen Ausdruck einer Wahrnehmung, das Verhältnis von
Bedeutungsintention und erfüllender Anschauung beschrieben, sagten wir, das intentionale
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which of course is different in the two acts. Moreover, it cannot be the mere
reference of both acts to the object, because it would be too general and vague.
This is why Husserl, in the previous definition, speaks of the coincidence of the
essences of the two acts58: from a general perspective, knowledge is a synthesis
of coincidence between the essences of two acts; from a particular perspective
the intentional matter of the two acts is the initial carrier of this synthesis.
Then the two essences are taken to unity by the synthesis of coincidence,
which can give results of different degrees, and consequently different degrees
of knowledge. In any case, there is a further act, the act of knowledge, that
will have as matter the unification of the essences of the two original acts –
i.e. the unification of their intentional matters – and as quality the character
of knowledge. In this synthesis, the quality of the two original acts is, so to
say, cancelled in favor of a new act character, the act of knowledge. This is
possible because empty acts and intuitions belong to the same class (that of
the objectifying acts), i.e. their qualities belong to the same general class. By
contrast, the matter of the two original acts is taken to unity. What is really
different between the acts involved in this notion of knowledge is the degree of
Fülle: the essence of the two acts is taken to unity and the presentation of the
act of meaning, which is empty, is taken to fullness through the fullness of the
act of intuition. The result is a new act, the act of knowledge.
2) In the case of what Husserl calls static knowledge, the matter between
the two acts involved is not only identical, but also given at the same time. The
essences of the two acts are, in other words, the same and are also given at the
same time. To put it simply, the essence is already given in one blow. There is
no real process of unification between two essences with a similar matter, rather
it is as if the two acts shared from the beginning the same intentional essence.
Wesen des anschaulichen Aktes passe oder gehöre zu dem bedeutungsmäßigen Wesen des
signifikativen Aktes” ([Hua XIX/2], VI, §16, 596).
58On one side the significational essence and on the other side the intentional essence.
However, as Husserl notices in LU V, in a act of meaning, these are the same thing. For this
reason, is not wrong to say that in the synthesis of coincidence the intentional essence of
two acts are unified.
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From a broader perspective, concepts and intuitions are given together, the
application of the concept to the intuition or the subsumption of the latter
under the first, are not visible (noticeable). By contrast, this is not the case for
dynamic knowledge. In fact, the movement itself between empty intentions and
intuitions is the main characteristic of this kind of knowledge. If we had only
static knowledge, we could only classify objects, without having the possibility
of establishing relations between them, and consequently to progress or regress
into our knowledge.
In the dynamic relation, we have a first step with an act of the ‘mere
thought’, which is empty, i.e. unsatisfied. In a second step, this act acquires
some form, more or less adequate, of fulfillment. At a certain point the thought
is satisfied by an adequate intuition. What is important is that in the dynamic
unity there is a particular gap between the two acts. From the different possi-
bilities of fulfillment of this gap, derives the richness of this concept of knowl-
edge. Oppositely to the inert consciousness of unity of the static relation, the
dynamic relation does not have a ‘pre-established history’. It is a process of
satisfaction of the thought that can happen in different ways: the consciousness
of the unity itself has in this case a history, it is not already there, but it is a
process.
1.4.1 Knowledge and Objetuality
In the second chapter of LU VI, Husserl intends to explain the relation be-
tween the following things: synthesis of knowledge, schema empty–fulfilled act,
objectivation and objectivity. In particular, he shows that the notion of fulfill-
ment can be used to define general classes of acts. In particular the fulfillment
that he called knowledge, i.e. the identification (or contrast) between an act of
meaning and an act of intuition, can provide a definition of the fundamental
class of the objectifying acts. There is here a powerful relation: in the same
way that all the acts of consciousness are reducible to objectifying acts, all
the relations of fulfillment between acts that are not objectifying acts are re-
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ducible to the relation of fulfillment between meaning acts and intuition. From
this fundamental character of the of the empty–fulfilled schema for knowledge,
Husserl obtains a new definition according to which the class of objectifying
acts is the class of those acts whose synthesis of fulfillment has the character
of identification. The definition quoted before was already present in the in-
troduction to LU VI. This is an important point of conjunction between LU
V and VI. Once again, In order to understand the importance of this passage,
one must look back to the previous investigation59.
LU V is mainly directed to the differentiation of diverse notions of presenta-
tion (Vorstellung). This is the fundamental step for a philosophy which is not a
philosophy of the presentation, but rather intends to explain how presentation
is possible through a phenomenological analysis of the acts of consciousness.
For Husserl, it is necessary to eliminate all the possible equivocations that stem
from the traditional notion of presentation. In the sixth and last chapter of RL
V, Husserl put together the results of the whole investigation. The result is a
list of the different meanings of presentation. Among them, important for the
present discussion are60: 1) presentation as matter or better matter with other
elements that are necesary for its manifestation, such as the representation
(Repräsentation)61; 2) presentation as mere presentation (bloße Vorstellung),
as qualitative modification of some form of the belief ; 3) presentation as nom-
inal act, 4) presentation as objectifying act (objektivierender Akt). This fourth
definition, as Husserl notices, comprehends the previous three. Here a particu-
lar class of acts is defined, a class that for Husserl is a fundamental qualitative
one (qualitative Grundklasse)62.
59This continuous back and forth between V and VI testifies the particular character of
LU.
60For the most important among the 12 different notions, see App. fig. 1
61The notion of representation was already introduced in LU V, §32, where Husserl refers
to those elements that the matter need in order to realize, i.e to concrertely realize. However,
this notion is very central in RL VI, §§26 and ff., where Husserl seeks for the categorial
representation
62In LU this is a fundamental class of acts and every other act can be reduced to this class.
As we will see this is the class to which the synthesis of knowledge belongs. This is the class
to which intuitions and assertions (judgment) belong. It is important to say that in Ideen
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This class of acts has a very particular role, because it is only through this
class that the other acts of consciousness can refer to an object. The objec-
tifying act has the peculiar function of making representable an objectuality
for all the other acts, of making possible the reference to an object for other
acts: “Die Beziehung auf eine Gegenständlichkeit konstituiert sich überhaupt
in der Materie. Jede Materie ist aber, so sagt unser Gesetz. Materie eines
objektivierenden Aktes und kann nur mittels eines solchen zur Materie einer
neuen, in ihm fundienen Aktqualität werden ([Hua XIX/1], V, §42, p. 515)”.
Through this class of acts, Husserl is able to translate phenomenologically a
law that was widely accepted in the tradition, and that says that presentation
is the foundation of all acts:
Jedes intentionale Erlebnis ist entweder ein objektivierender Akt
oder hat einen solchen Akt zur ‘Grundlage’, d. h. er hat (in diesem
letzteren Falle einen objektivierenden Akt notwendig als Bestandstück
in sich, dessen Gesamtmaterie zugleich, und zwar individuell identisch
seine Gesamtmaterie ist (LU V, §41, [Hua XIX/1], p. 514).
In LU, Husserl not only identifies this important class of acts. On the
contrary, he also shows what the structure of this class is. In other words
he provides a sort of anatomy of the class of objectifying acts. This can be
represented as in figure 1.2 below.
Of course this table cannot take into account the complexity of the entire
discussion about the notion of objectifying act, as it is developed in LU V,
ch. 3 and 4. On the other hand, it is an attempt to present together the main
results of that investigation with the new definition based on the synthesis of
identification that Husserl achieves in LU VI. The class of objectifying acts is
that class through which all the other acts can refer to an object. The first
important distinction is that between positing (setzenden) and non positing
this position, and the consequent priority of this class of acts, will change. However, the
meaning of what we are discussing here, considering that we are interested in the definition
of knowledge and its consequences, remains the same
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Figure 1.2: Objectifying acts
(nichtsetzenden) acts. The main difference is that the first kind of acts are
intentions of being, in the sense that they intend the object as being, they
express a position about the being of the intended object. By contrast, the
acts of the second kind are mere presentations of the object63. The distinc-
tions between positing and non positing act is a distinction according to the
quality. Considering the previous schema (fig. 1.2 all the distinctions that de-
velop on the vertical axis are given according to the quality. For example, the
difference between asserting and non asserting acts as well as the more gen-
eral difference between objectifying and non objectifying act. By contrast, the
distinctions that developed horizontally, are given according to the matter.
In the class of the objectifying acts, it is important to differentiate between
nominal and propositional structures. According to this, we can have a nomi-
nal act of intuition (positional-non asserting) and a corresponding nominal act
63This difference is presented at the beginning of LU V, §38. However the discussion
is really difficult and Husserl himself leaves some aspects of it open: “durch qualitative
Differenzierung die Einteilung in die setzenden Akte – die Akte des belief, des Urteils im Sinn
Mills und Brentanos – und in die nichtsetzcnden, hinsichtlich der Setzung „modifizierten”
Akte, die entsprechenden „bloßen Vorstellungen”. Wie weit der Begriff des „setzenden” belief
reicht, inwiefern er sich besondert, das bleibe hier offen” ([Hua XIX/1], V, §38, p. 268). For
this reason the line of separation in our table is not continuous. The acts of intuition can
be, according to the perspective, both positional and not positional.
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of expression (positional-asserting). Between the two there is a difference of
quality – for example one is a perception and the other a denomination – but
also of Fülle. As we noticed before, the difference of quality is irrelevant in the
class of objectifying act. Once the acts have a similar matter there can be a
process of fulfillment. Here one finds Husserl’s new definition again: the class
of objectifying acts is that class where the synthesis of fulfillment is a synthesis
of identification.
1.4.2 Fülle. Hierarchy of acts
The fulness (Fülle) is another component of the act, together with the matter
and the quality64. In particular it is an element that depend on the presence of
the object in the reference and indicates the vivacity of an act. Two acts can
have the same intentional matter (and hence the same intentional essence) but
two different degrees of vivacity. For example, a perception of this red apple in
more vivid than the imagination of this red apple. But the two presentations
are somehow similar. In particular, the apple appears in imagination similar to
the perceived one. If we consider the relation between an empty act of meaning
and an act of intuition, the first does not have Fülle at all and need the second
one in order to be fulfilled. The coincidence and identification between the two
essences is what provides knowledge. In other words, the two essences tend
to coincide and the fulness of the act of intuition tends to make full the act
signitive intention. The fulness in then a characteristic that creates particular
relations between acts. We have the limit relation empty-full acts. But we also
have the relation between different kinds of intuitions, i.e. between act with the
same matter and quality but with different degrees of vivacity. In this sense, an
act of imagination can find is empty with respect to an act of perception and
can find in this latter a fulfillment65. According to this, the fulness generates
64As we will see, this depends on the representation of the act, cf. below 1.5.6.
65Another form of the couple emty-fulfilling, as I will discuss in the next chapters, is the
relation between an expectation and a partial perception in the same perceptual process.
But this is a very different situation.
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a hierarchy of acts, in which we start with the mere intentions (signitive acts
in which the fulness = 0 and the meaning = 1) and finish with perceptions
(intutitions in wichi the fulness =1 and the meaning =0) (cf. [Hua XIX/2], §§
20 and ff).
1.4.3 Truth and Evidence
In the framework of this theory of knowledge, which is based on the schema
signitive-intuitive act, Husserl can provide a phenomenological definition of two
very important notions, those of evidence and truth. As previously described,
on one side there are the signitive empty acts of meaning, those that merely
intend the object; on the other side there are the act of intuition, that provide
different degrees of fulness to the acts of meaning. Among the intuitive acts, the
acts of perception are those that can provide the ideal degree of erfüllung for
the meaning intention, since in perception the object is given as present. When
the act of meaning is fulfilled by an act of intuition, in particular by a ultimate
act of intuition that presents the ideal ultimate fulfilled perception, then the
authentic adaequatio rei et intellectus is produced. In other words, Husserl is
presenting here a phenomenological account of a very classical notion: truth
is the coincidence of what is thought and what is perceived. When a meaning
intuition is fulfilled by a perception that perfectly correspond to the signitive
intention, and consequently none of the intentions of the signitive side remain
unfulfilled, then the coincidence is given with ‘an act of evidence’ and the
‘correlate of this act of evidence is truth’. In general, evidence occurs with
different degrees when a signitive act is fulfilled by a corresponding intuition.
When this intuition is the ultimate ideal perception of the intended object,
then we have the maximum degree of evidence (Evidenz), whose correlate is
truth (Wahrheit). From a phenomenological perspective, evidence is defined as
the act of the perfect synthesis of coincidence between an empty intention and
the corresponding ultimate ideal perception. As an identification, evidence is
then an objectifying act whose correlate is truth, i.e. the being in the sense of
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the truth (cf [Hua XIX/2], §38). In §39, Husserl discusses four senses of the
truth. According to the first sense, which represents an explanation of what
we just saw, truth is the correlate of an identifying act and in this sense it is
a state of affair. By contrast, as correlate of an identification of coincidence,
truth is an identity, i.e. the concordance between what is merely intended and
what is given. This concordance is experienced in evidence, i.e. evidence is the
Erlebnis of the truth66. I do not intend to deal here with Husserl theory of
truth in LUVI67. The iportant thing was to notice that on the basis of the
schema empty-fulfilled act Husserl can provide a phenomenological account of
truth and evidence. Furthermore, Husserl ‘discovers’ here that evidence has
different degrees. Even if from a different perspective the different degree of
evidence will be at the centre of the discourse of transcendental logic.
1.5 Kategoriale Anschauung
1.5.1 The question of kategoriale Anschauung
The question of categorial intuition is another fundamental piece of theory in
LU VI68. It is extremely complex and controversial and suffers from a charac-
teristic vagueness in Husserl’s own presentation. On the other hand, without
categorial intuition, an important piece of Husserlian phenomenology would
turn to be untenable. The crucial question to answer is then: What is and what
should be kategoriale Anschauung? In this formulation, the question is clearly
two-sided. On the one side, one must answer the question: what is kategoriale
66According to the second sense, truth is the knowing essence (erkenntnismäßigen Wesen)
taken as an idea, i.e. the idea of the adaequatio as such. According to the third sense, truth
is the verifying intention of the act of intution, i.e. the fact that the intutitive act, thanks
to its fulness, can be a verifucation for the mere intention of meaning. According to the
fourth sense, from the perspective of the act of meaning, truth can be the rightness of the
intention (Richtigkeit der Intention) (cf. [Hua XIX/2], §39, pp. 652-52). The most important
definition of truth, the one from which the others come, is the first one.
67For a deep account of this, cf. [Tugendhat, 1967].
68There are several interesting contributions on this topic. The most important are:
[Tugendhat, 1967]; [Levinas, 1978]; [Sokolowski, 1981]; [Bernet, 1988]; [Cobb-Stevens, 1990];
[Seebohm, 1990]; [Lohmar, 1998], III. 2; [Lohmar, 2008a]; [Majolino, 2008]. Moreover, one
should consider Heidegger’s interpretation and the literature about it. Cf. [Heidegger, 1979];
[Heidegger, 1986]; [Taminiaux, 1977].
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Anschauung for Husserl? On the other side, one must answer the question: is
the theory presented by Husserl coherent? does it really work? Every answer
that concerns exclusively one of the two sides is necessarily incomplete: the
‘vagueness’ itself, that carachterizes Husserl’s theory requires the reader who
really takes Husserl seriously to take a decision. In fact, the theory, as presented
in the LU, is incomplete, but represents nonetheless a great breakthrough that
deserves to be developed. In this context I cannot provide a full account of the
problem, however I will present the question and then some reflections about
it. The very general idea, which is also one of the reasons why this investigation
begins with an analysis of LU VI, is to show that already here, and in partic-
ular already in what I consider to be some neglected aspects of the discussion
of kategoriale Anschauung, there is space and need for a genetic account of the
relationships between the idealities of logic and experience, i.e. for a solution
of the gnoseologial dualism between sensibility and understanding69. To put it
differently, I would like to show that in some ‘non-developed’ insights of the
discussion of kategoriale Anschauung, and in particular in the double direc-
tion of the structure of the synthesis of coincidence, one can already find the
characteristic movement of explication that connects the layers of the genetic
constitution as expressed for example in EU.
Before going ahead with this topic, a couple of preliminary remarks are
necessary. 1) One must notice the difference of context between the first and
the second part of LU VI. Indeed, the transition from the first to the second
section of LU VI is important and illuminating. It can be read as the passage
from one sphere of Husserl’s theory of knowledge to another , i.e. it is the tran-
sition from a narrower, epistemological, to an enlarged, cognitive, dimension of
69In [Lohmar, 1998] one finds an analysis of categorial intuition that is framed in the
context of an analysis of Husserl’s – but also Hume’s and Kant’s – theory of pre-predicative
experience. Although my problem is slightly different, since I am trying to show where,
already here, one finds a particular demand for a genetic account of constitution, this is an
important reference for the analysis of categorial intuition
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it. As the title itself shows, the second section aims to the more general task
of investigating the relation between sensibility and understanding. In the first
section, the notion of knowledge, evidence and truth are at focus and Husserl
answers mainly questions like the following: what is knowledge? what is truth
and what is evidence? The path that Husserl follows in order to answer these
questions is a sort of ‘phenomenological translation’ of what was traditionally
understood under the title of adaequatio rei et intellectus. Furthermore, the
whole discussion is based, as I already tried to show, upon a distinction be-
tween empty and fulfilled intentions and the conviction that knowledge can
occurs only in the unity (unification through particular synthesis) of empty
and fulfilled intentions. Indeed, in the attempt of defining the notions of truth
and evidence, Husserl achieves a definition of what must be meant under the
title of knowledge.
2) Now, it is necessary to answer a simple question: What does it mean to
speak of categorial intuition? Is it perhaps the reintroduction of the intellectual
intuition (intellektuelle Anschauung) that Kant rejected in the first Critique70.
The answer to these question is negative. The kind of intellectual intuition is
something completely different. That notion of intuition involves a sort of
‘creative power’, i.e. the possibility of the knowing subject to produce himself
the object of the intuition, and consequently to know it, only by means of
intuition. Husserl’s concept goes in a different direction, towards the definition
of a ‘kind of act’ that can rather change the way to interpret the traditional
relationship between Understanding and Sensibility.
1.5.2 The fulfillment of categorial elements of signitive
acts
In the second part of LU VI Husserl deals with the problem of testing the
validity of the schema of knowledge previously drawn. If this schema holds,
there must be a fulfillment for the entire signitive intention, even when this
70Cf. KrV; cf. [Lohmar, 1998] III.2c
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intention is complex, formed, put in some articulated form71:
Im Falle der Wahrnehmungsaussage erfüllen sich nicht nur die ihr
eingeflochtenen nominalen Vorstellungen; Erfüllung durch die unter-
liegende Wahrnehmung findet die Aussagebedeutung im ganzen. [...].
Erscheint jemandem die Erfüllung nominaler Bedeutungen als hinre-
ichend klar, so stellen wir die Frage, wie die Erfüllung der ganzen Aus-
sagen, zumal nach dem, was über ihre „Materie“, d. h. hier über die
nominalen Termini hinausreicht, zu verstehen ist. Was soll und kann
den Bedeutungsmomenten, welche die Satzform als solche ausmachen,
und wozu beispielsweise die Kopula gehört – den Momenten der „kat-
egorialen Form“ – Erfüllung verschaffen? (LU VI, §40 [Hua XIX/2], p.
658)72.
The schema ‘empty–fulfilled intention’ seems to work well for empty in-
tentions that are not structured, for example for nominal intentions. When I
see a white piece of paper and I say “white piece of paper”, I am expressing
in an ‘adequate way’ something that is happening in my perception and that
is completely present to me. But if I say “this is a white piece of paper” the
situation is clearly different. In this case, I do not have a simple adaptation of
the expression to perception. Instead, I have something more, i.e. a particular
structure of the sentence that does not match completely into my perception.
The articulated structure also changes the meaning of the sentence, for I say
71Husserl deals here with a lacune (eine große Lücke) in his theory of knowledge that
concerns the objective categorial forms (kategorialen objektiven Formen), i.e the synthesis
in the sphere of the objectifying acts (cf. §40). This way of putting the question means two
things: 1) for Husserl there is no problem in the case of the fulfillment of nominal elements,
they can be fulfilled in an adequate way 2) the problem is with the sythetical elements of
the expression. In facts, these elements are carachteristic of the complex expression. The
problem is now to prove that also for these elements there is a fulfillment. It is important to
notice that §§ 40 and 41 of LU VI are written in a very general style. Here Husserl in mainly
interested in offering a general view of the problem and of a possible solution. For example
he uses here the words form and matter, without explaining what they precisely mean.
72In this passage, one finds two questions that are similar but not identical. The first
concerns what gives fulfillment to the entire sentence; the second what gives fulfillment to
those elements of the sentence that go beyond the nominal components. On this I shall
return later, but it can be noticed that Husserl seems to treat the two questions as they
were the same. Futhermore, here one can find the first informal occourrence of the term
‘matter’ (Materie) and a merely negative definition of it. Is does not have anything to do
with the matter of the act. On the contrary matter is here the element of the expression
that finds complete fulfillment in intuition. For example the nominal elements are matter of
the expression. Opposite to the notion of matter in this sense, there is what Husserl in the
previous passage define as the moment of the categorial form (Momenten der kategorialen
Form), i.e. those elements that give the structure of the sentence.
CHAPTER 1. KNOWLEDGE IN THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 61
that white is a predicate of the substrate piece of paper. In the structured sen-
tence there are some elements that exceed what I directly and simply perceive
when I see a white piece of paper. As Husserl says, in the meaning there is
a surplus (Überschuß), a form, that does not find confirmation in the presen-
tation of the thing itself in the intuition (cf. §40, [Hua XIX/2], p. 660). On
the other side, even for the structured expressions (geformten Bedeutungen)
there must be an element on the side of perception that allows the three terms
relation (empty intention–coincidence–intuition) to obtain. If this were not the
case, we could properly fulfill only those parts of the empty intentions which
intend elements that are directly present in our perception, and because of
this directly fulfilled. But this would imply the defeat of the project of the
Prolegomena, for knowledge and science are characterized by a propositional
structure. On the other side, abandoning the schema described in the first
section of LU VI would mean to abandon some important results that allows
to define in phenomenological terms some fundamental classical notions like
those of truth and evidence73. As a result, both the two possibilities, admitting
that one can only know in the case of simple unstructured expression and that
the schema does not hold for structured expressions, must be refused. Husserl
must now investigate what happens in the case of structured sentences such as
“the piece of paper is white”, “the piece of paper is on the table” and so on.
To be precise, as Husserl notices later in the same paragraph, also the
nominal elements, which actually have something like a complete fulfillment
in intuition, have their own structure of ‘matter’ (Materie) and ‘form’ (Form,
cf. §40). In the rest of the Investigation, however, Husserl seems to forget
this notation and treats the nominal elements as they had a proper complete
adequate fulfillment. In fact, there is a certain formality of the nominal element
itself. This is the formality that makes the essence of the act of meaning,
even of the simple nominal acts of meaning, a significational essence. In other
73These results are important for the late development of Husserlian phenomenology as
well. For example the question of evidence is crucial for the passage from one level to another
of the different disciplines of formal logic described in FTL.
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words, even in the case of “white piece of paper”, which finds fulfillment in the
perception of a white piece of paper here on my table, there is a formal element
that does not find fulfillment in the perception. This formal element is what
makes possible that different occurrences of the same expression have the same
meaning. In other words, both in the formed expression and in the nominal
(simple) expression there is a formal element that does not find a precise
counterpart in perception. The difference is that in the nominal expressions
the gap is not immediately noticeable, because it does not have a particular
grammatical form, like in the case of the syntactical elements of the discourse.
The correspondence between the empty intention and the intuition appears to
be complete. In fact, with the nominal elements of meaning we have simple
expression that refer to object. It is easy to see how something is given simply
in the intuition. A white piece of paper for example is given in perception
as a simple object. In other words, it is easy to think of the correspondence
between two simple things. On the contrary, it is problematic to think of the
correspondence of something like “this piece of paper is white”. This is the great
innovation of Husserl’s thought: also in intuition, i.e. in what traditionally was
named sensibility, there is a particular organization, an inner structure. In fact,
there are not only simple objects that correspond to the expressions of meaning,
but also complex structures (state of affairs) in intuition, which correspond to
complex expressions. As I will try to show, this is the way in which the question
of categorial intuition must be read: it is not an intuition of the understanding,
it is not the intuition of categorial forms it selfs. Rather it is the intuition of
something complex that corresponds to the categorically formed expressions.
the articulated structure of intuition will be clear in genetic phenomenology.
To conclude, one most notice that this notation has a further importance.
Indeed, it shows that also in the most simple case of expression there is a
gap between the side of meaning and the side of intuition. In other words, in
Husserl the side of the meaning and the side of the intuition, though on the
same plan, remain two different things that aim to different result. There is no
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reduction of the meaning to the intuition, nor vice versa.
1.5.3 The parallelism between empty and fulfilled in-
tentions: Stoff and kategoriale Form
The questions posed by Husserl in LU VI § 40, and extended to other cases
of structured expressions in the following paragraphs (cf. §41), run the risk of
being ambiguous. In LU VI § 42 Husserl defines what he means with the terms
form and matter, which until now he had used without a precise indication of
their meaning74.
In particular, the concept of matter (Stoff ) is not to be confused with the
concept of matter of the intentional act. In this context, Stoff refers to those
elements of the signitive expression that can be fulfilled directly in intuition.
Oppositely, the integrative forms are those elements of the signitive act that
cannot in any case find a fulfillment directly (in simple) intuition. Husserl
is now able to gain the more general distinction between form and matter
of presentation, which must hold for the whole category of objectifying acts,
i.e both for signitive empty acts and intuitive fulfilled acts. In § 42 Husserl
provides a new and very meaningful version of the “parallelism” between empty
and fulfilled acts. Moving from the new definition of Stoff and Form, Husserl
claims:
Wir fassen nämlich die den stoﬄichen resp. formalen Bestandstücken
der Bedeutungsintentionen entsprechenden Bestandstücke der Erfüllung
ebenfalls als „stoﬄiche“, resp. „formale“; und damit ist klar, was in der
Sphäre der objektivierenden Akte überhaupt als stoﬄich und als formal
zu gelten habe. ([Hua XIX/2], p. 665).
Especially meaningful is the claim that both on the signitive side and on
the intuitive side of knowledge it is possible to find a formal and a material
component. The material elements find a complete fulfillment in perception,
while the formal elements do not. This means that the formal elements can
be considered in a certain sense proper elements of the signitive acts and here
74This paragraph is to be compared with the Beilage I of [Hua XVII].
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they play a particular role. On the contrary, material elements seem to play
no crucial role in the context of the expression, while they find their particular
meaning once they are fulfilled. For this reason, they can be considered proper
elements of the intuitive side. In other words, we have a sort of interesting reci-
procity: on the signitive side something that belongs properly to the intuition,
i.e. the material elements that find their proper sense only in the fullness of
the intuition. On the other side, the formal elements are proper of the signi-
tive side and can play on the intuitive side only an indirect role. This way of
putting the discussion sheds a particular light on the whole argument, since it
shows an essential interpenetration of the two sides of knowledge. Both have
already in themselves something that is proper to the other side: the signitive
act has a material component, the intuitive act has a sort of formal one. Now,
it can be clear what role the material components play in the signitive act.
This is what Husserl explains with the discussion of fulfillment. What would
seem now natural to do is to investigate what kind of formality we can find
on the intuitive side, i.e. what role the formal elements in intuition play. This
is to some extent equivalent to the question of what the fulfillment of the for-
mal elements of the expression are, but it is not the same question. In fact,
it requires the comparison of the formality that one can find on the intuitive
side to the formality that one can find on the signitive side. On the signitive
side formality means a particular determined kind of synthesis (spontaneus),
which of course cannot be the case for the formal elements on the intuitive side.
If this were the case, the entire distinctions between intellect and sensibility
would fall apart.
The investigation of the formal elements on the side of intuition would be
the counterpart of the investigation of the fulfillment of material terms. In
other words, this could be an investigation of how the formal elements of the
intuitive side differ from the formal elements of the signitive side: in the same
way that the material element of the signitive acts are fulfilled in intuition
there can be a process that leads from the formal element of intuition to the
CHAPTER 1. KNOWLEDGE IN THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 65
formal elements of the signitive acts. Instead of taking this direction, Husserl
offers an analysis that shows how categorial acts are founded act in opposition
to the simple act of perception.
1.5.4 Supersensuos perception, simple and founded acts
We already noticed the importance of two questions: first, the question regard-
ing what fulfills the formal elements of the signitive expression; and second,
the question regarding what fulfills the entire sentence. This two questions are
considered by Husserl as a unique question and in the rest of the chapter (cf.
LU VI, §§ 45-52) he answers the second one75, providing an explanation of how
the categorial acts, oppositely to the simple acts of perception, are structured
act, i.e. founded act.
The development of Husserl’s discussion can be summarized in the following
way: 1) it is not possible that the formal elements are fulfilled in sensible
perception, 2) nonetheless they have to be fulfilled in intuition, as a conclusion
3) an enlargement of the notion of intuition is necessary. On the basis of this
argument, Husserl will propose the notion of super-sensuous perception (cf. LU
VI, §45). But immedialty before that, there is a passage that deserves to be
mentioned:
In der Tat können wir auf die Frage, was das heißt, die kategorial
geformten Bedeutungen fänden Erfüllung, sie bestätigten sich in der
Wahrnehmung, nur antworten: es heiße nichts anderes, als daß sie auf
den Gegenstand selbst in seiner kategorialen Formung bezogen seien.
Der Gegenstand mit diesen kategorialen Formen sei nicht bloß gemeint,
[...], sondern er sei uns, in eben diesen Formen selbst vor Augen gestellt;
mit anderen Worten: er sei nicht bloß gedacht, sondern eben angeschaut,
bzw. wahrgenommen ([Hua XIX/2], p. 671).
75At the beginning of LU § 45, Husserl poses the question again: “Zunächst, daß wirk-
lich auch die Formen Erfüllung finden, wie wir es ohne weiteres vorausgesetzt haben, bzw.
daß die ganzen, so und so geformten Bedeutungen und nicht etwa bloß die „stoﬄichen“
Bedeutungsmomente Erfüllung finden, macht die Vergegenwärtigung jedes Beispiels einer
getreuen Wahrnehmungsaussage zweifellos; und so erklärt es sich auch, daß man die ganze
Wahrnehmungsaussage einen Ausdruck der Wahrnehmüng und, im übertragenen Sinn, einen
Ausdruck dessen nennt, was in der Wahrnehmung angeschaut und selbst gegeben ist” (HU
XIX/2, p. 671).
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Here Husserl seems to claim that the same formal structure that charac-
terizes the syntactical elements on the signitive side can provide a form for the
intuitive side. But this is equivalent to say that the synthesis of the categorial
thought can be already effective in perception. I think this passage can lead
to confusion and here is to find one of the problems of Husserl’s explanation.
Indeed, Husserl says that the object is formed and that this form is perceived,
but it is not clear what this form really is and what role it plays here. This
passage can lead to one of the fundamental misunderstandings of the ques-
tion of categorial intuition, i.e. the fact that we perceive the categorial form
itself and consequently that we ‘see’ the categorial form in perception. To put
it differently, this means confusing the constitution of the fulfillment of the
categorial forms with the constitution of the categorial form itself.
Husserl distinguishes now between sensible and super-sensuous perception
by means of the distinction between simple and founded acts76. The key for
the solution of the problem is the following threefold structure (cf. LU VI, §48;
[Lohmar, 2008a]):
1. Gesamtwahrnehmung of the object. The object is intended as a whole by
means of a simple act, and its parts are intended only in an implicit way
2. gegliederde Sonderwahrnehmung of the parts of the object. The parts of
the object that were before only implicitly intended are now intended in
an explicit manner. Nonetheless there is not an intention of a new object,
but the explicit intention of the same object intended through one of its
moments previously only implicit.
76A fundamental passage in this distinction is the characterization of sensible perception as
simple perception. The fundamental idea, that gives the distance between sensible and cate-
gorial intention, is to be found in the following passage: “Man könnte nun auf diese Seibigkeit
Gewicht legen und sagen: Die Einheit sei doch Einheit der Identifizierung. Die Intention der
aneinandergereihten Akte decke sich fortgesetzt, und so komme die Einheit zustande. Dies
ist sicherlich richtig. Aber Einheit der Identifizierung — es ist unausweichlich diesen Unter-
schied zu machen — besagt nicht dasselbe wie Einheit eines Aktes der Identifizierung. Ein
Akt meint etwas, der Akt der Identifizierung meint Identität, stellt sie vor. In unserem Falle
ist nun Identifizierung vollzogen, aber keine Identität gemeint [Hua XIX/2], p. 679)”.
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3. the actual categorially synthetic intention, which is founded on the first
two moments.
The categorial act is for Husserl at the third level and is founded on the
simple acts of perception.
1.5.5 Categorial intuition: a reading
Husserl’s discussion of categorial intuition can run the risk of some ambiguities
and some possible criticisms can be advanced. Furthermore, some passages of
the argumentation can lead to misunderstanding, misleading interpretations
or confusions77. To be brief, I will try list some problematic aspects:
a) Husserl’s discussion runs the risk of confusing the argument for the
constitution of founded act in which the categorial act find its fulfillment with
the articulation of the categorial act itself. In other words, Husserl means
to answer the following question: where does the categorial parts of signitive
intentions find their fulfillment? But his answer, the fact that categorial acts
find their fulfillment in some articulated and founded acts, can bring to the
misleading conclusion that the categorial act itself is constituted in this way78.
The difference between the constitution of the categorial act can be confused
with the constitution of what fulfills this act. In other words, and it is important
to insist on this point, it must be clear that what Husserl describes at the
last point of the threefold analysis is the constitution of the fulfillment of the
categorial act. In fact, the categorial act itself is not in perception, because it
is characterized from formal elements (form of synthesis) that are not in the
perception79. I believe this is the most delicate part of Husserl’s analysis, from
77Just to mention a couple of them, one can think to Heidegger’s reading and the con-
nection he sees between his Seinsfrage and the question of categorial intuition in the Sixth
Logical Investigation.
78A discussion of the difference, absent in the LU, between Sachverhalt and Sachlage is
necessary to full understand this point.
79The formal element itself cannot be in perception, even if, as Husserl shoes in EU, it
founds its origin in perception
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where the other problems derive.
Connected to this there is another passage of Husserl’s argumentation that
I find problematic. In fact, Husserl starts from the consideration that the nom-
inal elements of expressions find a complete fulfillment in intuition. Even with
the remarks on the formality of nominal elements, this premise can be accepted.
Then Husserl considers a complex structured expression, which is composed of
nominal elements, and he notices that also the complex expressions as a whole
find fulfillment in intuition. Also this premise is acceptable, indeed also the
expressions like “this piece of paper is white” find fulfillment in intuition. On
the contrary, the third step is problematic. Indeed, the question that Husserl
wants to answer – where do the formal elements of the signitive side find their
fulfillment? – is the result of a sort of subtraction between the complex ex-
pression and the nominal elements of it80. The result are the formal elements
of the expression isolated from the rest of the meaning expression. Since the
whole expression has a fulfillment and its nominal elements have a fulfillment,
it seems clear for Husserl that the formal elements must have a fulfillment. But
from the fact that the whole expression has a fulfillment and that the nominal
elements have a fulfillment does not derive the fact that the formal elements
have a real fulfillment. As I tried to show discussing the parallelism, from this
derives the fact that there must be some formal structure in intuition itself
and explaining it is the task of categorial intuition, i.e. of an enlarged notion
of intuition in which not only simple object, but also complex state of affairs
are presented to us.
b) The most important condition that characterizes Husserl’s definition
of Anschauung is the presence of the object and the immediate reference of
the act to the object which is somehow presented, with a certain degree of
Fülle. But in Husserl’s view this condition seems to be lost. On the contrary,
categorial intuition is defined as a founded act, i.e. a mediated act. In other
words the question about what is immediately present in categorial intuition
80It is not a case that Husserl calls it a categorial difference.
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does not find a proper solution.
c)The discussion appears to be dependent on the concept of exceeding el-
ements of the signitive act. This is for example what led Heidegger to assert
that Husserl already dealt with the Seinfrage
d) Connected with the first remark, one can notice that Husserl’s discus-
sion makes difficult to appreciate in what sense the categoriale intuition is an
Anschauung (schauen), i.e. what kind of “vision”, if any, is categorial intuition.
e) It is difficult to appreciate the real distance and relations between cat-
egorial intuition and Wesensshau. This is already another direction of inves-
tigation. I just meant to notice that without a clarification of the notion of
categorial intuition, also a clarification of the relation with Wesensschau is
impossible.
f) Husserl’s argument seems to forget one direction of the schema empty-
fulfilled intention. In other words, it is focused on the direction that goes from
the empty to the fulfilled intuition. But, as I tried to show in the previous
paragraph, also the other direction of the schema is important. In this sense,
one must investigate also the direction that goes form the intuition to the
meaning. In this passage, categorial intuition plays a role. The double direction
of the schema is already what in genetic phenomenology will be called the
double direction in the foundation of the layers of sense.
The best way to express how I am trying to read the question of categorial
intuition is the discussion of the following schema (fig. 1.3, below).
In this schema, categorial intuition is neither the intuition or the constitu-
tion of the syntactical formal part of the signitive intention (thought), nor a
particular kind of creation or vision of the categorial element. On the contrary,
it is a structured intuition, i.e. the intuition of something complex and struc-
tured, with a proper order and proper laws. The sense of this will be clear in
genetic phenomenology. But already here it can be seen that sensibility is char-
acterized by an internal structure that makes possible a form of constitution
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Figure 1.3: Categorial intuition
of objects that are not simple and consequently the possibility of maintaining
the schema of knowledge. It must be clear that the categorial elements are not
constituted in sensibility, but only their fulfilling counterparts are. The consti-
tution of the threefold intuition remains on the side of intuition and gives as
result something different from the real categorial synthesis. The contribution
of the categorial synthesis (of the formal elements of the signitive side) remain
original, even if, as Husserl will show later, these are in a certain sense founded
in intuition, i.e. they find their origins the pre-predicative experience. More-
over, one must notice the real categorial syntheses – which provides knowledge
with its typical repeatability and formality – function exclusively on the signi-
tive side. Nonetheless, the articulation that characterizes the side of sensibility
is a condition for the formality on the side of the meaning. In other words, if
one considers the schema in the direction that goes from the intuition to the
meaning, categorial intuition has the role of leading this direction, since it is
a condition for the application of determined categorial forms.
The schema reveals a great insight of Husserl’s phenomenology: the relation
between understanding and sensibility are now different. The more noticeable
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aspect is that sensibility has its own organization and structure. This structure
will be explained in genetic constitution, where Husserl describes the typical
synthesis of pre-predicative experience. Furthermore, both understanding and
sensibility have their own role but they also share an analogical structure and
both are characterized by some sort of synthesis. Husserl’s discovery is that
the sensibility is already structured by means of some synthesis and that the
synthesis of understanding find their origin in the passive synthesis. This will
be the argument of the next chapters, but already the discussion of the cate-
gorial intuition makes it clear the further development of the theory. If there is
something that makes Sensibility and Understanding different is not their com-
plexity or the synthetical structure, both a reciprocal lackness: sensibility lack
the possibility of the repeatability, i.e. of the formality in the real (atemporal)
sense; understanding, as we already saw, lacks the Fülle, i.e. the presence (in
this sense the materiality) of the object. Both sensibility and understanding
can work on their on, but in order to know something, they need each other.
Finally, I would like to resume the sense of the present investigation quoting
a famous passage from the KrV: «Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauun-
gen ohne Begriffe sind blind» (KrV, A 51/B75). From the present perspective,
this is one of the most important insights of Kant’s critical philosophy and it
shows a general prerequisite for theory of knowledge, which is only possible
through a real inter-penetration of sensibility and understanding. What Hus-
serl achieves in the LU is to explain what it means for ‘concepts’ to be fulfilled,
i.e what it means for concepts to be empty without intuition. However, what
is lacking here is a consideration of the second direction of the quotation, i.e.
an explanation of what it means for intuitions to be blind without concept.
Nonetheless, one finds already here the basis for the development of Husserl’s
later genetic philosophy: intuitions are not merely blind, they can see in a cer-
tain sense. They can see at least what kind of categorial forms ‘can be applied’.
This is the sense of categorial intuition that I am trying to focus on and that is
to be connected with the later development of Husserl’s genetic phenomenol-
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ogy.
1.5.6 Note on the categorial Representation
The question of the categorial representation (kategoriale Repräsentation) is
strictly connected to the question of the categorial intution81. We already met
this notion when we briefly analysed some of the senses of the word presentation
(Vorstellung) discussed in LU V. In §32 of that Investigation, representation
was defined as that component of the act that is necessary for the matter to
completely and fully realize (cf. [Hua XIX/2], LU V, §32). According to Hus-
serl, representants are the ultimate necessary basic bases of the acts. In fact,
there are in sum different modes of the relation of an act to its object: 1) the
quality of the act, i.e. the different modes of the believe, wishing, doubting and
so on; 2 the underlying representation, which is divided in three parts. 2a) the
apprehensional form (Auffassungsform, which isthe proper representation and
that indicates whether the object is presented in a purely signitive, or intu-
itive, or perceptive or mixed fashion. This is the element that also indicates if
the object is presented in the wise of perception or of any other intuition. The
representation is then connected to the basic sensible elements (sensations)
and gives the degree of fulness of an act. 2b) the apprehensional matter (Auf-
fassungsmaterie) that indicate the ‘sense’ of the relation to the object, i.e., as
we already saw, it indicates ‘how’ the object is referred. 2c) the apprehensional
contents (ufgefaßten Inhalte) that indicates whether the object is referred by
way of this or that sign82.
81Cf. [Hua XIX/2], LUVI ch. VII, which is devoted to this topic. It is an extremely con-
troversial problem, since it is the object of self criticism (cf. Vorwort zur 2. Auflage der 6.
LU in [Hua XIX/2], p. 533; [Hua XX/1], Text nr. 5. Although the question is crucial and
would deserve particular attention, here I cannot analyze it question in detail, but only to
make some general consideration. For a deeper account, see [Lohmar, 1990].
82cf. [Hua XIX/2], §27, p. 624. In the english translation one finds respectively interpreta-
tive form, interpretative matter, interpretative contents for the differences at point 2 (cf. [LI],
p. 245). This schema completes the composition of the act according to Husserl. It makes
clearer why an act of perception and an act of imagination can have the same matter (once
the representation is abstracted) and different degrees of fulness. Even more important, it
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In simple intuition, representation and matter of an act are inseparable,
although they are distinguishable. For example an act of imagination and an
act of perception can refer to the same presentation and have the same matter,
better the same matter without considering representation. In fact, the compo-
nent that in the matter of the two acts make it possible to distinguish between
their degree of Fülle is properly the representation. In simple intuitions these
two elements can be separated only by abstraction, but their difference is for
Husserl important, and representation gives the degree of fulness, i.e. allow the
matter to realize and indicates how the matter realizes, for example either in
an act of imagination or in an act of perception. In simple intuition, it is clear
for Husserl what distinguishes the perception of an apple from the image of
the same apple just perceived. In general, these two acts can be thought of as
two acts that have the same matter (matter once representation is abstracted)
and two different representans. Representation is then that element that to-
gether with matter establishes the peculiar nature of an act. It is in a certain
sense the ‘vehicle of matter’, which allows it to realize either in the wise of an
act of perception (with the maximum degree of Fülle) or, for example, in the
wise of an act of imagination (with a lower degree of Fülle) or in the wise of
a different intuition. In the sphere of simple intuition, the sensible represen-
tants can be the same even when the apprehension sense changes, but also the
opposite holds. In other words, the representant of an act is that component
that outside the intentional essence says what degree of fulness the act has.
The representant is connected to the presence of the object. It is the presence
of the object that produces different sensations that are the basis of the differ-
ent representans, which can be more or less vivid. For example, in perception
we have the maximum vivacity, because the object in concretely present. And
this is precisely why the act of perception the ideal form of fulfillment. By
contrast, meaning intuition are notoriously empty and they do not have real
representing, but only indirect ones, i.e. the representants by which they are
also makes the relation between an act of meaning and an act of intuition.
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fulfilled.
Husserl’s problem in LU VI, ch. VII is to answer the following question:
which are the representants of categorial intuitions? I do not intend to follow
the whole argumentation, but only to notice that in the answer to it, Husserl
makes a mistake which is similar to the one that I tried to stress in the discus-
sion of categorial intuition: he confuses the constitution of the fulfillment of the
categorial act with the constitution of the categorial act itself. Consequently, he
tries to answer the question about the representants of categorial acts them-
selves and not to that of the representants of the fulfillment of categorial acts.
Whereas these latter have representants, since they are complex intuitions, the
categorial acts themselves do not. Categorial intuitions are not the categorial
act itself, but the complex structure in sensibility (the enlarged lawful sensi-
bility) that allows the application of the categorial acts and are the fulfillment
of them. Whereas simple intuitions refer to objects, categorial intuitions refer
to state of affairs intuited as objects. Their representants will be a particular
combination of the representats of those elements that join (blend) in the state
of affairs. Let me insist on this point. According to my previous analysis the
state of affairs is the fulfillment of the categorial act. It is a formal structure in
sensibility that allows the application of a categorial forms in understanding:
I can express ‘the apple is red’, since I can perceive a particular state of affair.
The perception of the state of affair is a complex founded perception. It not the
mere union of the elements red and apple perceived singularly. It is a complex
perception in which the two are unified according to a form. But this is not
yet the categorial form "is" or "and" and so on. According to this, it is neces-
sary to seek for the represents of the state of affairs and not of the categorial
forms (syntheses) "is", "and" and so on. In particular the representant of the
the state of affair is given by a particular fusion of the representants of the
single elements that are combined in the state of affair. This is the analogues
of the representant of simple intuitions that Husserl is seeking in ch. VII.
Chapter 2
Methods and Logics
2.1 Static and genetic phenomenology
Theory of knowledge as presented in the first chapter of this work represents
the core of LU and is developed in the framework of what is commonly known
as static phenomenology.
Two things must be carefully taken into consideration. First, the relation
between sensibility and understanding was framed in that particular notion
of pure logic that I discussed at the very beginning of this work (cf. 1.1). In-
deed, it was the attempt of founding a pure doctrine of science that required a
‘preliminary’ discussion of the relation between sensibility and understanding.
As a consequence, the analysis of this relation is dependent on the notion of
pure logic that Husserl describes in the Prolegomena and the foundation of
which is the aim of the whole Logical Investigations. Second, I already tried
to show (cf. 1.2.1) that Husserl’s analysis of the relation between sensibility
and understanding can be presented in terms of the discovery of a new vertical
dimension. But in the context of LU, this discovery could not be completely
developed, because of the general framework of the analysis. Indeed the no-
tion of act, and consequently the schema empty-fullfilled intention, was still
a horizontal two-sided notion. The vertical dimension is here only implied in
the structure of the three moments of the constitution of the fulfillment of
the categorial act (cf. fig.1.3). Nonetheless, it was not clearly visible (explicit),
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because the dominant structure of the phenomenological analysis was that of
act, as developed in LU V. Here the act of consciousness is intended as al-
ready given, as a ‘closed structure’ with its horizontal dimension. To use a
later terminology, the relation ego-cogito-cogitatum is given ‘in one blow’ and
the phenomenological investigation aims to the analysis of this relation1. As a
consequence, the possibility of a vertical dimension of the act itself, the pos-
sibility of a vertical (deep) constitution of the act itself, was not at focus. To
put it simply, the vertical dimension was discovered in the context of a rela-
tion between acts and not in the context of the proper act analysis, which is
the analysis of the constitution of an act of consciousness. If the constitution
of the categorial fulfillment of the act had a proper vertical dimension, this
was not the case for the constitution of the act itself, which was already given
as a ‘primitive’ basic structure. On the contrary, in order to appreciate the
full importance of this Husserlian ‘revolution’, that of moving from a horizon-
tal to a vertical theory of knowledge2, one must look at what goes under the
name of genetic phenomenology and at the related notion of logic. After some
general considerations on the development of genetic phenomenology, I will
discuss in detail the related notion of logic, which is now not only pure but also
transcendental3.
1Cf. [Welton, 2003], p. 262 e [Hua VI] (Krisis), §50.
2For a brief but illuminating discussion of the difference between vertical and horizontal
with respect to the phenomenological methods. Cf. [Welton, 2003], §2.
3Among others, the main questions that I intend to answer in this chapter are the follow-
ing: what is the difference between static and genetic constitution? is there really anything
like a turn or ‘revolution’ between the one method and the other? Why does genetic phe-
nomenology requires as counterpart a transcendental logic? And finally, what is the sense
of transcendental logic in Husserl? For the sake of clarity, let me reveal some of the an-
swers in advance. First, the difference between the two methods can be explained in terms
of difference between the two members of the following pairs: horizontal/vertical analysis;
ontological/explicative approach; micro/macro phenomenology. According to my reading,
there is no turn between the two methods, but a necessary deepening of the act analysis.
Second, genetic phenomenology requires a transcendental logic as counterpart because it is
more dynamic than static analysis. Indeed transcendental logic is more dynamic than pure
logic because the subjective side of logic is here explored and consequently the connection
with experience. In other words, transcendental logic allows Husserl to explain the conti-
nuity of the two branches of knowledge (sensibility and understanding) and the continuous
movement (dynamis) between them. Third, transcendental logic can mean different things,
which are however interconnected. It means a logic that considers not only the form but
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The literature is rich in contributes on the difference between static and
genetic phenomenology4. However, it often happens that in these analyses the
distinctive connection between genetic phenomenology and the particular kind
of logic that this phenomenological method requires is not well explained or,
worse yet, not taken into account. In addition, some readings run the risk
of remaining purely abstract, as the mere juxtaposition of two different phe-
nomenological methods5. In these, the emphasis is more on the question of the
continuity (or discontinuity) of the two, rather than considering specific cases
of application, in order to show which the differences are. In other words, many
discussions on the difference between static and genetic phenomenology focus
on a mere abstract juxtaposition of the two phenomenological approaches, as
if the sole crucial question is whether there is a turning point between the
two or the latter method leads to completely overcome the first. Although
these kinds of methodological considerations can be significant, I believe that
dwelling exclusively on them is a betrayal of the authentic phenomenological
spirit. The same holds for those readings which dwell on historical or philolog-
ical questions. Of course, all these elements of the investigation – the general
comparison between two methods, the historical and the philological question
also the contents through a particular consideration of the question of evidence; it means
discovery of the subjective side and consequently explanation of the possibility of the refer-
ence to experience in order to found the logical principles; it also means the analysis of the
genealogy of logic itself.
4Among Husserl’s texts, very important is the manuscript BIII 10. Concerning sec-
ondary literature: [Sokolowski, 1964]; [Sallis, 1967]; [Aguirre, 1970]; [Larrabee, 1976];
[Holenstein, 1972]; [Almeida, 1972]; [Snyder, 1981]; [Welton, 1982]; [Derrida, 1990];
[Lohmar, 1998]; [Steinbock, 1998]; [Montavont, 1999], ch. 1; [Bégout, 2000]; [Lee, 2002];
[Rabanaque, 2003]; [Welton, 2003].
5“I must begin with a precaution and a confession. When, in order to approach a philos-
ophy, one is armed not only with a pair of concepts – here, “structure and genesis” – that
has been determined or overburdened with reminiscences by a long problematical tradition,
but also with a speculative grid in which the classical figure of an antagonism is apparent
from the start, then the operative debate which one prepares to undertake from within this
philosophy, or on the basis of it, is in danger of appearing to be not so much an attentive
scrutiny as a putting into question, that is, an abusive investigation which introduces before-
hand what it seeks to find, and does violence to the physiology proper to a body of thought.
[...] Thus, the presumption of a conflict between the genetic approach and the structural
approach from the outset appears to be superimposed upon the specificity of what is given
to a virgin glance.” ([Derrida, 2001], p. 193-4)
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– are important. But the lack of a particular case of application means the
impossibility of the comprehension of the whole structure of phenomenology.
Regarding the relation between the two methods, a passage from Derrida can
be illuminating:
And if the question ‘structure or genesis’ had been exposed to Hus-
serl ex abrupto, I wager that he would have been quite astonished to
see himself called into such a debate; he would have answered that it
depends upon what one intends to speak about. There are some givens
which must be described in terms of structure, and others which must
be described in terms of genesis ([Derrida, 2001], p. 194)6.
The best way to show this is to consider what changes between a static and
a genetic analysis with regard to a particular question, such as, in this case,
the synthesis of coincidence7. Regarding the philological question, it must be
noticed that Husserl never devoted a complete and exhaustive discussion to the
question of the differences between static and genetic analysis. Consequently,
important passages are to be found in the manuscripts8. In these Husserl is
dealing with specific problems, such as the question of monadic intersubjectiv-
ity or the constitution of the world. Therefore the discussion of the difference
6Is not phenomenology the philosophy of the return to the thing themselves? This is
another way to put the question. Phenomenology is characterized by a dynamic method,
a method that has to adapt to the things, to the object of the investigation. For example,
if the aim of our analysis is the constitution of the object of an act of consciousness, then
static analysis is enough. In this case, there is a fixed starting point, the already given act,
and the object is constituted as object of the act. On the contrary, if the analysis aims to the
constitution of the act itself, there is need for a more dynamic method, since there cannot
be fixed starting point. There is need of a genetic analysis that can explain the constitution
of the act. The same holds for particular phenomena that involve a particular relation with
time constitution.
7We saw in the first chapter what the role of the the synthesis of coincidence (of the
different degrees of that synthesis) between two acts different kinds is. In the last chapter,
we will see what the role of coincidence is in one of that acts, i.e. in the constitution of the
act of perception.
8Significant are Manuscripts B III 10 (1921-23) and A V 3 (1933). The first is published
in parts diverse volumes of Husserliana. Particularly relevant are the parts published as
following: 1) Statische und Genetische Phänomenologische Methode (1921), in [Hua XI], pp.
336-345 (from now on SgpM); 2) Beilage I of [Hua XIV], pp. 34-42. The second is published as
text nr. 35 of [Hua XV], pp. 613-627. It is worth noting that the manuscripts did not spread
until they have been published in the Husserliana. As a result, even important philosophers
were not given the opportunity to deal directly with these texts. Philosophers like Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Sartre, understood that a difference between the two methods was
at work in Husserl’s philosophy, but they understood and metabolized it according to their
interests and philosophies.
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between static and genetic is developed as part of a broader discussion and,
consequently, is adjusted to a particular context. Among other things, in the
next chapter, I will try to highlight the differences between static and genetic
method with reference to the synthesis of coincidence, i.e. to the role that this
synthesis plays in two different kinds of constitutional analysis. Indeed, this is
a good witness of the transition from static to genetic phenomenology and of
the subsequent ‘enlargement’ of the vertical dimension of Husserl’s theory of
knowledge. Then the question of the continuity of the two methods will follow
as a consequence.
This way of putting things offers a particular picture of phenomenology
and its structure. In fact, the result is a particular symmetry: on the one
side, static analysis and the notion of pure logic of the Prolegoma; on the
other side, the genetic analysis and the characteristic notion of logic of FTL.
Logic and method are not the same thing, even if they run the risk of being
confused. In fact, they are strictly connected to each other and the introduction
of a new phenomenological approach requires new instances in the notion of
logic as well. As a result, if genetic phenomenology is more ‘dynamic’ than
static phenomenology, since it deals with the whole ‘development’ of an act of
consciousness, transcendental logic will be more dynamic than the pure logic
of the Prolegomena. In fact, introducing the question of the subjective side of
logic, is a way of making logic dynamic, since it requires a regress (passage)
to experience in order to have its principles explained. In other words, logic
as theory of sciences cannot remain in the limited field of traditional formal
logic. The major witness of this new dynamism of logic is the discovery, the
complete development, of the question of evidence. In fact, this is what allows
the passage, and consequently the connection, from logic to experience and
this is what was still lacking in the Prolegomena, where the characterization
of logic as theory of science could not yet be accomplished.
It must be noticed that already in the question of categorial intuition there
was a certain appeal to experience (sensibility) in order to justify (found) a
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logical (categorial) entity. Indeed, as mentioned above, already in the LU there
was a need, or better a demand, for a sort of genetic analysis. However, this was
by no means comparable to the complex structure of experience that Husserl
is able to reach through genetic analysis. It is only the genetic approach that
makes Husserl able to describe the very vertical structure of the constitution
of consciousness, and consequently of theory of knowledge as well.
Around the Twenties Husserl concretely moved from an ‘old’ to a ‘new’
phenomenological method, i.e. from static to genetic phenomenology. From
this period one finds a ‘double expression’ of phenomenology or, as Husserl
also asserts, “two points of view” in phenomenology (cf. [Hua XIV], Beilage I):
In gewisser Weise scheidet also ‘erklärende’ Phänomenologie als Phä-
nomenologie der gesetzmäßigen Genesis und beschreidende’ Phänome-
nologie als Phänomenologie der möglichen, wie immer gewordenen We-
sensgestalten im reinen Bewußtsein und ihrer teleologischen Ordnung im
Reich der möglichen Vernunft unter den Titeln ‘Gegenstand’ und ‘Sinn’.
In der Vorlesungen sagte ich nicht ‘bescreibende’, sondern ‘statische’
Phänomenologie (SgmP, [Hua XI], p. 340)9.
First of all, let me make some general remarks on this quote. Husserl dis-
tinguishes between two phenomenological methods and associates to them two
general typologies or approaches in philosophy. On one side an explanatory
(but also explicative) phenomenology; on the other side, a descriptive, phe-
nomenology. This distinction gives the sense of the difference between the two
phenomenological methods. To explicate something means to analyze it in full
details, also with regards to its motivations, to its causes and to its effects,
to what concerns the object and is not present in that particular mode of ap-
pearing of the object. Not only, so to say, to make a list of the causes or the
consequences of something, but also to put something in a complex structure of
relations with its causes and effects. In this structure all the nexus are brought
to light and put in some order, there is always a motivation that explains the
connections, i.e. a motivational nexus between something and its causes or ef-
9To be noticed that in this manuscript Husserl is also preoccupied with the question of
systematicy and systematic phenomenology. On this topic see [Welton, 2003].
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fects and its hidden sides. The nexus are ‘unfolded’, ‘explicated’, the structure
of what is below is traced (recognized) in the structure of what is above in
the order of constitution, and the two are taken to their common structure of
origin. On the contrary, to describe means a ‘more superficial’ kind of analysis
that considers something as it appears with its ‘present’ features, properties
and qualities. There is no interest for the relations below, for what concerns the
something but is not present at that precise moment of the appearing thing.
These two approaches are not an Husserlian invention. What is Husserlian, is
to adjust these two attitudes to the study of consciousness and to covert them
in an effective two-sided phenomenological analysis.
Let me try to give an example of these two general approaches to things.
If I consider these glasses on my table I can analyze them in two ways. First, I
can provide a full description of them. I can describe their form in detail, I can
describe their color, their dimensions, their position on the table. These glasses
are black, they have the following dimensions, the distance between the lens
is the following, their lenses are square, the arms of the glasses are bended at
the end, they are made out of this material with the following properties, and
so on. All these are descriptions of the glasses that take into consideration the
glasses as they appear on the table in front of me, in this moment and for this
particular description. I isolate the fact – the situation of affairs or the object –
that the glasses are on the table and I describe them. In other words, I provide
a description of this determinate state of the glasses. This is a static analysis
that considers the glasses only with respect to their actual state, i.e. with
respect to the particular condition in which they are in a specific time10. To
10This specific time can be an instant but also a period of objective time. One could
say that some phenomenon like the perception of a melody, are essentially to be analyzed
from a genetic perspective. Because they essentially involve a partcular role of time. But
this is objective time and not inner time consciousness. Here a further discussion of the
renstriction of genetic phenomenology to certain domains of temporal objects should be
opened. But it would lead too far. In my view, however, static and genetic phenomenology
are not two different methods for two different kinds of objectuality. On this question, and
on the more or less radical distinction between static and genetic, see the opposite positions
of [Holenstein, 1972], pp. 28-29; [Larrabee, 1976].
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put it differently, this is a static analysis because it considers a particular state
of something, i.e. how something appears at a certain point, at a determinate
time.
On the other hand, I can explain what the glasses are made for. I can ex-
plain their function, i.e. I can provide an analysis of the use of the glasses.
Furthermore I can explain how the glasses are made, the process of their con-
struction. I can also say to whom the glasses belong and why they are on
the table. Again, I can also decompose the glasses and analyze every part, its
function as part of the glasses or as single isolated part. In a few words, I can
illustrate ‘different histories’ concerning the glasses. The history of their social
function, the history of these particular glasses, the history of how they are
made. All these explanations do have to do with the object here on the table
only in a broad sense. They do not describe the object glasses as it is on the
table in front of me, as the first kind of analysis does. They do not analyze
the glasses as object on the table, but they take into account a broader hori-
zon of this object. In this broader horizon, the object has relations to other
things, but also to different moments of its own history. All these elements
are, so to say, ‘invisible’ during the first kind of analysis because they are not
at focus. But they are nonetheless there. To use another metaphor, one can
think of a photography. On the one hand, one can provide a static analysis, a
description, of the photo. But the photo is also the result of the development
from a negative. In order to analyze the printed photo, the image so to say,
one does not need to explain any relation to the ‘underlaying’ negative. But
it is possible, if the aim is not a mere description of the photo, to refer to the
relation to the negative. More radically, one can also explain the relation of the
negative to the real things represented into the picture. We are speaking here
of two different general kinds of analysis. If the first is aimed to a description
of something as it appears in a particular state of its existence, the second
intends to explain, to bring to light, the relations of this object with other
objects, or with its own constitutive parts. Now it must be seen what these
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different strategies mean in the particular case of phenomenology.
2.1.1 Static phenomenology and ontology
Static phenomenology, what Husserl calls also descriptive, phenomenology,
goes under the title of the first approach. Since phenomenology has to do with
consciousness, i.e. with the essential structures of consciousness, this method
provides an investigation of the possible forms of essence of pure conscious-
ness. As we saw in the previous quotation, static phenomenology does not
investigate the way in which the essences became essences. Rather, it takes
into consideration their teleological order in the domain of reason as they can
be ‘objects’ or ‘senses’, i.e. object constituted by a constituting subjectivity,
by a consciousness that through its acts gives them a sense. Within static
phenomenology, the acts of consciousness that constitute the object, that in-
tend the object, are already given. What is at issue is the structure of these
acts, the way in which they constitute the objects of experience. This form of
constitution is rather superficial, for the objects are constituted only insofar
they became object of an act of consciousness. Neither all the degrees of the
constitution of an object are at focus, nor the development of the constituting
subjectivity. This means that the object investigated by static phenomenology
are already there, somehow pre-constituted for the intentional consciousness11.
In fact, static analysis takes as its starting point what is already given inten-
tionally, without questioning the source, the origin or the process of formation
of its objects. Whatever its genesis is, what is presented in intentional con-
sciousness has a certain intentional structure that can be unraveled by means
of static analysis.
Whether they are real or ideal, the objects of static phenomenology are
‘stable’. Focusing on the noetic-noematic correlation, static phenomenology in-
11“Static analysis grasps the individual from the side of essence. As a result the individ-
ual is a factum determined by a universal, and is not discussed in terms of its perceptual
composition nor in terms of its progressive constitution throughout a linguistic explication
which is temporal” ([Welton, 1983], p. 169).
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vestigates the connections and the relations of a living experience in which its
objects came teleologically to givenness. In other words, static phenomenology
takes into account finished apperceptions, as Husserl says, here the appercep-
tions are awakened as finished, as already formed, they do have a history, which
however is not taken now into consideration12.
According to these premises, it is now intelligible that the final aim of
this kind of phenomenological consideration (Betrachtung) is to describe and
clarify the different essential correlations between the acts of consciousness
constituting objects and the ways of givenness of the objects themselves:
Als statisch kann ich wohl phänomenologische Forschungen bezeich-
nen, die den Korrelation zwischen konstituierendem Bewusstsein und
konstituierter Gegenständlichkeit nachgehen und genetische Probleme
überhaupt ausschliessen ([Hua XIV], p. 38).
According to the quotation above, within static phenomenology one must clar-
ify the sense of the objects, investigating their complexes of appearance in the
offering consciousness. In doing so, static analysis takes the form of an analysis
of essences, it seeks to uncover the invariant, which has a universal validity, of
the acts of consciousness and of the objects, which those acts constitute.
In sum, static phenomenology remains in the field of the intentional descrip-
tion of the object. As an object this is already given, it is already constituted
(das Gebilde). What is constituting now, the kind of constitution that static
analysis takes into account, is the way in which this object offers itself to
the pure consciousness. Static phenomenology, the phenomenology of LU and
Ideen I, has the task of clarifying the essential relations between the object
and the different ways in which it becomes an object of consciousness. Neither
the deep (full) constitution of the object, nor the constitution (the history) of
the subject are here at issue.
Whereas in SgmP the difference between static and genetic phenomenol-
ogy is analyzed in the context of an analysis of apperception, in manuscript
12“Aber in der ‘statischen’ Betrachtung haben wir ‘fertige’ Apperzeptionen, Apperzep-
tionen treten auf und werden als fertige geweckt und haben eine weit zurückliegende ‘Ge-
schichte’ (SgmP, [Hua XI], p. 345).
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A V 3 the analysis is framed in the broader discussion on the world (Welt),
the finished already constituted world (die fertige konstituierte Welt), and the
historical World (menschlich-historische Welt). As a consequence, the main
character of static analysis, that of dealing with object that are (almost) al-
ready constituted, is expressed in terms of the constitution of the world and
the constituting subject, i.e. in terms of the constitution of the world for the
constituting subject:
Das ist also statische Phänomenologie. Ich analysiere ontologisch den
Seinssinn Welt und korrelativ frage ich nach den Seinsgewissheiten, und
zwar konkret nach den Gegebenheitsweisen. Die ontologische Analyses
ist Leitfaden für die Analyse der korrelativen Seinsgeltungen ([Hua XV],
p. 616)13.
Static analysis deals with the typic of the objects and of the possible ob-
jects and aims to explain the apriori conditions of the eidetic structures of
consciousness. The result is an ontology, in which the object that has become
objects for the consciousness are framed. In other words, the objects become
object for the consciousness once they are ‘apperceived’ and are framed in an
ontology, which, according to the kind of objectuality taken into consideration,
can be formal or material. To conclude, static analysis produces a universe of
essences distributed according to their peculiar ontological properties. It must
only be noticed that for phenomenology an essence is not a real entity, but
the essential, the invariant (the universal) in the relation between an object
and the respective act through which it is given to consciousness. Static phe-
nomenology aims to the apriori structure of consciousness that allows an object
to access the realm of being, i.e. the realm of sense-donating objects.
To conclude I would like to emphasize a parallelism that can be useful later.
The distinction between static phenomenology (which reveals the ontological
regions) and constitutive phenomenology (which gives different levels of ex-
13“Idee der statische Phänomenologie: die universale Struktur der Weltgeltung, die En-
thüllung der Geltungsstruktur in Rückbeziehung auf die ontologische Struktur als die der
geltenden Welt selbst. Geltungsstruktur = das System als die der geltenden Welt selbst”
([Hua XV], p. 615).
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planation of the nexus between the objects and the act of consciousness) is
similar – it is a case of – to a difference that one finds in FTL, where Husserl
distinguishes between formal ontology and logic as theory of science. This one
needs the discovery of the subjective side of logic that cannot be investigated
only on the basis of the formal apriori structures. By contrast, it requires an
explication. The passage from the purely formal logic to the subjective logic is
precisely a passage from a static to a genetic approach.
2.1.2 The analysis of constitution
Following a suggestion of sgpM, the scholars normally distinguish three levels
of phenomenology. The first level and the third level are those already men-
tioned of static and genetic analysis. Between these two, there is a second level,
that of the constitutive analysis14. It is quite clear what static phenomenology
is and this method can also be framed in a particular historical context, which
goes from the LU to Ideen. In contrast to static analysis, from the 1920s genetic
analysis discloses the deep layers of constitution, bringing to the light the ‘his-
tory’ of consciousness (‘Geschichte’ des Bewußtseins). What is the level that
Husserl calls ‘konstitutive Phänomenologie’? And moreover, is there a sense
in the succession of these three levels as Husserl presents them? Is it neces-
sary that phenomenology develops in the order from static analysis to genetic
analysis through a phenomenology of constitution? Is not all phenomenology
a philosophy of constitution?
According to the present view, static phenomenology is “limited to the im-
mediately intuitable, essential structures of trascendental subjectivity” ([Welton, 2003],
p. 260). It can also be called analytic, phenomenology or, following some schol-
ars, categorial phenomenology, i.e. a method whose result is a typic of inten-
14In a note of B III 10, Husserl writes:“Phänomenologie: 1) Universale Phänomenologie
der allgemeinen Bewußtseinsstrukturen; 2) Kostitutive Phänomenologie; 3) Phänomenologie
der Genesis” ([Hua XI], p. 340, n. 1). To be noticed that Husserl is led here by the underlying
idea of arguing for a systematic phenomenology.
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tionality15.
In Ideen, in a very important paragraph entitled “Die phänomenologische
Zeit und das Zeitbewußtsein”, Husserl explains the main reason why static
analysis can only be a proper part of the whole phenomenological enterprise:
“Fortunately we can leave out of account the enigma of consciousness of time in
our preliminary analyses without endangering their rigor” ([Ideas I], p. 192)16.
Static analysis excludes from its field of investigation the questions regarding
the consciousness of time. But on the other hand, time and time constitution
are fundamental aspects of consciousness, they are so important that Husserl
defines them as the enigma of time, i.e. the fundamental problem to be solved
in order to fully comprehend the structure and constitution of consciousness.
What does it mean that static analysis excludes the question of time? On
this I shall return later, for now it should suffice to observe that a method
that does not take into account the enigma of consciousness cannot pretend
to be complete and has a very limited field of application. In fact, we saw
that static phenomenology generates some sort of ontology and ontology deals
with the being – things that are already some sort of ‘entity’ – and not with
the becoming – with the process of becoming a being17. But is static analysis
really only an ontology? Is it really limited to the constitution of the object of
consciousness? Some passages from the manuscripts that we are considering
show how static analysis has an additional constitutional meaning. Besides
the investigation on the universal structure of validity of consciousness, static
analysis can move a step forward. It is possible to achieve a further level
15“Husserl calls this ‘analytic phenomenology’. I want to call this first ordering ‘categorial
phenomenology’. The key to categorial phenomenology is that it is built upon, as it restricts
itself to, the relationship between things appearing as something and to whom or for whom
they appear. By classifying or categorizing the essential for of cognition, it supplies a typology
of intentionality” ([Welton, 2003], p. 262.
16“Zum Glück können wir die Rätsel des Zeitbewußtseins in unseren vorbereitenden Anal-
ysen außer Spiel lassen, ohne ihre Strenge zu gefährden”([Hua III/1], §81, p. 198). The
question of time is of vital importance, cf. [de Warren, 2009]
17“Constitutive phenomenology must penetrate to the underlying modalizations and trans-
formations that give rise to the manifest structures. In this way constitutive analysis uncovers
a depth to the ‘sphere of being’ first opened by the transcendental reduction and described
by categorial analysis” ([Welton, 2003], p. 262.
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indicated now as constitutive phenomenology.
In the manuscript this is described as that level of analysis that draws and
follows the history of the apperceptions and of the categories generated by the
statical ontological analysis18.
In opposition to the purely horizontal static analysis, which follows the
noesis-noema schema, Husserl speaks now of a typica of nexus of conscious-
ness at different degrees of its development ([Hua XIV], p. 41)19. The idea is
that through the enlargement of static analysis, which is not to be intended as
a purely ontological method, one can discover what in general can be called
the ‘historicity of consciousness’. In this particular case, what is discovered is
the ‘historicity of apperceptions’, i.e. the fact that every apperception presup-
poses another apperception and can in turn be a presupposition for a further
possible one. In this case the historicity of consciousness, its dynamism, coin-
cides with the series of the presuppositions that bring from an apperception
to another. Apperceptions are given as unifying act, but now the possibility of
a connections between the apperceptions is recognized. In other terms, purely
static analysis deals with already formed apperceptions given as a unique and
unifying act referred to an object, to whom they give a sense as object of con-
sciousness. By contrast, this intermediate level deals with the possibility of an
history of the apperceptions. They are still given as unifying acts of conscious-
ness, but now they are put in a broader context, where one apperception is
connected to another. They are now put together as a web of discrete unifying
acts of consciousness. Not only according to the horizontal dimension of the
ontological connections – the relations between the different regions of being –
but also according to the vertical dimension of the presuppositions.
18[Hua XI], pp. 340 and 345. cf. also [Welton, 1983], p. 173.
19“Working with the difference between profile and object, categorial analysis uses the
distinction between intention and fulfillment to frame its description. “I follow the corre-
lation: unity of the appearing object and multiplicity of the appearances uniting in such a
way that they are noetically harmonious.” In contrast to such horizontal studies, a vertical
analysis provides us with a “typology of the interconnections in consciousness of a particular
developmental level, as well as a description of the “modalizations” transforming one level
into another» [Welton, 2003], p. 263.
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This is but an enlargment of the static analysis. On the one hand, static
analysis (the phenomenology of the universal structures of consciuosness) is a
purely descriptive method and is limited to the already constituted objectu-
alities in so far they are apperceived in consciousness. On the other hand, as
investigation on the foundation of validity, it also generates a sort of stratifica-
tion of meaning, i.e. of the objects given to the consciousness. It shows the way
of the implicit origin of these unities. Even if it remains a description, since a
real explication of the passage from one level to the other still lacks in this con-
text, this constitutive analysis indicates a stratification built upon the relation
of structural foundation of the upper levels on those below. In other words, it
describes how the upper levels of validity, the upper levels of the constitution
of the apperceived, presuppose the inferior levels. Here, the uncovering of the
presupposition does not yet mean the investigation on the genesis of one layer
of sense starting from the a lower one (Cf. [Hua XV], p. 616), since the moti-
vations that lead from one level to another are not yet at focus. Nonetheless
there is a certain depth in this kind of description. If static analysis in the first
strict sense was a completely horizontal description, this constitutive analysis
is a deep description, i.e. a description of a deeper constitution, even if this
depth does not goes down to the origin of constitution.
This level of analysis, athought it does not represent the proper regressive
inquiry (Rückfrage) of the origin (the iqnuire on the genesis that involves
the analysis on the constitution of time), produces a stratification by virtue
of a sort of regressive movement of its own. Therefore, this level is not yet
genetic phenomenology where the history of consciousness is revealed and the
passage from one layer to the other of the sense constitution is explained in
terms of motivation. Here we still deals with description and not with any sort
of explanation. Looking back at the quotation where Husserl distinguishes
between description and explication, one can see that we are still in the field
of a descriptive philosophy. In metaphorical terms, one can say that at this
level a first ‘historicity’ of consciousness is brought to light. This is not yet the
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proper history of consciousness but rather a ‘chronology’ of apperceptions that
describe the presuppositions, but not the motivations, of the passage from one
perception to another.
Constitutive phenomenology is a method that considers the possibility of
the becoming but that does not really analyze it. It indicates the presupposi-
tions of the being but does not investigate on them and their relations. The
history of consciousness is discovered as a possibility, as a further dimension
besides the superficial apperceptive constitution. But this history is neither
really investigated nor taken to its origin. The question of time is not yet the
measure of the vertical axis just discovered. To say it differently, the devel-
opment of consciousness according to the constitution of time, is not yet in
question. On the contrary, we are still on the plane of the mere possibility of
the presuppositions: an apperception can be presupposed and can presuppose
another apperception. We remain on the side of what is apperceived, indeed the
apperceiving is still given in one blow, as an act that does not have a develop-
ment of its own. In other words, the apperceiving, the side of the subject, is not
yet decomposed and considered in its development. This is not yet a history of
consciousness but a history of the things with respect to a consciousness that
is still fixed or fixable in its acts. Only when on the vertical axis there is the
development of consciousness with its acts according to time constitution, we
properly deal with the genesis. There is a relevant example of this intermediate
kind of constitutive analyses that are still static but develop also on a vertical
axis revealing a new dimension of constitution. Looking back to the schema
of the previous chapter (cf. fig. 1.3) and considering the constitution of the
fulfillment of the categorial act, one finds an example of vertical description
that deals with relations between apperceptions, with level of apperceptions
founded on each other, but not yet with the question of time20.
20As we will see, the question of time is fundamental for the definition and application. And
this in two ways. First, genetic analyses goes down to the original layers of the constitution
both of the object and of the knowing subject. This means, since time is the basic structure
of consciousness, to take into consideration the question of time. Second, time can become a
CHAPTER 2. METHODS AND LOGICS 91
In the light of what has been discussed so far, we understand the true
meaning of an important and illuminating passage of Ideen III, where Husserl
speaks of ontology and phenomenology and makes a significant distinction
between the two. Illustrating the limits of the ontological approach, Husserl
shows the importance and the sense of constitutive analysis:
Die ontologische Betrachtungsweise ist sozusagen katastematish. Sie
nimmt die Einheiten in ihrer Identität und um ihrer Identität willen als
wie ein Festes. Die phänomenologish-konstitutive Betrachtung nimmt
die Einheit im Fluß, nämlich als Einheit eines konstituierenden Flusses,
sie verfolgt die Bewegungen, die Abläufe, in denen solche Einheit und
jede Komponente, Seite, reale Eigenschaft solcher Einheit das Inden-
titätskorrelat ist. Diese Betrachtung ist gewissermaßen kinetisch oder
‘genetisch’: eine ‘genesis’, die einer total verschiedenen ‘transzenden-
talen’ Welt angehört als die natürliche und naturwissenschaftliche Gen-
esis. [...]. Jede Erkenntniseinheit, insbesondere jede reale, hat ihre ‘Ge-
schichte’ oder auch, korrelativ gesprochen, das Bewußtsein von diesem
Realen hat seine ‘Geschichte’, seine immanente Teleologie in Form eines
geregelten Systems wesenhaft zugehöriger Bekundungs- und Beurkun-
dungsweisen, die sich aus ihm herausholen, ihm abfragen lassen ([Hua V],
Beilage I §6, p. 129)21.
Constitutive phenomenology represents a step toward genetic analysis, i.e.
it represents in a certain sense the methodological passage between static and
genetic analysis22.
Whit this level of analysis, Husserl seems to give new life to his old interests
in the formation of the objectualities, wich in the static approach are given as
already finished23. But in the quotation above, and in all the books of Ideen,
the sense of the genesis is restricted to considerations on the history of the
way to read genetic constitution. In fact at every level of the constitution there is some form
of the synthesis of time (cf. on affection): from the simple formal synthesis of time to the
allzeitlichkeit of the logical idealities. Unfortunately the task of showing how this precisely
happen cannot be carried out in details in the present work.
21Cf. also [Hua V], Beilage I §5, p. 126: “Man kann sich die Stufenbildung der Konstitu-
tion am Bilde einer Genesis vorstellig machen, indem man sich fingiert, Erfahrung vollzöge
sichwirklich erst in den Gegebenheiten der untersten Stufe allein, es trete dann das Neue
der neuen Stude auf, womit neue Einheiten sich konstituireren usw”.
22Welton has a similar position and claims that with constitutive analyses the border
between static and genetic phenomenology disappears (cf. [Welton, 2003], p. 262-265).
23With respect to the mathematical objectualities, this was the task of the Philosophy of
arithmetic.
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meaning, i.e. to the apprehension of an object as dependent on other presup-
posed apprehensions. It can be worth repainting that the question of time is
not yet at focus. Only with an investigation that takes into consideration the
question of time one can develop a real genetic approach. In other words, with
the constitutive levels of analysis Husserl shows that static phenomenology
is not only an ontology, but also has a constitutive dimension that, although
does not fully describes (esplicates) the genesis, at least singles out the path
for a further genetic investigation. For this reason static phenomenology is also
called phenomenology of the ‘Leitfäden’ (cf. below, 2.3). What is important
to notice however, is that already in static phenomenology there is need for a
further investigation, which is not only ontological:
In dieser Art entstehen natürlich alle ‘Horizonte’ bzw. alle ‘Ap-
perzeptionen’. Aber in der ‘statischen’ Betrachtung haben wir ‘fertige’
Apperzeptionen, Apperzeptionen treten auf und werden als fertige geweckt
und haben eine weit zurückliegende ‘Geschichte’. Eine konstitutive Phënomenolo-
gie [a first form of constitutive phenomenology] kann sie Zusammen-
hänge der Apperzeptionen betrachten, in denen sich eidetisch derselbe
Gegenstand konstituiert, sich, als was erfahren ist und erfahbar ist, zeigt
in seiner konstituierten Selbstheit. Eine andere ‘konstitutive’ Phänome-
nologie, die der Genesis, verfolgt die Geschichte, die notwendige Ge-
schichte dieser Objectivierung und damit die Geschichte des Objektes
selbst als Objectes einer möglichen Erkenntnis. Die Urgeschichte der
Objeckte führt züruck auf die hyletischen Objekte und die immanenten
überhaupt, also auf die Genesis derselben im ursprünglichen Zeitbe-
wußtsein. ([Hua XI], p. 345).
To answer one of our initial questions, we can say that all phenomenology
is constitutive and the diversity of the phenomenological methods depends on
how deep the constitution that one takes into account is. Static phenomenology
is an ontological and superficial kind of investigation. It reflects a horizontal
form of constitution, i.e. an individual apprehensive constitution of an object
through an act of consciousness. But static phenomenology is constitutive also
insofar it uncovers the possibility of another deeper kind of constitution that
traces the history of apperceptions, their interconnections and relations. How-
ever this does not mean that this history is fully investigated. This is the task
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of a further, deeper method that inquires a deeper form of constitution, i.e. an
original and primitive constitution that also involves the question of time.
2.2 Genetic phenomenology
We have now to move to this deeper level of constitution. Whereas static
phenomenology inquires into the superficial apperceptive constitution, genetic
phenomenology takes into account the deepest layers of constitution, both on
the side of the formation of the objectualities and on the side of the devel-
opment of the constituting subjectivity. In fact, encompassing the problems
of the constitution of time in the field of investigation allows to lo look at
consciousness from the perspective of the different levels of time constitution,
i.e. from different stages of its own development: from the universal purely
formal synthesis of time, to the atemporality (omnitemporality, Allzeitlichkeit)
of logical objectualities.
As already mentioned, there are ‘two constitutive phenomenologies’ and
the second one, that of the genesis, moves on the path singled out by the first
one, taking it to the deepest level. First of all, let me make a remark on the
last quotation. In a sense, moving from the static constitutive method to the
genetic one is an essential achievement of phenomenology. In other words, it
is the concept of constitution itself that gains a meaningful enrichment. It is
now a complete notion that encompasses all elements of the intentional sphere.
In other words, this broader notion of constitution admits that every element
of the intentional sphere can be explained in terms of its own constitution.
Whereas constitutive phenomenology at its first degree describes the history
of the connections of apperceptions, constitutive phenomenology at its second
degree – that of genesis – follows this history, explaining all the passages of
it as far as the original layers of constitution are reached. Indeed, to examine
the constitution is not to examine the genesis, which is precisely genesis of the
constitution (cf. [Hua XIV], p. 41).
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The genesis of constitution is here at work. It is a constitution of a second
degree, a ‘constitution of the constitution’. In general, this shows that genetic
analysis is a development, a completion and a deepening of constitutive anal-
ysis. In other terms, within the genetic approach, the notion of constitution
assumes its proper complete character, because it can now explain all the as-
pects of the what, the how and the why that animate the constitutive process,
also with respect to the ultimate questions of the constitution of time.
The inquiry on the origin, which is only implicitly introduced with consti-
tutive phenomenology, is now carried out and completed in two ways: on the
one hand, it goes down to the original depth of passive syntheses, association
and inner time consciousness. On the other hand, it acquires more power, be-
cause it becomes a survey on the motivations of the passage from one layer
of the constitution of meaning to another. In other words, genetic analysis
investigates the relation of motivation, or as Husserl also says, ‘the nexus of
influence’ (Bedingtheitszusammenhang), between motivation and motivating in
which the apperceptions are properly constituted.
A quotation from the Cartesian Meditation can help to clarify this perspec-
tive. Not only to understand what is to be meant under the title motivation,
but also to shed light on the relation between genetic phenomenology and the
question of time. Furthermore it gives some indications on how to intend the
notion of genesis in this context and how to differentiate it from the psycho-
logical or causal genesis:
DieWesensgesetze der Kompossibilität (im Faktum Regeln des Miteinan-
der -zugleich-oder-folgend-zu-sein und -sein-zu-können) sind in einem
weitersten Sinne Gesetze der Kausalität – Gesetze für ein Wenn und
So. Doch ist es hier besser, den vorurteilsbelasteten Ausdruck Kausal-
ität zu vermeiden und in der transzendentalen Sphäre (wie in der rein-
psychologischen) vonMotivation zu sprechen. Das Universum der Erleb-
nisse, die den reellen Seinsgehalt des transzendentalen ego ausmachen,
ist ein kompossibles nur in der universalen Einheitsform des Strömens,
in welche alle Einzelheiten selbst als darin stömende sich einorden. Also
schon diese allgemeinste Form aller Sonderformen von konkreten Erleb-
nissen und der in ihrem Strömen selbst strömend konstituierten Gebilde
ist eine Form allverknüpfender und in jeder Einzelheit insonderheit wal-
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tender Motivation, die wir auch mit ansprechen können als eine formale
Gesetzmäßigkeit einer universalen Genesis [...] ([Hua I], §37, p. 109).
The relation of motivation is a sort of causal connection between the lay-
ers of the formation of meaning, but it excludes the real cause-effect relation
that we can find, for example, in the physical world. And the most general
form of such connection, the form that guarantees the possibility of such a
motivational connection, is the form of time. Since genetic analysis is a sur-
vey on the connections of motivation, the constitution of time becomes the
ultimate object of investigation of genetic phenomenology. By means of the
regress to the fundamental deepest laws of validity of the constitution, genetic
phenomenology singles out all the layers of meaning in the constitution of the
objectualities and the respective levels of the constitution of time. To say it
differently, the constitution of time becomes the index of the vertical axis of
the genetic constitution of the objectualities.
Husserl is now entitled to move from a descriptive method to an explicative
one: from a phenomenology that investigates the being of the objectualities,
to a phenomenology that explains the becoming, i.e. the transformations and
the motivations of such transformations. The quotation from which we took
our initial step becomes clearer: so far, even when we used terms like con-
stitution or vertical analysis, we remained in the framework of a descriptive
phenomenology24. From now on, we are in the framework of an explanative
philosophy:
Indem die Phänomenologie der Genesis dem ursprünglichen Werden
im Zeitstrom, das selbst ein ursprünglich konstituierendes Werden ist,
und den genetisch fungierenden sogenannten ‘Motivationen’nachgeht,
zeigt sie, wie Bewusstsein aus Bewusstsein wird, wie dabei im Werden
sich immerfort auch konstitutive Leistung vollzieht [...] ([Hua XIV], p.
41).
Let me try to paraphrase this passage. Husserl says clearly that genetic
phenomenology investigates the original becoming of time flowing and that
24Cf. [Hua XI], p. 340, where Husserl claims that with the descriptions, even if on a
constitutive level we do not deal yet with an explicative genesis.
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the flow of time itself is an originally constituiting becoming. This means that
genetic phenomenology directly adresses the enigma of time, in terms of the
question about the origin of consciousness. Genetic phenomenology goes back
up to the very original formation of the objectualities, where the formation
of time is to be found. It can be said that genetic phenomenology discovers
the question of time as original matter of the constitution of something in
general, of subjectivity and of consciousness itself. As a consequence, it is the
original and primary question of the whole phenomenological philosophy. On
the other hand, genetic phenomenology does not deal only with the question
of the original constitution of time. Indeed, it singles out all the stages of the
formation of an objectuality, from its being a stable, already finished object
for the consciousness to its being originally constituted in time consciousness.
Furthermore, it investigates the motivations that lead from one stage to an-
other. Now the events of consciousness are not only put in a ‘chronological’
order, but every event is explained as depending on a previous inferior one and
as possible motivation of a possible superior one. The events of consciousness
are connected by motivational nexus and in the underlying layer one finds the
implicit motivations for the stage above. As a result, the passage from one
stage to another consists in the explication of the implied motivations.
Whereas constitutive phenomenology displays (describes) the teleological
structure that connects the already finished apperceptions, showing how a cer-
tain apperception presupposes a founding apperception at a lower level, genetic
phenomenology explains how an apperception rises from another one according
to a particular motivation. In a few words, the task of genetic phenomenol-
ogy is to “to establish the universal and primitive laws under which stands
the formation of an apperception arising from a primordial apperception and
to derive systematically the possible formations that is, to clarify every given
structure according to its origin” ([Passive Syntheses], p. 627)25.
25“Es ist also eine notwendige Augabe, die allgemeinen und primitiven Gesetze, unter de-
nen die Bildung von Apperzeption aus Urapperzeption steht, aufzustellen und die möglichen
Bildungen systematisch abzuleiten, also jedes gegebene Gebilde seinem Ursprung nach
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The history generated according to the essence of the apperceptions is not
enough anymore. Now an investigation on the original laws is necessary, i.e. an
investigation on the original history of consciousness (Urgeschicte). From the
mere individuation of an history of consciousness, one passes now to its proper
analysis (cf. [Hua XVII], §98, p. 217). A passage from FTL can be helpful:
Während die ‘statische’ Analyse von der Einheit des vermeinten
Gegenstandes geleitet ist und so von der unklaren Gegebenheitsweise,
ihrer Verweisung als intentionaler Modifikation folgend, gegen das Klare
hinstrebt, ist die genetische Intentionalanalyse auf den ganzen konkreten
Zusammenhang gerichtet, in dem jedes Bewußtsein und sein intentionaler
Gegenstand als solcher jeweils steht. Es kommen dann alsbald in Frage
die anderen intentionalen Verweisungen, die zur Situation gehören, in
der z.B. der die urteilende Aktivität Übende steht, also mit in Frage
die immanente Einheit der Zeitlichkeit des Lebens, das in ihr seine „Ge-
schichte” hat, derart daß dabei jedes einzelne Bewußtseinserlebnis als
zeitlich auftretendes seine eigene „Geschichte” d. i. seine zeitliche Gen-
esis hat ([Hua XVII], Beilage II, §2b, p. 316).
We are now back to what at the beginning of our discussion was indicated
as the main difference between static and genetic phenomenology, i.e. the fact
that genetic phenomenology includes the investigation on the different stages
of development of the consciousness of time. Introducing the investigation on
the lower level of time constitution implies a new innovative way of considering
the constitution of the hyle. In particular, Husserl can now explain in full detail
what was already implied in the discussion of the question of the categorial in-
tuition, i.e. the fact that sensibility has a proper organization and proper laws,
independently from the understanding. Sensibility is not the mere acquiring a
sensation, an appearance, or a certain amount of data that need understating
in order to have some determined order or sense. On the contrary, sensibility is
a complex phenomenon with a proper inner lawful structure. The most impor-
tant consequence of this discovery is the fact that sensibility is characterized
by its own syntheses, are they passive or active, which are irreducible to those
of the understanding.
aufzukären” ([Hua XI]. p. 339).
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As well as the question of time constitution, the analysis of the constitutin
of the original hyle, which within the tradition was considered as the infimum
level of knowledge, was excluded from the field of investigation of Ideen I. By
contrast, in genetic phenomenology also the hyle in studied in terms of its own
laws of constitution. This means that the question of validity, the question of
the lawfulness of knowledge can be framed already in experience. Better, it
can be framed in what was traditionally considered a mere aggregate of sense
data, whose analysis was beyond the interest of philosophy. To conclude, let
me quote a passage from the Analyses zur passive Synthesis, where Husserl
explains to what static and genetic phenomenology respectively aim:
Ist das Thema der konstitutiven Analysen dies, aus der eigenen
intentionalen Konstitution der Wahrnehmung, nach reellen Bestand-
stücken des Erlebnisses selbst, nach intentionalem Noema und Sinn die
Weise verstänlich zu machen, wie Wahrnehmung ihre Sinngebung zis-
tande bringen und wie durch alle leere Vermeinheit hindurch sich der
Gegenstand als sich immer nur relativ darstellender optimaler Erschei-
nungssinn konstituiert, so ist es das Thema der genetischen Analysen,
verständlich zu machen, wie in der zim Wesen jedes Bewußtseinsstromes
gehörigen Entwicklund, die zugleich Ichendtwicklung ist, sich jeje kom-
plizierten intentionalen Systeme entwickeln, durch die schließlich dem
Bewußtsein und Ich eine äußere Welt erscheinen
kann ([Hua XI], p. 24).
2.2.1 Active, passive genesis and association
In order to complete the discussion on genetic phenomenology, it is necessary to
distinguish between active and passive genesis. In other words, it is necessary
to answer the question about the different principles of constitutive genesis.
Husserl himself tries to answer this question and the key for the solution is a
distinction between passive and active genesis:
So scheiden sie [die Prinzipien der konstitutiven Genesis] sich nach
zwei Grundformen in Prinzipien der aktive und der passiven Genesis. In
der ersten fungiert das Ich als durch spezifische Ichakte, als erzeugende,
konstituierendes. Hierher gehören alle Leistungen der in einem weitesten
Sinne praktischen Vernunft. In diesem Sinn ist auch die logische Ver-
nunft praktisch. Das Charakteristische ist, daß Ichakte, in der Sozialität
(deren transzendentaler Sinn allerdings arst herauszustellen ist) durch
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Vergemeischaftung verbunden, sich in vielfualtigen Synthesen der spezi-
fischen Aktivität verbindend, auf dem Untergrunde schon vorgegebener
Gegenstände (in vorgebenden Bewußtseinsweisen) neue gehestände ur-
sprünglich konstituieren ([Hua I], §38, p. 111).
In practical reason, in this large meaning, the ego works through sponta-
neous acts that are connected to each other in a sort of productive chain: the
basis of an act is the product of the previous act in the order of the connection.
Here the ego is the constitutive centre, i.e. the active centre of all the produc-
tions. It is a centre that can spontaneously ‘decide’ and take a position about
the productions of its own acts. And this holds not only for the singular ego,
but it is also valid intersubjectivetely, because this kind of acts can be fully
communicated. At a certain point in the chain, however, there are acts that do
not refer to the product of previous act, i.e. that do not take the production
of a previous act as their starting point. This means that not all the acts of
consciousness are a proper production operated by the ego. Indeed, following
back the genetic chain, one passes from a kind of constitution to onother where
the ego is not the protagonist of genesis anymore, nor the constitutive centre.
In a few words, one passes from the active to the passive genesis. In the series
of what is constituted, at a certain point, all active constitutions presupposes
a passive constitution26.
Whereas in the active genesis the motivations can be explained with refer-
ence to the acts of the ego and to their products, in the passive genesis they
are to be explained in terms of passive syntheses, in which the ego plays no
role. The result is that the acts of the ego are ultimately founded on passivity.
Every production of the spontaneous ego has origin in the passivity and
this is the case also for the idealities and abstractions of formal logic. It is now
necessary to put clearly the question about the principle of passive genesis. The
principle of passive genesis is for Husserl association, i.e. a very particular form
26“Jederfalls aber setzt jeder Bau der Aktivität notwendig als unterste Stufe voraus eine
vorgebende Passivität, und dem nachgehend stoßen wir auf die Konstitution durch passive
Genesis. ” ([Hua I], §38, p.112).
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of association which is now made transcendental. This is a purified association,
i.e. a non-empiristic association27. On this Husserl is extremely clear:
Das universale Prinzip der passiven Genesis für die Konstitution
aller im aktiven Bilden letztlich vorgegeben Gegenständlichkeiten trägt
den Titel Assoziation. Es ist, wohlgemerkt, ein Titel der Intentional-
ität, als das in seinen intentionalen Leistungen unter Wesensgesetzen
stehend, aus denen alle und jede passive Konstitution, sowohl diejenige
aller realen Naturgegenstände der objectiven raumzeitlichen Welt ver-
ständlich zu machen ist.Assoziation ist ein transzendental-phänomenologischer
Grundbegriff ([Hua I], §39, p. 114).
2.3 Remarks on static and genetic phenomenol-
ogy
Before going on with the discussion of the particular notion of logic that ge-
netic method requires as necessary counterpart, I shall make some additional
remarks on the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology and dis-
cuss the relation between the methods and the characteristic directions of in-
vestigation of phenomenology. Let me start from a question that was left open:
what is the relationship, the order, between static and genetic phenomenology?
This question was already raised at the beginning of the present discussion and
is also raised in the manuscripts, where Husserl wonders how the diverse forms
of investigation must be organized (cf. [Hua XI], p. 344):
Das sind Grundfragen der Unterscheidung, aber auch der Ordnung
der notwendigen phänomenologischen Untersuchungen. Ich spreche da
immer von statischer und genetischer, phänomenologie. Was war da der
eigentlich leitende Gesichtspunkt ? ([Hua XIV], p. 40).
Husserl must clarify which the organization of the two methods is and in
particular which one comes first and why. To use Husserl’s own words, he deals
27The question of association is very important. This is a particular kind of passive/active
synthesis (with different degrees) that is the basis of Husserl’s theory of constitution. However
I cannot discuss the question of association here, since it would require a parallel long
discussion. I consider it as presupposed, cf. [Lanzillotti, 2010].
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now with the question of the leading clues, i.e. he must explain how the two
methods relate in a broader systematic framework28.
First of all, it is necessary to single out a starting point for phenomenology
in general: which kind of analysis is the starting point for phenomenology?
The answer to this question seems to be clear:
Dann entspricht der „statischen”, auf eine schon „entwickelte” Sub-
jektivität bezogenen Konstitution von Gegenständen die apriorische
genetische Konstitution, aufgestuft auf jener notwendig vorangehenden
([Hua XVII], §98, p. 257).
In general, static analysis comes before the genetic one and gives to it a
starting point and a leading clue. This means that before deepening the analy-
sis through genetic phenomenology it is necessary to carry out a static analysis
([Larrabee, 1976], p. 165). In particular, in the sphere of static analysis, the
ontological considerations have the proper function of starting point: “It is
clear that one will initially proceed from particular fundamental types, some
of which, as I already said above, will occur necessarily, others which will be
presented as possibilities. The question concerns the leading clues of the sys-
tem. As leading clues, we have types of objects, that is, leading clues from the
standpoint of ontology ”([Passive Syntheses], p. 633)29.
Static phenomenology gives start to the phenomenological investigation
and provides the leading clues for the regressive inquiry (Rückfrage) that ani-
mates genetic phenomenology30. In the light of this a schema that Husserl uses
later becomes clear:
Thema und Resultat dieser Blätter: ‘Statische’ Phänomenologie gegenüber
genetischer Phänomenologie: 1) Ontologische Struktur = Struktur des
28The question of systematicy and system is a difficult one in phenomenology. cf.
[Welton, 2003].
29“Es ist überhaupt die Frage, wie die Untersuchungen zu ordnen sind. Klar ist, daß
man zunächst von einzelnen Grundtypen ausgehen wird, die, wie ich oben schon sage, teils
notwendig vorkommend, teils als Möglichkeiten sich darbietend sein werden. Die Frage ist
die nach den Leitfäden der Systematik” ([Hua XI], p. 344).
30Ist die statische Phänomenologie nicht eben die Phänomenologie der Leitfäden, die Phä-
nomenologie der Konstitution ihres Nichtseins, der blossen Scheine, der Nichtigkeiten, der
Widerstimmigkeiten etc) ([Hua XIV], p. 41).
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Seinssinnes Welt in ihren Sinnesfunfierungen. Diese als 2) Leitfaden der
Rückfrage: den Sinnesfundierungen entsprechen korrelativ die Fundierun-
gen möglicher Erfahrung von Mundanem und von Welt ([Hua XV], p.
615).
This is the ‘natural direction’ of phenomenology. From the ontology de-
scribed in static phenomenology to the origins, following the path of the re-
gressive inquiry (Rückfrage). This is a very important kind of archaeologic
inquiry that goes down to the origin of the formation of the objectualities,
following all the degrees of development and the layers of meaning. This in-
vestigation starts from the superficial analysis – the analysis of the surface –
of what is given as already finished and goes back, generating a Geschicte and
a Urgeschichte der Objekte (cf. [Hua XI], p. 345). This is the first direction
of phenomenology as a systematic philosophy: from static analysis to genetic
phenomenology, i.e, from the being to the becoming. In other words, after the
horizontal investigation of the surface – the plane of the noetic-noematic rela-
tion – phenomenology goes back to the origin of the formation of that relation,
through a vertical path. As a consequence, we have a horizontal movement and
then a vertical one in a up-bottom direction. However, if phenomenology had
only this direction it would be an incomplete method. What is indeed the sense
of the regress to the origins? Once the origin of the formation of an objectuality
is gained, what should one do ? What would we gain from a mere regressive
path, if we could not use the layers of meaning singled out in order to explain
the already finished objectuality? In other words, in order to maintain the
general orientation of phenomenology, that of explaining the relation between
consciousness and world, one must be able to go up again from the origin to
the finished objectuality singled out through the regressive inquiry.
Whereas the regressive direction singles out the motivational nexus, so
to say, looking at the origin, there is another direction that moves from the
origin and goes toward the finished object. This looks at the constitution in
perspective of the finished object. In this way, it runs through the motivational
nexus looking at the finished object as destination of the formation. This is a
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bottom-up movement and can also be called teleological analysis, for it looks
at the already formed object as telos of the constitution. The presence of this
direction confers to phenomenology as a systematic philosophy a particulare
double articulation31.
2.4 Logical Explorations
Phenomenology is not, either in its original intent or in its ultimate achieve-
ments, a mere philosophy of mathematics. Nonetheless at the beginning as at
the end of its historical development, Husserl’s thought seems to originate from
reflections on mathematics, logic and the relations of both with philosophy32.
Let me briefly consider an overview of Husserl’s works: the path from Hus-
serl’s Habilitationsschrift on the concept of number to the Philosophie der
Arithmetik; the path from the conception of ‘mathematical formality’ in the
Prolegomena to the more analytic reflections of Formal and transcendental
Logic (FTL); again the path from the reflections on mathematization in the
31As Bégout claims, “l’articulation du statique et du génétique est donc double: soit comme
archéologie régressive (ou le statique est pris à même la reconstrucution comme fil conduc-
teur), soit comme téléologie progressive (ou la genèse elle-même sert alors comme fil conduc-
teur)” ([Bégout, 2000], p. 64). On archeology in phenomenology and the relation with other
philosophical approach see [de Warren, 2006].
32“Für diejenigen, die an meinen diesbezüglichen näheren Darstellungen Interesse nehmen,
möchte ich noch bemerken, daß mein ursprüngliches Leitproblem für die Sinnbestim-
mung und Abscheidung einer puren Logik der „Widerspruchslosigkeit” ein Evidenzproblem
war, nämlich das der Evidenz der formalmathematischen Wissenschaften”([Hua XVII], Ein-
leitung, p. 16). Let me make some remarks on this quote. First, Husserl says that the problem
from which his investigation originated was a problem of evidence of the formal sciences.
This is the same input that animated what in the first chapter I tried to define as an attempt
to ‘extend’ the formality of mathematics to theory of knowledge. FTL and LU are very close
to each other both concerning the starting point and the main aims. However there are
important differences. The LU start from an investigation on the meaning and the relation
between meaning and intuition. Evidence is there a particular Erlebnisse of an appropriate
fulfillment. By contrast, in FTL Husserl accesses the question of evidence through a prelim-
inary systematization of the formal disciplines, then he shows that, in order to justify this
evidence, it is necessary to refer to the evidence of experience. In this case the justification
of evidence will consist in showing how the logical principle and idealities find their origin
in pre-predicative experience. According to the general sense of the change of strategy from
static to genetic analysis, also the discussion of evidence becomes in this context ‘vertical’,
in opposition to the horizontal analysis of evidence and truth in LU. Whereas the LU start
with language and meaning, FTL starts directly from formal logic (cf. [Bachelard, 1957], p.
61).
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Krisis to the genetic constitution of categorial objectualities in Erfahrung und
Urteil33. On the other hand, one must also take into account all those impor-
tant mathematicians with which Husserl came into contact34.
All this shows the importance of mathematics in Husserl’s work. What is
then the true meaning of the reflections on logic and mathematics in Husserl’s
philosophy? Both Husserlian scholars and philosophers of mathematics have
tried to answer this question. Hence a dual result: on the one hand, that of find-
ing out a ‘phenomenological philosophy of mathematics’ developing some frag-
ments of Husserl’s philosophy (categorial intuition, pure logic, formal ontology,
mereolgy, etc). On the other hand, the opposite attempt of reducing different
approaches in philosophy of mathematics to phenomenological issues35.
The first purpose here is to answer questions like this through an analysis
of the first section of FTL, where the connection between logic, mathematics
and philosophy (transcendental philosophy) is deeply analyzed. I shall try to
bring to light the thread of a discourse that, through the decomposition of the
concept of formality, finds out the relations between these different disciplines
in the frame of the foundation of a philosophical logic, i.e. logic as ‘theory
of science’. In other words, I shall try to spell out the ‘architecture’ of logic
as theory of science, of that philosophical logic, whose paradigm cannot be
formality in the classical sense. However, in order to found and comprehend
logic as theory of science, and in this context also as transcendental logic, it
is necessary to discover and investigate the subjective side of logic itself. In
33I do not intend here either to make an history of the evolution of Husserl’s thought or to
discuss his philosophy of mathematics in general nor to analyse those philosophies of math-
ematics that can be developed from a phenomenological approach. For Husserl’s philosophy
of mathematics is essential [Lohmar, 1989]. Cf. the initial considerations of Bachelard in
[Bachelard, 1957]. Cf. also [Haddock, 1987], [Haddock, 1997], [Haddock, 2006].
34Among others: Weierstrass, Cantor, Kronenberg, Hilbert, Weyl. Many are the attempts
in literature to explain the influence of each of these figures in phenomenology and vice
versa. For example, cf. [Hill, 2000a], [Marion, 2004], [Mohanty, 1991].
35Each of these attempts has its own interest and also the merit of highlighting different
aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology, which rarely presents itself as a unique philosophy. The
mistake to be avoided, and this holds as fundamental methodological principle, is to make
absolute aspects that in Husserl’s philosophy are only partial. cf. bibliography for examples
of such attempts.
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sum, one can say that there are several meanings of form and formality and
each of them characterizes a piece of the Husserlian logical system36. Then,
once this system is well explained, it is necessary to move to the foundation
of these levels and this requires the discovery and the characterization of the
subjective side of logic.
In LU phenomenology is intended as a discipline that may clarify, alterna-
tively to psychology, those subjective operations that are the correlate of the
idealities of logic intended as Wissenschftslehre. Through the notion of act, of
Erlebnis, Husserl aims to explain the subject-object relation, i.e. the relation
between the subjective side and the ideal side of knowledge. In the Prolegom-
ena, through a radical critique of psychologism, Husserl points out the program
of a pure logic. But in the following investigations this logic is never completely
achieved (reached). Instead of the effective foundation of pure logic, one finds
the preliminary discovery of the method and the basic notions of phenomenol-
ogy: act, Erlebnis, consciousness, categorial intuition. Only in the final chapters
of Prolegomena, Husserl briefly describes the structure of a threefold logic (cf.
[Hua XVIII], chap. XI).
FTL is a work of its maturity, written in a very short time and immedi-
ately thought to be published. It was drawn as an introduction to phenomenol-
ogy and it is to be considered essential for the other works of Husserl’s later
production37. Together with Erfahrung und Urteil and Analyses über passive
36In what follows, it could perhaps be possible to refer to Husserl’s system using the Kan-
tian term ‘architectonics’. This also to highlight the critical significance of Husserl’s attempt.
To be noticed that the reading proposed here fits into a particular view of phenomenology,
according to which the phenomenological method is a method of ‘decomposition and recom-
position’ of classical notions in the history of thought. Indeed, this seems to occur in both
static and genetic phenomenology, through the analysis of basic notions such as perception,
passivity and synthesis. I think the term architectonics can be used, because also in Husserl
this analysis on logic are part of a broader project of foundation of a teleological reason.
37As Lohmar shows, it is an introduction addressed not only to philosophers (cf.
[Lohmar, 2000], Introduction. In FTL Husserl aims to be ‘complete’ and homogeneous. In
particolar, Husserl regards as complete the investigations of the first section (cf. [Hua XVII],
Introduction, p. 15). As Bachelard claims: “Logique formelle et logique transcendantale est
un livre, le livre de Husserl”. In other passages, he points out the fundamental critical impor-
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Synthesis, it can be considered a sort of Organon of genetic phenomenology38.
Again, it closes a parable in the Husserlian production, or, to say it better, it
opens a new one39. Here Husserl considers under a transcendental light some
of the topics and arguments already presented in the LU40. In FTL, the foun-
dation of a doctrine of science is directly addressed and it is intended to be
effectively realised: while in LU the foundation of a pure logic is announced,
here Husserl aims to complete that project also by means of a new notion, that
of transcendental logic. This is now to be reached through a definition of the
relation of all the disciplines that are part of logic as Wissenschafslehre. To
say it in other words, pure logic is now considered as a more complex structure
and a further element, that of logic of truth, is added to the threefold structure
presented in the Prolegomena41.
Besides the polemical intent against the state of science that animates
the Introduction, what Husserl is aiming to is an “intentional explication of
the proper sense of the formal logic” ([Hua XVII], Introduction). Through the
initial clarification of formal logic, Husserl moves toward the foundation of
a transcendental logic, all in the frame of what he considered an ‘innovative
critique of logical reason’, as the subtitle of the book testifies42. It is remarkable
tance of Husserl’s text (cf. [Bachelard, 1957], p. 14). Cf. also Einleitung in [Lohmar, 2000],
pp. 1-14 and Sokolowski’s review [Sokolowski, 2002].
38And FtL is to be seen as the Introduction to that Organon, cf. [EU], Vorwort des
Herausgebers.
39On the last production of Husserl philosophy and the role of FTL , in particular with
respect to EU, cf. [Lohmar, 2000], pp. 1-14. On EU see also [Lohmar, 1996].
40Whereas LU was a starting text, FTL is a culmination. As Sokolowski notices
([Sokolowski, 1974]), the latter is a text that absorbs and clarifies (cf. pp. 271-2), not only
what Husserl said before, but even the mathematical and logic tradition (Aristotele, Leibniz
and the british logicians). To be noticed also that FTL is, according to Husserl, a way to
access transcendental philosophy, which is alternative to the cartesian way (cf. [Hua XVII],
Introduction; [Lohmar, 2000], p. 18).
41In the Prolegomena there is a succession of three logical disciplines (tasks) obtained
according to their degree of formality, i.e. to the way they deals with formal entities: 1. die
Fixierung der reinen Bedeutungskategorien, 2. die Gesetze und Theorien, die in diesen Kat-
egorien gründen, 3. die Theorie der möglichen Theorienformen oder reine Mannigfaltigkeit-
slehre. In FTL, this still holds, but now also logic of truth is considered. One can say that,
with respect to the degree of formality the first distinction holds still in FTL. But here a
new discipline is singled out, which is lateral with respect to the pure degree of formality,
but fundamental to achieve the sense of formality itself.
42As said in the Preliminary Remarks, this is a radical analysis of the meanings of logos.
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that this criticism – and this represents for Husserl a break with tradition (cf.
[Hua XVII], Introduction) – moves primarily from a ‘critique of formal logic’,
a discipline that has always been considered accomplished and that43, because
of its ‘crystallization’, has lost its true and original function, i.e. the possibility
of the explanation of its own ‘subjective-side’ and consequently the possibility
of being doctrine of the sciences.
To put it in other words, the project of founding a Wissenschaftslehre
merges here with that of defining a transcendental logic. In LU, the ‘need
for formality’ appears to be a mere projection, it seemed to be merely trans-
posed from mathematics to theory of knowledge. Indeed, Husserl’s interests
are shifting from the initial investigation on the nature and origin of mathe-
matical objects to theory of knowledge, in which Husserl intends to maintain
the powerful features of mathematical thought, namely its formality and the
modes of evidence associated with it. The necessity to satisfy these require-
ments was the starting point for the process of transforming mere psychology
into a philosophical discipline. But there is something missing in this first step
of Husserl’s investigation, that is a critical reflection on the idea of formality
itself. By contrast, this is a relevant innovative element of FTL, which allows
Husserl to outline a consistent ‘theory of forms’. Formality is now reconsidered
through the whole realm of logic: on the one hand, formal logic is showed to
be organized in a very particular structure; on the other hand, a new way to
transcendental philosophy is opened by means of the discussion of questions
like evidence, genesis of formal meaning and the different levels of the apriori44.
In FTL §6, which is a vital paragraph of the text, Husserl achieves two
main results. First, he distinguishes between a material apriori and a for-
In particular, it is important the meaning of logos as threefold reason (speaking, thinking,
thought). cf. [Hua XVII] §5, cf. [Bachelard, 1957], p. 44.
43cf. KrV, BVIII
44According to Kern’s famous dinstincion of the three ways of phenomenology, the access
through formal logic is a particular case of the ontological access. Indeed if one considers the
relation between logic and formal ontology, it is easy to see how this holds (cf. [Kern, 1964];
traslated in [Kern, 2005]).
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mal apriori. Second, he challenges the uniqueness of the notion of theformal
(das Formale). Here the origin of a distinction that leads the entire following
Husserlian investigation is to be found:
Die prinzipielle Allgemeinheit der Logik ist nicht nur überhaupt
apriorische oder Wesensallgemeinheit, sondern formale. Nicht nur die
enge und unklar umsteckte Disziplin, die gewöhnlich formale Logik heißt,
und die an einen besonderen Begriff des Formalen gebunden ist – mit
dem wir uns viel werden beschäftigen müssen –, sondern die Logik über-
haupt in ihrem universalen und erst dann philosophischen Sinne ist,
und in allen ihren Disziplinen, „formal”. Wir könnten ebensogut sagen:
Vernunftselbst und im besonderen auch theoretische Vernunft ist ein
Formbegriff ([Hua XVII], §6, p. 32).
Two things from this passage must be considered. First, the Formal is not
exclusive domain of formal logic (mathematical logic). By contrast, it is the
framework of philosophical logic and consequently of logic as theory of sciences.
Moreover, Husserl adds that a certain kind of formality is the framework of
theoretical reason as a whole. Secondly, Husserl claims that mathematical logic
is in a certain sense narrow and has uncertain boundaries. As a result, there
is need to ‘treat’ it in some way, in order to establish its borders, but also
to find out its proper tasks and define the notion of formality by which it is
characterized. Already in the Prolegomena, it was clear that these characters
cannot be established within particular knowledges, i.e. within a particular and
limited field of knowledge or discipline, even when this particular knowledge is
mathematics. Indeed, without a clarification of its principles, also mathematics
remains uncertain and unclear. In other words, in this passage Husserl calls
into play that particular criticism of logic that animates the first section of the
text and whose major result is the systematization of the formal disciplines
that compose traditional logic.
The general sense of the inquiry comes to light: formality is something
that unifies to some extent traditional mathematical logic and logic as theory
of knowledge, whose lost meaning and function Husserl is seeking to recover.
How does formality refer to each of them? In which sense is formality common
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to these two kinds of logic? Already in the Prolegomena it is claimed that pure
logic must be formal. But this demand was there in a certain sense suspended.
In FTL Husserl takes a step forward: the criticism of formal logic itself marks
(leads) the transition from one logic to another – from mathematical logic
to transcendental logic. It is in the critique to the formality of formal logic
and in the passage from the evidence of logic to that of experience, that one
must find the elements for the explanation of a notion, that of ‘formality of
transcendental logic’, which can seem obscure at the first glance.
Logic deals with pure apriori generalities that are the basis of every partic-
ular science (cf. [Hua XVII], §5). And these generalities are not only a priori
but also formal: in fact, not all forms of apriori are equal. To say it better, they
are equal with respect to their independence from experience, but not with re-
gard to their degree of generality. Here, one finds the distinction between a
material apriori and a formal apriori. The first relates to the apriority of a
given regional field of scientific reason. It is a contingent apriori and depends
on an hyletic-eidetic concrete sphere. Even in its purity and independence from
experience, it refers to well-defined fields of application45. By contrast, formal
apriori runs through all regions, it holds for all of them. It provides the frame-
work of logic as Wissenschaftslehre but also of pure reason. Indeed, from this
point of view, pure reason and logic ‘tend’ to coincide46. Logic really becomes a
self-explication of pure reason as system of the formal apriori (cf. [Hua XVII],
§6). If this did not bring to misunderstandings, the formal apriori could be
considered as innate apriori. In any case, it is the highest apriori, the one on
which the other levels of apriori depend47. This is the formal apriori of logical
laws and the task of transcendental logic is that of discovering the origin of
45Husserl’s example is that of sound, cf. [Hua XVII], §6.
46As Lohmar points out, pure reason here is not to be read in the Kantian sense (cf.
[Lohmar, 2000], p. 33).
47To be noticed that logic can also have a normative function, since it can be considered
a universal norm. But this is never to be considered its essential function (cf.[Hua XVII],
§7; [Hua XVIII], chap. 1 e 2; [Lohmar, 2000], p. 33).
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them as well as of their formality48.
Besides being formal, logic as theory of science is bilateral (two-sided, dop-
pelseitig): on one side, there are the formal and objective schemes of reasoning;
on the other side, the subjective operations that give rise and found the formal
objective patterns of reasoning themselves:
Die Logik als Wissenschaft vom Logischen überhaupt und in der
obersten, alle anderen Formen des Logischen umspannenden Gestalt, als
Wissenschaft von der Wissenschaft überhaupt, ist zweiseitig gerichtet.
Überall handelt es sich um Vernunftleistungen, und zwar in dem doppel-
ten Sinne der leistenden Tätigkeiten und Habitualitäten, anderseits der
dadurch geleisteten und hinfort verharrenden Ergebnisse ([Hua XVII]
§8, p. 36)49.
A feature that, according to Husserl, for a long time was left hidden is
finally recognized. Logic has not only an objective side and cannot be confined
to a mere technique of ideal formations. By contrast, logic has a subjective
side in which the possibility of a transcendental logic and consequently that of
logic as a doctrine of science are founded.
The transition from the formality of objective logic to the subjective cor-
relative structures is exactly what Husserl intends to clarify not only in FTL,
but in the whole project of the genealogy of logic. To be more precise, as I
will try to show, logic of truth and the discussion on evidence will be the pivot
of the transition from a purely technical formal logic to a philosophical one50.
48For Kant, the main question to answer, the one that encloses in itself all the branches of
the critical investigation, is how synthetic apriori judgment are possible. The answer is based
on the interplay of two different kinds of apriori knowledge. The first from experience and
the second from the understanding. Here the situation is quite different. The main question
is rather how the formality and the apriority of the laws of logic are justified. And the
answer aims to show that they find their origin in the formality – in the passive structures
– of pre-predicative experience. Also in Kant sensibility has a own formality, as the two
apriori forms of space and time show. What is unclear is whether this formality means also
that sensibility is synthetic. However it is clear for Kant, that there is no direct connection
between the formality of sensibility and that of the understanding. By contrast, in Husserl
they have a common synthetic structure.
49Cf. also [EU], §3; [Hua XI] (AzpS), p. 305. Cf. below 2.8.1
50The effort is that of conciliating the objective side and the subjective one of a phe-
nomenological theory of knowledge. Here the stratification of the notion of formality, and
the logical architecture that follows, are a radicalization of an investigation already present
in LU cf. [Lohmar, 2000], p. 34.
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Whereas in the LU it might seem that Husserl tries to ‘extend the power of
formality’ of mathematics to the theory of knowledge, in this new context,
he points out a new kind of formality internal to theory of knowledge itself:
mathematical logic is formal, mathematics is formal, logic on its subjective
side is formal and formal are temporal syntheses, which represent the roots of
Husserl’s transcendental logic and of his genetic constitution. The first step
towards this sort of ‘phenomenology of formality’, as already noticed, consists
in discerning the different levels of formal logic (cf. below 2.5). The second step
will consist in showing that the formality of pure logic, and consequently the
formality of mathematical logic, is founded in the structures of pre-predicative
experiences. And this because consciousness has a permanent synthetic struc-
ture (cf. below 2.8) . But before going on with the stratification, I would like
to insist on some questions.
In the framework of the genetic method, the investigations on logic are
strictly related to the investigation on the lower strata of consciousness, i.e.
to the investigation on sensible perception and its structure. Investigating on
logic means now to develop a ‘critique of logical reason’, where critique means
the Kenntinsnahme of the constitutive role of subjectivity in the formation of
logical idealities. The project of a pure logic, which was firstly theorized in
LU, is now completed by means of two main strategies: first, an innovative
and deeper analysis of evidence51; second, the consequent theorization of the
regressive inquiry (Rückfrage) that allows to find out the roots of logical entities
in the lower strata of perceptual constitution.
In a certain sense, transcendental logic takes the form of a phenomenologi-
cal constitutive analysis of logic as that formal discipline whose principles are
the common basis of all particular sciences. According to this, transcendental
51As I tried to show, genetic phenomenology means somehow vertical analysis. This is also
the case for the question of evidence. Indeed, in the LU this was to indicate the horizontal
relation between two kinds of living experience. Now, as it will be discussed, the vertical
development of evidence as index for the logical disciplines is to be considered.
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logic cannot be derived or even deduced from formal logic, since it must consti-
tute the phenomenological foundation of this latter52. In other words, formal
logic requires in turn a foundation in which transcendental logic, bringing to
the light the origin of the idealities of formal logic, plays a distinctive role. It
is in fact the ultimate foundation, the source of an authentic knowledge that
does not require further foundation. This is possible because Husserl aban-
dons the classical conviction according to which formal logic is complete and
accomplished and, by virtue of the characteristic apodictic evidence of its prin-
ciples, does not need any sort of justification or foundation. Abandoning this
view, which since the Aristotelian systematization of logic was dominant53, is
what concretely opens the door to a genuine analytic of experience. Indeed this
means for Husserl to exclude from theory of knowledge the last presupposition.
If one considers that a key feature of phenomenology is that of eliminating
hidden presuppositions in philosophy, it becomes clear that the elimination of
this last presupposition – that of the completeness and closure of apodictic
logic – represents a sort of realization of the phenomenological method.
It is important to make it clear that this does not mean to delegitimate
formal mathematical logic and its principles, but to confer them a deeper sense.
Indeed, this means to investigate their ultimate justification, their origin. In
fact, they are of course characterized by a certain apodictic evidence, which
52In Kant for example transcendental logic was the result of an operation called meta-
physical deduction. This was an operation that ‘transformed’ the table of judgments (typical
of Aristotelian formal logic) into the table of categories (typical of the new Kantial tran-
scendendental logic) (cf. KrV, A 80, B 106). As a result of these operation, there is a strict
connection between the two logic that, so to say, remains on the same horizontal plane. By
contrast, in the Husserlian theory of knowledge, formal and transcendental logic are not on
the same plane, but the latter is on a transversal.
53Cf. KrV, A 50, B 74 and ff. As already noticed, in Kant there formal and transcendental
logic are on the same plane. This means that an isomorphism between the two subsists, an
isomorphism between the table of judgments and the table of categories. The structure of
traditional formal logic is in a certain sense ‘projected’ onto the structure of transcendental
logic. By contrast, in Husserl formal logic in the finished result of a particular genealogy
from experience and transcendental logic provides the essential conditions of validity of this
genealogy. Aristotelian categories were real-ontological and logical categories. In kant they
became subjective. In Husserl we do not find a proper table of categories but a genealogy of
its basic structure from experience.
CHAPTER 2. METHODS AND LOGICS 113
continues to be more general than the evidence of the laws and principles of the
particular sciences. But this apodictic evidence must now be justified in order
to get their transcendental role. The formality and apriority of logical principles
are now showed to originate from the formal structure of experience. And this
is possible by virtue of the synthetic structure of consciousness. The laws of
mathematical logic are in fact the basic laws of science. However, in order to
be comprehended as such, they cannot be taken as only presupposed. Their
formality and origin must be explained and this is the task of the genealogy of
logic, i.e. of transcendental logic in a strict sense. Again, formal logic maintains
its role of formal structure for the other sciences. The basic principles of formal
logic continues to be fundamental for the validity of the other theories. But
formal logic itself needs a step forward to be justified and to acquire the status
of theory of sciences.
In other words, formal logic maintains its role and its characteristic kernel,
that of its formal qualities. From the genetic perspective, the change is that
this kernel does not prevent from a deeper investigation, i.e. from a questioning
of the characteristic formality itself. It is the initial questioning that opens the
door to the Kenntnisnahme.
2.4.1 The original task of Logic
At the origin of FTL there is the impulse of a regenerated project of critique
of the human reason in general, which is carried out through the rediscovery
of the origins of thought. The later works on logic, are not isolated from those
‘more existential’, like the Ideen; the Meditations or the Crisis54. In FTL, one
finds the same controversial and ideal that animate the later mature Husserlian
works and in particular the Crisis55: on the one side, the polemic against a
54As Sokolowski notices: “Husserl’s logical works are not developed independently and in
parallel to his more ‘existential’ books, such as Ideas I, Cartesian Meditations, and Crisis; his
logical works, with their treatment of language, formal structure, categoriality, and evidence,
are at the source of his entire philosophy” ([Sokolowski, 2002], p. 236).
55But this was also, although with a more neutral connotation, the project of the Prole-
gomena.
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logic that abandoned its original aim and function and that, in doing so, left
the door open to the skepticism and consequently to the crisis of european
philosophy and sciences. On the other side, the attempt of re-establishing the
basis for a logic that could lead all the other sciences and be their grounding,
i.e. a logic that could carry out the task lost during the modern age:
Die Wissenschaften verselbständigten sich, sie bildeten, ohne dem
Geist kritischer Selbstrechtfertigung voll genugtun zu können, höchst
differenzierte Methoden aus, deren Fruchtbarkeit zwar praktisch gewiß,
deren Leistung aber nicht letztlich einsichtig wurde ([Hua XVII], Ein-
leitung, p. 6)56.
The loss of meaning of the whole rationality that had characterized eu-
ropean philosophy is parallel to the overturning of the relation between logic
and science. Indeed, the methods of the particular sciences are characterized,
according to Husserl, by a sort of naiveté that makes it impossible for them to
be founded on pure principles. In other words, objective sciences cannot face
the problems of foundation that derive from their limited unilateral methods:
Die Wissenschaft ist in der spezialwissenschaftlichen Form zu einer
Art theoretischer Technik geworden, die, wie die Technik im gewöhn-
lichen Sinne, viel mehr auf einer in der vielseitigen und vielgeübten prak-
tischen Betätigung selbst erwachsenden „praktischen Erfahrung” beruht
(was man in der Praxis auch „Intuition”, praktischen Takt und Blick
nennt) als auf Einsicht in die ratio der vollzogenen Leistung ([Hua XVII],
p. 7).
Science, in the form of specialized science, became a sort of theoretic tech-
nique which, as well as ordinary technique, is based more on that ‘practical
experience’ that emerges from the habit and usage of the practical work, than
on the penetration of the rationality of the performed operations. The loss of
rationality, abandoning the ideal of an authentic knowledge founded on first
principles and that can justify its own principles, is the cause of the crisis that
56The passage continues as following: “Sie bildeten diese Methoden aus, zwar nicht in der
Naivität des Alltagsmenschen, aber doch in einer Naivität höherer Stufe, einer Naivität, die
darauf verzichtete, die Methode aus reinen Prinzipien, unter Rekurs auf die reine Idee, nach
letzten apriorischen Möglichkeiten und Notwendigkeiten zu rechtfertigen” ([Hua XVII], p.
6).
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affects the sciences. According to Husserl, logic itself had a role in this degener-
ation because it became in turn a special science of calculus, instead of keeping
its historical mission alive and consequently being doctrine of science57.
In the history of philosophy, there were different attempts of founding au-
thentic knowledge and the Cartesian one is a good example. Although it fails
because of some uncovered presuppositions that affect Cartesian philosophy,
it is very relevant because for the first time it calls into analysis the absolute
knowing subjectivity that will be at focus in phenomenology as well. As already
noticed, the investigation on genealogy of logic, together with the Cartesian
way and the psychological way, is a further way to access the knowing subjec-
tivity and consequently to found an authentic knowledge based on a transcen-
dental logic which is first and absolute:
Es sind noch andere Wege auf das Radikale gerichteter Besinnungen
möglich, und einen, gerade durch die historische Rückbeziehung der Idee
echter Wissenschaft auf die Logik als ihre Norm nahegelegten, versucht
die vorliegende Schrift [FTL] wenigstens in Hauptstücken zu bahnen
([Hua XVII], p. 12).
This attempt follows a new way. It takes the initial move from logic, given
by the tradition as a closed system of formal rules, and questions it, aiming to
discover its foundation, and consequently the foundation of all the sciences.
This brief account is perhaps a general way of describing the Husserlian
project of a genealogy of logic. However, it excludes the common tendency to
distinguish two periods of Husserlian phenomenology. The first focused on the
foundation of mathematics and logic, the second that stresses the cognitive rel-
evance of sensible (perceptual, intuitive) experience and of the praxis of life58:
the two are essentially interconnected and are together part of a broader en-
compassing investigation, which is not limited to cognitive, but also to ethical
57“An dieser Lage ist, wie gesagt, die Logik selbst mitschuldig, Weil sie, wie wir hier auch
ergänzen können, statt ihren historischen Beruf fest im Auge zu behalten und sich als reine
und universale Wissenschaftslehre auszuwirken, vielmehr selbst zu einer Spezialwissenschaft
geworden ist” ([Hua XVII], p. 8).
58On the contrary, the whole phenomenological parable has to be seen as a continuous
investigation of the interplay of these two poles of human reason.
CHAPTER 2. METHODS AND LOGICS 116
and ideological concerns (cf. Crisis). In other words, the interest in outlining
a theory of sciences is always dominant in Husserl, a science to which the
other sciences – natural sciences but also formal logic and mathematics – must
look for the ultimate foundation of their principles59. In the new context of
the genetic analysis this investigation calls into play the foundamental role of
pre-predicative experience.
Note on FTL. According to its clear and well defined structure, FTL can be
divided in five thematic poles (cf. [Hua XVII]; [Lohmar, 2000], p. 2), every of
which represents a particular a step, a moment, in the development of the
critical inquiry on logical reason:
1. the section concerning the threefold structure of formal logic (syntactic
compatibility, non contradiction or logic of consequence, logic of truth)
[§§12-22];
2. the section concerning the phenomenological elucidation of formal ax-
iomatic mathematics [§§23-54] and the idea of theory of deductive sys-
tems and mathesis;
3. the question of evidence [§§57-61, 105-107]
4. the project of the critique of the logical idealities [§§73-80]
5. the Rückfuhrung of the critique of the evidence of the logical principles
to the critique of the evidence of experience [Erfahrung] [§§82-90]
With this schema, one can always keep in mind the outline of the Husserlian
project. This is fundamental for a programmatic text like FTL, where it is
important not to get lost in the diversity of all the branches of the investigation.
The book is to be divided in two parts. The first encompasses items 1) and 2)
of the schema above and concerns the attempt of providing a systematization
for the formal and mathematical disciplines, in continuity with the project
of the Prolegomena. Difficult questions are analyzed here. In particular, at
point 2) Husserl deals with some obscure questions concerning the theory of
multiplicities and deductive systems. This question will not be addressed in
the present work. By contrast, 1) is at focus in the next section (cf. 2.5). This
point represents the first step of the Husserlian critique that could be defined
as analytic critique. The systematization of the formal disciplines has the task
to clear the field from possible misunderstandings concerning the role and place
of formal logic. Here Husserl seeks to answer a question, which is preliminary
59“der Philosophie der Aritmetik und der Krisis, den Ideen und der Formalen und tran-
szendentalen Logik ist gemeinsam das philosophische Interesse am subjektiven Erkennt-
nisleben. Die phänomenologische Kritik der Grundlagen, Gültigkeit und Folgen der natür-
lichen Wissenschaft vom Erkenntnissubjekt. Mag sich die Bestimmung dieses Subjektes sowie
die Articulation seines Zusammenhangs mit den Objekten der Wissenschaften in der En-
twicklung von Husserls Denken auch mehrmals gründlich geändert haben, die Priorität der
Wisseschaft con der wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit blieb unangetastet” ([Bernet et al., 1989],
p. 11).
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and fundamental for the transcendental inquiry: what is the structure of formal
logic? The transcendental inquiry moves from the ideal structures of logic to
experience, so to say, from the manifest surface to the depth of the original
meaning (origin) of the idealities (cf. 2.1).
The second section of the text (3-5 of the previous schema) is relevant for the
present work. I will focus in particular on the two conditions of the Husserlian
transcendental inquiry: on the one side, the question of evidence; on the other
side bilaterality of logic (cf. 2.8 and ff.).
2.5 Tasks and performances of formal logic
The critique of formal logic generates a first stratification of the notion of
formality: three logical disciplines are defined according to the way they deal
with the structure of judgements60.
The original idea of a typica of judgements, i.e. of that disciplinary core
that underlies the development of traditional formal logic, is found by Husserl
in Aristotle:
Aristoteles zuerst stellte diejenige Formidee heraus, welche dazu
berufen war, den Grundsinn einer „formalen Logik” zu bestimmen, so
wie wir sie in der Gegenwart verstehen und wie sie schon Leibniz in
seiner Synthese von formaler Logik (als apophantischer) und formaler
Analysis zur Einheit einermathesis universalis verstanden hat ([Hua XVII],
§12 p. 53).
This quotation is particularly important, not only because it shows that
Aristotle is to be considered the first formalizer of the apophantic sphere of
60On the meaning of the stratification, besides FTL, cf. [Hua XVIII], ch. XI; [Hua VII], ch.
2, p. 17 and ff. See also [Lohmar, 2000], ch. 3. Particularly interesting and important is the
orientation of [Heffernan, 1988], which intends to highlight the fact that the Husserlian divi-
sion is still focused on the question of the relation between form of emptiness and fulfillment:
“The central argument of the treatise consists in the thesis that there is a level of analysis
operative in the first chapter of the Logic which is more fundamental than the investiga-
tions into the three different disciplines or even than those into the three different evidences,
namely the analysis of that which Husserl refers to as ‘the three different manners of inten-
tion and fulfillment’, that is, ‘from confusion to distinctness’, from ‘distinctness to clarity of
anticipation’ and ‘from clarity of anticipationts clarity of possession’ ”(p. 102). And more-
over: “It is remarkable, by the way, that the role played by empty and the filled, respectively,
by intention and fulfillment here has been systematically overlooked or underestimated by
all interpretations of this chapter of the Logic in the secondary literature, this neglecting one
of the necessary conditions of the possibility of an adequate understanding of the three-fold
structural stratification itself” (p. 103). Cf. also [Heffernan, 1983], [Heffernan, 1989], §4.
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logic, but also because it refers to Leibniz who, in Husserl’s view, is a coun-
terpart to the Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle, Leibniz, the British logicians
(Boole and de Morgan) and Bolzano are certainly the most important points
of reference (cf. [Sokolowski, 1974]). In particular, Husserl’s attempt seeks to
restore the authentic value of Leibniz’ philosophical intuitions and therefore to
relaunch the project of a mathesis universalis. In this universal discipline, the
relations between all disciplines are explained phenomenologically61. Aristotle
and Leibniz are to be regarded as two extremes within which Husserl’s aspi-
rations move: from the foundation of a theory of judgments, to the realization
of a mathesis that can truly function as a doctrine of science.
2.5.1 The theory of the pure forms of judgments
The very possibility of treating all judgments exclusively under the point of
view of their form gives rise to the first discipline (level, performance) of formal
apophantic. This is what Husserl also calls pure morphology of judgments (reine
Formenlehre der Urteile)62:
Die Möglichkeit, alle Urteile unter reine Begriffe der Gestalt oder
Form zu bringen, legte sofort den Gedanken einer deskriptiven Klassen-
scheidung der Urteile ausschließlich unter diesem Gesichtspunkt der
Form nahe, also abgesehen von allen sonstigen Unterscheidungen und
Fragestellungen, wie der nachWahrheit oder Widerspruchslosigkeit. Man
unterschied so der Form nach einfache und zusammengesetzte Urteile,
unter den einfachen die des singulären, partikulären, universellen Urteils,
ging zu den komplexen Gestalten des konjunktiven, disjunktiven, hy-
pothetischen und kausalen Urteils über, wohin auch Urteilskomplexe
gehörten, die Schlüsse genannt werden. Man zog weiter auch die Modal-
isierungen der Urteile als Gewißheiten in Betracht und die daraus erwach-
senden Urteilsformen ([Hua XVII], §13a p. 55).
61In §27b, Husserl refers to Boole and Bolzano in explaining how the Leibnizian idea
developed historically. To be noticed that in FTL there is not a real comparison with Leibniz.
For this, cf. §60 of Prolegomena.
62Cf. [Hua XVII], §13; [Hua XVIII], XI, §67. In LU, this level is called reine Formenlehre
der Bedeutungen. The variation in terminology, from meaning to judgment, is typical of the
context of FTL. While in LU the starting point was meaning (the ideal side of language), here
the starting point is judgments (smallest element of formal logic, cf. [Bachelard, 1957], pp.
61 and 63. This first discipline aims to establish which are admissible forms of judgment, i.e.
deals with “the mere possibility of judgments, as judgments, without inquirying whether they
are true or false, or even whether, merely as judgments, they are compatible or contradictory”
([Hua XVII], §13a).
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Pure morphology is devoted to avoid nonsense (Unsinn) in the process of
forming (constituting) judgments from former judgments or from basic propo-
sitional forms. The laws of this elementary logic aim, in the words of the fourth
Logical Investigation, to identify those apriori forms through which meanings
from different categories of meaning can be combined in a single meaning (cf.
[Hua XIX/1], LU IV).
Through this first discipline – this first task (Aufgabe) of formal logic, to use
the language of LU –, a classification of the forms of judgments is drawn, with a
twofold result. On the one hand, the basic forms (Grundformen) of judgments
are discerned. These are the primitive forms from which new judgments can
be formed. On the other hand, the basic operations (Grundoperationen), the
different ways of modalization (Modifikationsmöglichkeiten) and the iterative
processes, that allow to go from one form to other without incurring in the
non-sense, are displayed63.
The result is a hierarchy of judgments. Indeed, judgments are not only for-
mal concepts (Formalbegriffe) opposed to concrete judgments. They also have
a definite position within a range that goes, through iterations and constitutive
processes, from simple to the more complex (Formalbegriffe)64.
In FTL the notion of operation is really at focus and it is discussed through
the whole §13c. Starting from the basic forms, through the operational laws,
i.e. through the iterations contained in each of them (cf. [Hua XVII], §13c),
it is possible to establish that infinite universe of forms that characterize this
first subsystem of analytical apophantic. Operation is a chief notion in the
articulation of this first level of formality, because it, and it alone, can lead
from one form of judgment to another65.
63To be noticed that the notion of operation was not so important in the LU On the
contrary, here it is pivotal. As S. Bachelard notices, this is strange considering the importance
of arithmetic in the LU.
64In Husserl’s words, “each judgment-form, no matter how it may have been acquired, is
a generic universality, not only with regard to possible determinate judgments but also with
regard to pure forms subordinate to it” ([Hua XVII], §13 b).
65“Wir werden diese Forschung in der Weise einer Aufweisung der Grundoperationen und
ihrer Gesetze, sowie der ideellen Konstruktion der Unendlichkeit der Formen diesen gemäß
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From the basic form of judgment S is p, one can obtain as a result of
subordination a new judgment of the form Sp is q and so on inductively. Here
an operation of attribution is at work which transforms the predicate of the
first judgment in an attribute. Furthermore, from the first judgment, through
modalization, one can obtain judgments of the type if S is p, then necessarily
S is p and so on. In this case an operation that changes the dossic value is at
work. Of course, conjunction, negation and other logical operations must be
added to these two basic operations and to the tree of the derivations to which
they give rise.
The role of operation is so central that even the basic form S is p can
be considered, according to Husserl, as the result of the operation of bringing
(producing) a substrate of determination S ([Hua XVII], §13 c). Moreover, the
fact that modalizations themselves are in the framework of operations testify
how this notion is important and wide according to Husserl 66.
2.5.2 Logic of non-contradiction
The next level of the apophantical analytic aims to avoid the contradiction
(inconsistency) in combining judgments. Its task is to eliminate a further pos-
sibility of meaninglessness (counter-sense), i.e. the (formal) contradiction67.
Whereas in the first discipline one could not exclude inconsistent judgments,
now they must be removed from the domain of formal logic. With the logic
of consequence (Widerspruchslosigkeit/ Konsequenzlogik) the complete frame-
work of what traditionally was considered formal apophantic is reached 68.
durchführen müssen. Die Grundformen werden dann nicht nebeneinander stehen, sondern
auch aufeinander gestuft sein ([Hua XVII], §13c p. 57).
66On the fact that modalization is to be considered an operation, cf. [Lohmar, 2000], p.
44, [Bachelard, 1957], pp. 63.
67If the first level (layer) ensures the “possibility” of judgment itself, this upper level
ensures the ‘com-possibility’ (Kompossibilität) of judgments Com-possibility is also the term
used by Husserl in the Appendix III, where his historical considerations on the logic of
consequence are exposed. cf. [Hua XVII], App. III
68cf. Husserl’s historical considerations in App. III. Although this second level of logic
has not been historically developed in a pure manner, it was at least recognized in the
tradition. In contrast, the first level was completely ignored (cf. [Hua XVII], §14). As a
consequence, Husserl’s credit would be not to introduce a new discipline, but that of taking
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At this level formal logic begins to be significant, because here one can
exclude those forms of inference that lead to analytical inconsistencies. Only
those forms that remain in the field of the second level, can be “good candi-
dates” for the question about truth, and therefore, ways to knowledge, although
the question of truth is not here properly at issue:
Die Rede ist dann noch nicht von der Wahrheit der Urteile, son-
dern bloß davon, ob die in der Einheit eines ganzen, ob einfachen oder
noch so komplexen, Urteils beschlosserlen Urteilsglieder sich miteinan-
der „vertragen” oder einander widersprechen, und damit das betreffende
Urteil selbst zu einem widersprechenden, zu einem „eigentlich” nicht
vollziehbaren machen. ([Hua XVII], §14 p. 59)69.
Up to the previous level, eliminating the possibility of non-sense meant to
build a universe of forms through rules of construction, i.e. ‘gathering together’
through inductive processes all the infinite possibilities of combining the forms
of judgments. Now the context is opposite, from that universe itself the forms
that yield to contradictions must be eliminated, in order to obtain the universe
of the candidates for the question of truth.
The sense of the designation of pure analytics becomes now clearer: this
level ‘purifies’ the domain of formal logic achieved in the first and leads to a
second kind of formality, that of those judgments that are exempt from ana-
lytical contradiction. Based on the first discipline, which remains necessary to
the second as indeed the second for the third, the original core of this tradi-
tional model (notion) of formality is reached. It could be called ‘combinatorial’
but also ‘technical’ or ‘algorithmical’ (computational). Here, one has always
to do with rules that determine if judgments can belong to a certain domain,
both in the case of combination of judgments under iterative operations and
of combination of judgments under non-contradiction.
it properly, according to its essence. Here Husserl explains the double notation of logic of non-
contradiction and logic of consequence. Also to be noticed that Husserl uses the expression
pure analytical to designate this second level (cf. [Bachelard, 1957], p. 65).
69To be noticed, as Lohmar suggests, that in the first paragraph of §14 there is not a
positive characterization of logic of consequence. Instead it is always referred to logic of
truth. This can be misleading.
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2.5.3 Logic of truth
According to Husserl, the next level of formal logic is logic of truth (Wahrheit-
slogik)70. This new step is to be considered as a shift in Husserl’s argument,
indeed here a new kind of interest is introduced, that is the interest in the
truth of judgements.
This is an essential change that necessarily brings outside the game of the
first combinatorial sense of formality: it is the change from the attitude di-
rected toward the correctness of the combination to the attitudes directed to
knowledge. Now there is a cognitive impulse that must be filled: the ideal for-
mation of logic is not enough, on the contrary there must be the possibility
of comparing it with the state of affairs to which it is related. In other words,
this level goes beyond (cf. [Hua XVII], §19) the interest in the formal essence
of judgments, which instead characterizes the first two ‘faces’ of analytical
apophantic. The boundaries of combinatorial formality are overcome when the
problem of truth is concerned 71: from a purely logical interest one passes now
to an epistemological interest that then, with the deepening of the question of
subjective and transcendental logic, will become a cognitive interest, a prob-
lem of theory of knowledge in the classical sense. Here, the discourse on the
bilaterality of logic acquires its full sense.
As a result, logic of truth cannot be purely formal (combinatorial): it calls
into question an analysis of evidence that characterizes and establishes the
levels of formal logic themselves. Truth must be defined through evidence –
70Up to these moment, the first two disciplines of formal logic have been referred as levels
or layers (Stufen). They are also called tasks (Aufgabe) in the Logical Investigations. But
they are also performances, i.e. achievements (Leistung, Vollzugsmodi des Urteils). Logic of
truth must be considered a progression in the sense of the activity of performing judgments.
It is not properly the third layer of formal logic, but it is the third performance. The
third level (as task, Aufgabe), as discussed below, is the theory of deductive systems (as
Mannigfaltigkeitslehre. Cf. [Lohmar, 2000] ch. 3; App. below, fig. 2.
71As S. Bachelard says: “La logique de la vérité est le point aboutissement de la logique
formelle et c’est à ce niveau le plus élevé que seront sensibles les difficultés que soulèvent
les rapports entre logique formelle et logique trascendantale. La logique formelle de la vérité
engage donc des problèmes, si l’on peut dire, terminaux, ce qui suppose un travail préalable
d’approfondissement” ([Bachelard, 1957], p. 67).
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and this requires a subjective analysis – and not through the satisfaction of
formation or operational rules (formal rules). Certainly the non-contradiction
is a necessary condition, but truth is not to be defined in a purely formal way72.
2.5.4 Logic of Evidences
The critical task theorized by Husserl does not cease with the characterization
of the levels of formal logic. On the contrary, here it reaches its most propulsive
core, showing the way to the foundation of the levels themselves. Without this
foundation, the stratification of logic would run the risk of being an empty
formal structure, a system ended in itself. In this case, the Husserlian project
would have no real advantages over traditional logic and, given its ‘technical
weaknesses’, it would be useless.
Foundations must ‘penetrate more deeply’, they must ‘explicate the dif-
ferent evidences that correspond to the distinction’ (cf. [Hua XVII], §16a).
In other words, one must uncover the hitherto hidden side of logic as Wis-
senschaftslehre, the subjective side that differentiates it from sciences. In par-
ticular, unveiling this side means creating a system of correspondence between
the manifest levels of the stratification and different notions of evidence on the
subjective side73. In other words, the levels of evidence on the subjective side
give the measure, and in some way make explicit, the transition from one layer
of formal logic to another. The discourse on evidence has a particular value in
the case of the transition from the logic of consequence to the logic of truth:
whereas the transition from the first to the second discipline is understandable
in a purely formal way, the one from the second to the third would not make
sense without the discourse on evidence. To say it better, the passage from the
72Therefore, Husserl cannot be considered a forerunner of an attempt to make some formal
semantics, or any formal theory of truth. Rather, in the ongoing attempt to balance between
logic, mathematics and theory of knowledge, he identifies a point of passage in the discussion
of the question of evidence.
73I will return later to the problem of evidence. For the moment, it could be worth noticing
that in the Logical Investigations the notion of evidence was not yet decomposed, as instead
it is the case in FTL.
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first to the second level of formal logic could be understandable in terms of a
formal and apodictic conception of evidence. By contrast, the passage to the
third level requires an analysis of evidence on the subjective side.
Confusion and Distinctness. The first level of evidence is to be found in
the distinction between two ways of givenness of judgments74: on the one side,
the vague or confused judgment (vages bzw. verworrenes Urteil); on the other
side, the distinct (deutlich) judgment. In the first case, the judgment is given
as a vague idea: it comes to mind without any “claim of verification” (neither
analytic nor concerning the related state of affairs). In this case, no explicit
execution of judging spontaneity is requested (cf. [Hua XVII], §16) and this
means that the subject does not need to turn its attention to the judgment
and to its verification.
The first degree of evidence is characterized in a negative way by the lack of
an active operating subject (cf. [Lohmar, 2000], p. 49). The judgment “remains
in the background” of the subject’s attention, it is something that lies on the
horizon, it is there and one can glimpse its shape and contours, but without
really grasping its proper form of (being) judgment. The proper form can
be foreseen, but there is no awareness of it; the structure of the judgment is
anticipated, in that it lacks an awareness of the nature (formal) of the judgment
itself. Here, what Husserl calls index of unity of judgment plays a vital role:
at this level, a passive judging subject ‘perceives’ something that sounds like
a judgment75. Again, the vague judgment introduced as linguistic expression
contains an indication of the structure of the judgment, but this structure is
not explicit and is only passively sustained by the subject76.
Vague judgments can be made explicit. Now, a synthesis of identification
74“A judgment can be given as evidently the same judgment in very different manner of
subjective givenness” (cf. [Hua XVII], §16a).
75For the sound metaphor cf. [Lohmar, 2000], p. 56.
76“Diese passiv assoziativ indizierte Einheit (verworrenes/vages Urteil) ist jedoch noch
kein wirkliches, eigentliches Denken. Sie bildet noch keine explizit vom Ich her erzeugte
Einheit des Sinnes” ([Lohmar, 2000], p. 49).
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is at work and leads to the ‘distinction’, i.e. to the recognition of the judgment
as judgment and of its parts as parts of the judgment. From the background,
the judgment moves to a closer foreground, that of the consideration of the
formal structure. In other words, here a sort of spontaneity is working and its
function is to recognize the ‘correctness’ of structure of judgment77. One must
therefore distinguish, “on the one hand, a non-explicit judgment, indicated by
a sentence that makes its appearance explicitly, and on the other hand, a cor-
responding explicit judgment or, as the case may be, a subsequent explication
with identification of the meant ([Hua XVII], §16)”.
The operation of distinction, the above operation of “recognition” of judg-
ment and its parts, can occur in two ways. The first is the synthesis of iden-
tification, which is also to be considered the paradigmatic case. Moreover, in
addition to the identification of what is non-contradictory, the process that
leads to the identification of what is contradictory should be taken into ac-
count. While in the first case the explication leads to a unity that was before
expressed in a confused way; in the case of recognizing a contradiction, and
this is the second way, the beliefs that gradually overlook can be cancelled in
virtue of what has already become explicit78. In other words, in making the
judgment explicit, what previously was a belief tied to a judgment given in
a confused way becomes a real judgment. On the other hand, it is not yet a
judging act thematically addressing the state of things, and therefore it is not
neither an adjustment of judgment to a state of things nor even the apriori
77Even in this case, the interest for knowledge does not play any role. On the contrary
only the interest for correctness is addressed here. Nevertheless, the basis for knowledge are
to be found. To explain clearly the difference between these two ‘modi’ of judgment, Husserl
draw some analogies with other phenomenological situations like reading and perception.
The use of the term passive synthesis, is not to be confused here with the technical notion
at work in prepredicative experience. Bachelard has a different view [Bachelard, 1957], cf. p.
68-9. cf. also [Lohmar, 2000], p. 51. For a discussion of the kind of spontaneity in explicating
judgments cf. [Lohmar, 2000], p. 54.
78cf. [Hua XVII], §16; cf. [Lohmar, 2000]: “Die Explikation des verworrenen (= leer-ineins-
unexplizit-passiv) Urteils führt entweder zum deutlichen (= leer-gegliedert-explizit-aktiv)
Urteil oder zur Durchstreichung meines früheren, verworrenen Urteils”. Furthermore, as
Lohmar notices later, it is a mistake to consider the first form of evidence as a form that
depend on the explication. Even when the confused judgment is not explicated, vagueness
is still a form of evidence.
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possibility of such an adjustment.
Distinctness and Clarity. A further mode of evidence must now be added79.
Husserl is very clear about this new degree, now the difference between dis-
tinction and clarity is to be investigated, i.e. the difference between evidence of
distinction (Evidenz der Deutlichkeit) and evidence of clarity (der Klarheit):
Es scheiden sich hier zwei Evidenzen, diejenige, in der das Urteil
selbst als Urteil zur Selbstgegebenheit kommt, das dann auch deutliches
Urteil, aus dem wirklichen und eigentlichen Urteilsvollzug entnommenes
heißt. Fürs Zweite diejenige Evidenz, in der das zur Selbstgegebenheit
kommt, worauf der Urteilende „durch” sein Urteil hindurch will, näm-
lich als erkennen Wollender – so wie ihn die Logik sich immer denkt
([Hua XVII], §16b p. 65).
In this passage a few points are to be highlighted. First, it reaffirms the fact
that the distinct judgment constitutes judgment in proper sense and this fact,
because distinct judgment corresponds to the second of the disciplines of formal
logic, confirms the fundamental role of logic of consequence. Secondly, the use
of the term ’separate’ is extremely meaningful. Such a choice was lacking in
the previous part of the discourse and was unnecessary to use this term for the
first distinction. Indeed, in that context, the difference was characterized by
a different nuance of the attitude of the knowing subject, and evidence of the
distinction was still obtainable by explicitation from the first level. Here instead
the two kinds of evidence are split, because a new relevant factor is introduced,
i.e. the explicit interest of knowledge, which completely lacked in the first two
cases. In this type of evidence something new is at focus. Whereas up to this
point judgment was considered under the point of view of what makes it so (its
structure of judgment), now it is to be considered in relation to its content.
That means to refer to something that is outside the mere structure and form
of judgment, i.e. something to which the judgment tends to adjust. Therefore
the forms of evidence that found the formality of combinatorial type are not
here sufficient:
79To be noticed, as Husserl mentions in §16a, that the first two modes can mix. See also
[Lohmar, 2000], pp. 55-6.
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Explizit urteilen ist noch nicht in „Klarheit” urteilen, als welches
in dem Vollzug der Urteilsschritte zugleich Klarheit der Sachen undim
ganzen Urteil Klarheit des Sachverhaltes hat ([Hua XVII], §16 b p. 65).
In judging clearly, i.e. in judging in the fullness of clarity – and only in it –
one gets actual knowledge, because here intervenes also the evidence of things
given in themselves. However, the tree of degrees of evidence is not concluded
with this last level. Indeed one must now distinguish between the clarity of the
possession (in the having of something (der Selbsthabe), cf. [FTL Engl.]) of the
thing itself and the clarity of anticipation (cf. [Hua XVII], §16c). These are two
different nuances of clear evidence. In the first case, the state of affairs itself
is given, clarity designates here “the mode of the judging that gives its meant
affair complex itself ([Hua XVII], §16c)”. In the second case, the judgment act
appears as a looming judging that makes intuitive for itself the state of affairs
that is not given in the judgment itself. In this case, the state of affairs is not
given, but an image of it can serve as intuitive anticipation which tends to be
confirmed by the possession of the state of affairs.
Previously it was discussed how in confused judging the form of distinct
judgment was prefigured. Even in that case a form of anticipation was working,
which was “fulfilled” by making explicit the confused judgment and transform-
ing it into a distinct one. Now one has a different form of anticipation, that
of the ‘content’ of the judgment, namely the state of affairs which the judg-
ment refers to. This anticipation is fulfilled – and to fulfill is to be meant in a
more precise phenomenological sense – from effective-intuitive possession of the
state of affairs. Thus, the situation seems to be symmetrical and there are two
steps of fulfillment: indication–distinction: anticipation of the clarity–clarity.
the momentum of knowledge appears for the very first time in the anticipation
of clarity. It is an impulse, so to say, confused and tends to a upper degree of
distinction (cf. [Hua XVII], p. 75), i.e. it tends to the achievement of clarity in
the first sense 80.
80Clearness in the first sense means judgment and things given intuitively. In other words,
knowledge is still, like in Kant, only obtainable through the synthesis of intuitions and
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This is in fact the ‘isomorphism’ between the levels of evidence and logical
disciplines. The next step in the critique on logic will be that of showing how
this ‘stratification of evidence’ is finally founded on the evidence of experience.
This means, from another perspective, to show that the formal apodictic evi-
dence is in a certain sense founded on evidence of experience. On this, I will
return later (cf. 2.8.2 and ff.).
2.6 Logical Architecture
With the stratification of formal logic, the first result of Husserl’s project is
achieved. But it is still partial and incomplete, especially when one takes into
account that Husserl’s underlying target – which comes directly from the orig-
inal attempt to conciliate ideal and subjective – is to draw an ultimate assess-
ment of the relation between formal disciplines and theory of knowledge in the
framework of a Wissenschaftslehre.
Now, two further tasks are to be faced in order to complete the framework
of formal objective disciplines. First, it is necessary to address directly the
question of the relation between logic and mathematics. Second, one must
investigate the possibility of a level of formality which is higher than those
discussed above. Not only a formality of higher level, but also of higher degree.
In other words, Husserl addresses the question of a theory of the possible
forms of theory, i.e. a theory that shows how deductive systems, considered as
a unities, work.
Before going on with these two arguments, it might be appropriate to draw
an outline of what is being discussed here81.
What emerges is the idea of an architecture of logic (of logical reason) on
categorical factors, even if their connection is different. In this second form of explicitation
of judgments, from the anticipation to the possession of clarity, a fundamental nature of
logic as theory of science is recognized.
81A graphical representation with which the present brief summary is to be compared is
in [Lohmar, 2000], p. 80. Cf. also App. fig. 2.
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the basis of the different nuances of formality that characterize every single
discipline belonging to logic.
The focus of the discourse is of course the foundation of a logic that is doc-
trine of science. Once its bilateralism (two-sideness) is recognized, there are
two complementary and necessary directions of investigation for the effective
establishment of a theory of knowledge. On the one side, the investigation of
formal logic as the set of ideal configurations of logic. The formal apophan-
tic is divided into two proper sub-disciplines: morphology of judgments and
logic of consequence. A third level of apophantic, which however is to be seen
in a slightly transverse direction, is the logic of truth. In fact, rather than
being a linear development of the first two, this level is sideways, and opens
the discourse on subjectivity of logic on the basis of the distinction between
types of evidence: evidence of confusion, distinction and clarity. These three
types of evidence relate, characterizing them, the three levels of apophantic.
In particular, clear evidence characterizes the logic of truth. Going forward,
in the wise of a deepening of logic of truth – and therefore of the subjectively
addressed investigation – one finds transcendental logic, which is characterized
by a regressive method and by the formality of the synthesis of time.
Decomposing apophantic in sub-disciplines is only part of the discourse
on the objective side of logic. Indeed this would not be complete without an
inquiry on a third level of formality, that level that deals with the form of
laws and deductive systems. This is addressed by Husserl under the general
title of doctrine of multiplicity. This maximum level of formality itself will
be characterized by a certain sort of bilaterality: on one side, it is directed
towards objects; on the other, it faces the formation of judgments. Precisely
because of its two-sideness, it is the ideal place for the solution of problems
concerning the relation between the analytic apophantic (formal logic) and
analytical ontology (ontology formal/mathematical).
What should be immediately noted is that this sort of logical architecture
is a system within which the various modes of formality are displayed. First
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the ‘combinatorial’ formality that characterizes the logic of the first two levels.
Then the formality of the logic of truth and of the three different types of
evidence. Here there is an item as important as it may be the recognition of
the subjective side of logic itself: rather than reducing the subjective side of
logic to a type of combinatorial formality (typical of a side object), and not
wanting to give up the demand of formality for the subjective side, Husserl
traces a different type of formality, namely the formality of evidence.
2.7 Logic, mathematics and theory of science
So far, two different meanings of the Formal (des Formalen, cf. [Hua XVII],
§23) have been discussed: on the one hand, the characteristic formality of the
objective side of logic; on the other, the formality of evidence on the subjective
side. It would seem that the task of the Husserlian project should now continue
in the direction of the foundation of a transcendental logic. The much desired
phenomenological theory of knowledge would thus be tantamount to the union
of a formal logic understood as analytical apophantic and of a deeply devel-
oped subjectively addressed logic, i.e. a transcendental logic. However, before
discussing transcendental logic, there are two further tasks in the framework
of the fist notion of formality (cf. [Hua XVII], §23)82.
The starting question must be now reformulated in light of what has been
said so far: what is the relation between logic and mathematics? In other
words, what is the relation between the formality of logic and the formality
of mathematics? Precisely in relation to this question, Husserl’s attempt runs
the risk of being received as mere philosophy of mathematics. This question
is often misunderstood and put in improper terms: is logic to be grounded on
mathematics or vice versa83?
82“Dans le chapitre précédent Husserl a dégagé une telle structure téléologique: celle de
l’apophantique formelle à partir de la logique traditionelle. En procédant de même par une
analyse intentionelle il va dégager une autre structure de la doctrine de la science: celle de
l’ontologie formelle, à partir de la mathématique formelle” [Bachelard, 1957], p. 87.
83For other similar questions cf. [Lohmar, 2000], p. 66. In Prolegomena this question was
left suspended. In FTL, the decomposition of the notion of formality allows Husserl also to
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The relation between apophantical analytics (logic) and ontological analyt-
ics (mathematics) is extremely problematic and it is a focal point for the entire
architecture. Here an alternative response to the reduction of mathematics to
logic or of logic to mathematic is to be found, i.e. a solution that preserves the
philosophical value of logic that Husserl is seeking in the first part of FTL. Two
basic operations are performed: the first gathers and brings to fruition the re-
sults of the decomposition of formal logic; the second completes the framework
of analytical disciplines introducing a new level and degree of formality.
The development of the discussion is quite peculiar84: after defining the
scope of formal logic in the first chapter, Husserl discusses, in the second
chapter, the relation between formal logic and mathematics as formal ontology.
The discussion, however, is left incomplete and is suspended in favor of the
definition, in chapter three, of the concepts of multiplicity and the theory of
deductive systems. Hence comes a discussion that refers back to the ancient
ideal of a mathesis universalis. On the one side, this provides the third degree
in the field of the analytical disciplines. On the other side, one finds now
those elements for the definition of the relationship between mathematics and
philosophy that will be fully processed in chapter four85.
Apophantical analytics and ontological analytics are distinct but not sep-
arate. They are in fact a single discipline, but their respective areas of appli-
cation should not be confused and none of them must (can) be reduced to
the other. In other words, apophantic (formal logic) and mathematics (formal
ontology)86 are inseparable and the question of their relation cannot be solved
through the foundation of one onto another, but only through the recognition
clarify the notion of formal ontology.
84cf. [Sokolowski, 1974]. The author perfectly describes the two fundamental passages. The
first ([Hua XVII], ch. 2, §§23-25) is, so to say, a technical one and consists in distinguishing
between apophantic and ontology. By contrast, in the second ([Hua XVII], ch. 4, §§42-
45) the interest in knowledge is introduced, and consequently the real phenomenological
analysis begins (cf. [Sokolowski, 1974], p. 281). To be noticed that the interest in knowledge
was already the discrimination between two levels of evidence.
85I cannot insist on this question, which would need to be discussed independently.
86For the expression ‘formal ontology’ cf.: [Scalon, 1975]; [Bachelard, 1957];
[Lohmar, 2000]; [Hua III/1b] §§8-10.
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of the difference of their tasks. And this can be obtained only through the
analysis of their characteristic mode of intentionality, i.e. through a genuine
phenomenological inquiry.
First of all, one must recognize the difference between being turned toward
the formation of judgment, namely toward judgments considered according to
their form, and being turned towards objects. Apophantic deals with the forms
of judgment and makes use of the categories of meaning (Bedeutungskate-
gorien) like judgment, predicate, subject, proposition. By contrast, formal on-
tology is directed toward objects considered in their most general formality, in
the pure emptiness of their form. Formal ontology is not about judgments, but
about objects in their formal relations. It makes use of categories that relate
to objects (Gegestandskategorien) like object, collections, and so on:
Einheit, so erkennt man, daß die Mengen- und Anzahlen-lehre be-
zogen ist auf das Leeruniversum Gegenstand-überhau pt oder Etwas
überhaupt, in einer formalen Allgemeinheit, die jede sachhaltige Bes-
timmung von Gegenständen prinzipiell außer Betracht läßt; ferner daß
diese Disziplinen speziell für gewisse Ableitungsgestalten des Etwas-
überhaupt interessiert sind [...]. Von hier aus weitergehend erkennt man,
daß wie die Mengenlehre und Anzahlenlehre, so auch die übrigen for-
malen mathematischen Disziplinen in dem Sinne formal sind, daß sie als
Grundbegriffegewisse Ableitungsgestalten des Etwas-überhaupt haben
([Hua XVII], §24 p. 81-82).
If logic means analytics of judgment, mathematics means analytics of ob-
jects (and relations of objects) taken according to their form. This dual ap-
proach leads to define two thematically separate disciplines that are in practice
inseparable. In particular, the inseparability is to be explained by means of the
distinction of two phenomenological orientations (Eistellungen) and the tran-
sition from a phenomenological orientation to the other (cf. [Hua XVII], ch. 4).
These are, on the one hand, the orientation towards objects; on the other hand,
the orientation toward judgments. The change of focus, but also the continuity
from the one to the other, will be explained through the introduction of the
interest of knowledge. It is not possible here to go into details. Instead, what
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is important to notice is the homogeneity of the two disciplines from the point
of view of their degree of formality.
After the recognition of the ‘bilaterality’ of logic as doctrine of science, one
finds here the recognition of another characteristic duality that characterizes
the highest level (degree) of analytical formality, i.e. the theory of possible
forms of theory and the correlative doctrine of multiplicity87.
What is needed now is to answer a question that leads to a higher degree
of formality: is there anything that could be meant as formality of analytical
forms as described in the previous paragraphs? Is there a formality whose main
task is to coordinate formalities of lower degree? Responding to the Leibnizian
ideal of a mathesis universalis, trying to embodying its spirit more than ever,
Husserl’s research is now addressed to describe this sort of ‘meta-theory’, which
develops in two directions: from the mathematical point of view, it has to do
with a formal entity, i.e. the multiplicity. From a logical point of view, it has to
do with the more general logical formations, i.e. not with particular deductions
and judgments, but with systems of deductions.
So far, the three layers (performances) of logic have been discussed. Already
in LU, logic is articulated in three tasks (Aufgaben): tasks and performances,
as already said, do not clash exactly88. Indeed, if the third performance of logic
is the logic of truth, the third task is given by the discipline of highest degree,
the theory of multiplicity, which represents the last piece of the Husserlian
logical architecture89:
87This notion is present in many of Husserl’s works, from the Prolegomena to the Krisis,
cf.: [Hua VI] §9; [Hua III/1b] §§71-2; [Hua XVII] §§51-4; [Hua XVIII] §§69-70. Even in the
interpretation of this notion, there is the tendency to associate it to particular works in the
field of mathematics and mere philosophy of mathematics, e.g. cf.: Cfr: [Gauthier, 2004];
[Smith, 2002]; [Hill, 2000b]. Several interesting investigations spring from this point, . Here
Husserl faces the question, very important at that time, of the notion of axiomatiza-
tion and introduces a special notion (requirement) of completeness of a system of ax-
ioms: cf. [Bachelard, 1957], pp. 110 and ff.; [Lohmar, 2000], pp. 80 and ff.; [da Silva, 2000];
[Hartimo, 2007]; [Majer, 1997]; [Hill, 1995]; [Scalon, 1991]. This part of Husserl’s system
must be related and compared to Hilbert’s work. cf. also [Mahnke, 1977], [Cavaillès, 1997].
88cf. [Lohmar, 2000], p. 78 and note 121.
89As Lohmar says: “Die einzelnen Disziplinen del formal auf Gegenstände-uberhaupt
gerichteten Mathematik haben jeweils korrelative Disziplinen, die, in der Einstellung auf
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Waren auf der früheren Stufe der Logik der reinen Form nach thema-
tisch geworden alle Bedeutungsgebilde, die innerhalb einer Wissenschaft
apriori auftreten können, also Urteilsformen (und die Formen ihrer Ele-
mente), Schlußformen, Beweisformen, korrelativ auf der gegenständlichen
Seite Gegenstände überhaupt, Menge und Mengenverhältnis überhaupt,
Kombinationen, Ordnungen, Größen überhaupt usw. mit den zugehöri-
gen formalen Wesensverhältnissen und Verknüpfungen, so werden jetzt
zum Thema die Urteilssysteme in ihrer Ganzheit, welche die Einheit
einer möglichen deduktiven Theorie ausmachen, die einer „Theorie im
strengen Sinne” ([Hua XVII], §28 p. 94).
The foundation of this higher discipline, whose actual task is that of ex-
plaining the unity of the nomological sciences (cf. [Hua XVII], §§29-31) and
which leads precisely to a detailed formal higher level, opens several directions
of investigation: the demand for definiteness and saturation (completeness)
that Husserl formulates in this theory; the question of the relationship with
some Hilbertian notions; the origin of the mathematical notion of multiplic-
ity is to be found, as Husserl himself points out, in Riemann’s work; the re-
interpretation of the relationship between mathematics and formal ontology in
the light of this new discipline90.
2.8 Two-sideness of Logic and Evidence
Let me return now to the fundamental characteristics of Husserl’s transcen-
dental grounding of logic. Thery are, as already mentioned, the discovery of
the subjective (not psychological) side of logic, with the connected discussion
of evidence, and the foundation of the evidence of logic on the evidence of
pre-predicative experience. Indeed, this is a deep phenomenological account of
die Urteile, apophantische Analytik sind. Dasselbe Verhältnis gilt für die dritte Stufe bzw.
3. Aufgabe der formalen Logik: Gegenständlich gerichtet ist sie Mannigfaltigkeitslehre, kol-
lelativ auf Urteile gerichtet ist sie Theorie der möglichen Theorieformen. In dieser reinen
Analytik höchster Stufe sieht Husserl die leibnizsche Idee der mathesis universalis auf dem
Weg ihrer Verwirklichung” ([Lohmar, 2000], p. 74). cf. also [Lohmar, 2000], p. 121.
90As Husserl mentions in the last chapter (cf. [Hua XVII], §51), this universal degree of
formality is both on the side of pure consequence and on the side of truth. i.e. the distinction
between consequence and truth also holds at this higher degree of formality. What this
precisely means is problematic and needs to be investigated. All these are fundamental
issues that cannot unfortunately be developed in this context.
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evidence that makes the discourse on the evidences of the three logical disci-
plines complete. It is evidence that gives to the inquiry on the subjective side
of logic its foundational sense. In fact, Husserl’s argument can be sketched
as following: after describing the threefold structure of logic (first step of the
analytic critique), he continues uncovering the logical presuppositions (second
step of the analytic critique) and showing that they have a subjective con-
version. Finally, he shows that the evidence of these principles is based on
evidence of pre-predicative experience91. To be noticed that this is not only an
advance in the context FTL as a text, but also with respect to all the Husser-
lian philosophy, since the question of evidence was already a central point in
the LU.
At the very beginning of the second section of FTL, where the concrete
transcendental inquiry begins, Husserl poses an important question: is the
formulation of an objective formal logic enough to fulfill the task of being
doctrine of science, though merely from a formal point of view? In other words,
he is asking whether with the threefold structure of logic and the clarification
of the relation between mathematics and logic, we obtain at least the complete
formal structure of the doctrine of science and can then pass to the analysis
of a material ontology that considers the kernels also according to their plena
(Fülle) (cf. [Hua XVII], §55). The negative answer to this question opens the
door to the transcendental investigation: before going on with the attractive
task of developing a theory of a material (sachaltig) apriori – an universal
apriori that could connect in a totality all the particular material apriori (cf.
[Hua XVII], §55) – there are still some open questions left regarding logic
as theory of science. In order to answer these questions, one must look at
the bilaterality (zweitseitigkeit) of logic that Husserl already mentioned in its
preliminary remarks (cf. [Hua XVII], §8). In particular, an important question
91Just to make the framework clear, in FTL one finds: 1) two steps of the analytic critique
(decomposition of logic and critique of the idealizing presuppositions); 2) the elucidation of
the relations between logic, mathematics, formal ontology and mathesis, 3) two conditions for
the transcendental inquiry (the subjective side of logic and the implied critique of evidence).
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left is that concerning the ultimate justification of the threefold structure of
logic. The claim that they are based on the correlative distinction of different
modes of evidence is not enough. By contrast, it is necessary to go in the
details. As already noticed, with the logic of truth a kind of evidence that is
not only apodictic is considered. This opens the door to the subjectivity of
logic. But it cannot mean to develop a psychological theory of logic. Renewing
the polemic intent against psychologism of the Prolegomena, Husserl moves
now toward transcendental logic in which, justifying the evidence of the logic
of truth, he can justify the whole structure of formal logic.
2.8.1 The subjective side of logic
The discovery of the subjective side of logic is one of the most important
elements of the logical explorations of the Twenties and it is immediately ad-
dressed not only in FTL, but also in EU (cf. [Hua XVII], §8; [EU], §3; [Hua XI],
p. 305).
On the one side, one finds the operations and the activities of the knowing
consciousness in the formation (Bildung) of the judgments and in the operation
of judging. On the other side, one finds the objective formations, the linguistic
ideal and permanent formations, that become fixed ideal objects to be studied
and organized according to the laws of formal logic92. These formations are
to be considered as durable acquisitions of the knowing subject. They are
considered ‘objectively’ and are in fact the language that constitutes scientific
knowledge: the objective sphere of logic has also “the being-sense of abiding
validity; nay, even that of Objective validity in the special sense, reaching
beyond the now actually cognizing subjectivity and its acts”93. Furthermore
92“Das Urteil, an das sich alle diese Fragen knüpfen, ist dem Logiker zunächst vorgegeben
in seiner sprachlichen Ausformung als Aussagesatz und d.i. als eine Art objektives Gebilde,
als etwas, das er wie anderes Seiendes auf seine Formen und Beziehungsweisen hin unter-
suchen kann” ([EU], §3 p. 7).
93[FTL Engl.], §8 p. 33. “All dieses Objektive hat nicht nur das flüchtige Dasein des im
thematischen Feld als aktuelle Bildung Auftretenden und Vergehenden. Es hat auch den
Seinssinn bleibender Fortgeltung, ja sogar den objektiver Gültigkeit in besonderem Sinn,
über die aktuell erkennende Subjektivität und ihre Akte hinausreichend. Es bleibt Identisches
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they are identical in all their repetitions (re-executions) and are repeated in
the modality of the repetition of the same (von Demselben). This because they
are omnitemporal, i.e. not dependent on a particular determinate temporality
to which they belong (cf. [Hua XVII], §§58-9).
In the development of occidental philosophy, the objective sphere of logic
acquired a very dominant position. As a consequence the subjective side of
logic was left hidden and objective logic completely overlapped on it, in a very
similar way in which the idealities of sciences covered the Lebenswelt94. In
other words, the idealities of logic, in virtue of their objectivity and formality,
became presuppositions (Voraussetzungen). The second step of the analytic
critique will have the task of eliminating them. Besides the individuation of the
structure of the logical disciplines, an investigation directed to the clarification
of the judging activity is necessary and required by the degrees of evidence that
are the correlates of the logical disciplines:
Die Gegenrichtung logischer Thematik ist die subjektive. Sie geht
auf die tief verborgenen subjektiven Formen, in denen die theoretis-
che „Vernunft” ihre Leistungen zustande bringt. Zunächst ist hier in
Frage die Vernunft in der Aktualität, nämlich die in lebendigem Vollzug
verlaufende Intentionalität, in der jene objektiven Gebilde ihren „Ur-
sprung” haben. [...] Jedes in diesem Sinne objektiv Logische für sich hat
sein „subjektives” Korrelat in seinen konstituierenden Intentionalitäten,
und wesensmäßig entspricht jeder Form der Gebilde ein als subjektive
Form anzusprechendes System leistender Intentionalität ([Hua XVII],
§8, p. 38).
A constitutional intentional operation corresponds as correlate to the al-
ready finished and formed (Gebilde) objects of logic. Hence, in the framework
of a genuine theory of knowledge it will be necessary to go back from the consti-
tuted ideality to the constituting performance of subjectivity. In other words,
the history of the constituting intentionality is to be described. The question
can be faced from the perspective of EU. Here Husserl avoids to describe in
in der Wiederholung” ([Hua XVII], §8 p. 37).
94On must consider the parallelism, that Husserl himself develops in the introduction to
FTL, between geometry and logic. There is a similarity between the two, however they are
very different and this because the more universal character of logic.
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details the structure of formal logic, but claims that, in order to comprehend
the ultimate meaning of formal logic and in particular of the logic of truth,
it is necessary to investigate it by means of particular laws, which cannot be
purely formal (combinatorial):
Aber andererseits muß es, auch wenn es den Anforderungen dieser
Gesetze genügt, damit noch nicht sein Ziel, die Wahrheit erreichen.
Diese Einsicht zwingt zu der Frage danach, was über die formalen Be-
dingungen möglicher Wahrheit hinaus noch hinzukommen muß, soll
eine Erkenntnistätigkeit ihr Ziel erreichen. Diese weiteren Bedingungen
liegen auf der subjektiven Seite und betreffen die subjektiven Charaktere
der Einsichtigkeit, der Evidenz und die subjektiven Bedingungen ihrer
Erzielung. ([EU], §3, p. 8).
The quotation above is extremely important, because it shows the meaning
of the Husserlian systematization of formal logic, and in particular the meaning
of logic of truth: a) the true function of the systematization of the logical disci-
plines in the first section of FTL is to provide a starting point for the subjective
analyses; b) the connection between formal logic and transcendental logic, i.e.
the introduction of the subjective analyses; c) the boundaries between merely
formal (thecnical) logic and logic as theory of science. The next part of the
text is also illuminating and allows to add the following items to those listed
above95: d) the fact, already implied in the previous quotation, that the sub-
jective analyses are carried on through the analysis of evidence; e) the object
of the genealogy of logic as origin of the logical formation. On the subjective
side, one must take into consideration the conditions of evidence. Indeed, it
is evidence that guarantees to the subjective formations the characteristic of
being expression of knowledge.
95“Durch die Tatsache, daß Urteile als prätendierte Erkenntnisse auftreten, daß aber vieles
von dem, was sich als Erkenntnis ausgibt, sich nachher als Täuschung erweist, und durch die
daraus folgende Notwendigkeit der Kritik der Urteile auf ihre Wahrheit hin ist also der Logik
von vornherein eine, freilich von der Tradition nie in ihrem tieferen Sinne durchschaute Dop-
pelseitigkeit ihrer Problematik vorgezeichnet: einerseits die Frage nach den Formbildungen
und ihren Gesetzlichkeiten, andererseits die nach den subjektiven Bedingungen der Erre-
ichung der Evidenz. Hier kommt das Urteilen als subjektive Tätigkeit in Frage und die
subjektiven Vorgänge, in denen sich die Gebilde in ihrem Auftreten bald als evidente, bald
als nicht evidente ausweisen. Der Blick ist damit gelenkt auf das Urteilen als eine Leistung
des Bewußtseins, in der die Gebilde mit all ihrem Anspruch, Ausdruck von Erkenntnissen
zu sein, entspringen” ([EU], §3, p. 9).
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It is important to notice that opening the door to the subjective side of
logic is not yet transcendental logic. This is in fact something that happens
inside logic of truth, which is a discipline that belongs to formal apophantic.
It is instead the moment of transition between apophantic and formal logic, it
represents the internal conditions of apophantic that requires a further tran-
scendental investigation, which will lead back from the idealities of logic to
experience. Logic of truth, unlike the other two levels of apophantic, requires
that the subjective conditions of truth are added to the formal conditions
whose modes are explicated within the first two levels. This is precisely what
the logical tradition ignored and left to psychological analyses: the subjective
conditions of evidence must be added to the formal conditions of truth, i.e. to
those conditions that guarantees apodictic formal evidence. The recognition
of the bilaterality of logic can be considered a radicalization of the Kantian
Copernican revolution: even formal logic, the discipline that more than the
others embodies the objectivity of thought, encompasses a subjective side, and
this opens the transcendental inquiry.
2.8.2 Evidence
The question of evidence is the pivot of Husserl’s investigation on the subjective
side of logic and, consequently of the attempt of developing an investigation
that is not psychological but genetical in a philosophical sense. It is indeed
the natural starting point for every problem concerning the subjective origin
of the logical formations96.
In the framework of traditional logic, only apodictic evidence was at focus.
This is that kind of evidence deriving from the apriority of judgments, from
their objectivity and their formal character. By contrast, Husserl refers to
the evidence (Einsichtigkeit) on the subjective side: this is the evindence of
96“Überhaupt ist ja schon aus unseren bisherigen Stücken einer Evidenzkritik sichtbar
geworden, daß Evidenz zunächst eine naiv betätigte und „verborgene Methode” ist, die nach
ihrer Leistung befragt werden muß, damit man weiß, was man in ihr, als einem Bewußtsein
im Modus der Selbsthabe, wirklich selbst hat und mit welchen Horizonten” ([Hua XVII],
§80, p. 208).
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the intentional operations that constitute judging. In other words, Husserl
refers to the evidence of the intentional operations that are at the basis of
the apodictic evidence of logic and that make this latter possible. This is the
sense of evidence that must now be investigated: it is necessary to investigate
evidence, and this means to carry out a critical investigation that can lead,
through the differenf forms of evidence, to the more original one, i.e. that of
perception.
In EU, one finds a short but very illuminating presentation of the question
of evidence. The title of §4 is already meaningful97: The levels of the problem
of self-evidence. Objective self-evidence as preliminary condition of a possible
self-evident act of judgment (cf. [EJ], §4)98.
First of all, evidence is organized in levels (degrees). It is not the unitary and
monolithic notion that characterizes traditional logic. Second, the general plan
of the analysis is here already implied: according to it Husserl will move back
along the different degrees of evidence, up to the evidence of pre-predicative
experience. As already mentioned, the formal laws are not enough to gain
knowledge. By contrast, the subjective conditions must be added, because be-
sides the formal evidence guaranteed by the formal rules of the judgment, the
evidence of the object of the judgment must be also taken into account. To-
gether with the judgment, the object of the judgment as well must be given99:
Vielmehr stellt das Gelingen der Erkenntnisleistung auch seine An-
forderungen an die Weise der Vorgegebenheit der Gegenstände selbst
97The Introduction of EU (§§1-14), as Lohmar shows, has a different status than the
main text (§§15-98). In particular it is, so to say, less reliable than the rest of the text (cf.
[Lohmar, 1996], pp. 34 and ff.). However, I make use of paragraphs whose contents are also
presented in a similar way in FTL.
98“Die Stufen des Evidenzproblems: gegenständliche Evidenz als Vorbedingung möglichen
evidenten Urteilens” (cf. [EU], §4). I use the simple term ‘evidence’ instead of ‘self-evidence’
used in the english translation.
99This is nothing more than what we saw in the first chapter under the title of synthesis of
coincidence. But now, Husserl is showing more deeply why the coincidence itself is possible.
This is because the evidence of the judgment finds its origin in the evidence of pre-predicative
experience. Whereas in the first chapter the empty act of meaning and the act of intuition
were side by side and found a common point in the coincidence of their respective essences,
now they are on a vertical plane. In particular the judgment is foundend in the evidence of
experience.
CHAPTER 2. METHODS AND LOGICS 141
in inhaltlicher Beziehung. Sie müssen ihrerseits so vorgegeben sein, daß
ihre Gegebenheit von sich aus Erkenntnis und das heißt evidentes Urteilen
möglich macht. Sie müssen selbst evident, als sie selbst gegeben sein
([EU], §4, p. 11).
But what does it precisely mean to talk of evidence? A new definition
of the term is the first step toward a critical investigation. It is necessary to
abandon the common use of the word evidence, according to which it is limited
to apodictic evidence:
Die Rede von Evidenz, evidenter Gegebenheit, besagt hier also nichts
anderes als Selbstgegebenheit, die Art und Weise wie ein Gegenstand
in seiner Gegebenheit bewußtseinsmäßig als „selbst da”, „leibhaft da”
gekennzeichnet sein kann im Gegensatz zu seiner bloßen Vergegenwärti-
gung, der leeren, bloß indizierenden Vorstellung von ihm. [...] Als evident
bezeichnen wir somit jederlei Bewußtsein, das hinsichtlich seines Gegen-
standes als ihn selbst gebendes charakterisiert ist, ohne Frage danach,
ob diese Selbstgebung adäquat ist oder nicht. ([EU] §4, p. 11-12)100.
This is an enlargment of the notion of evidence that allows to encompass
all kinds of objectualities: every object has its own mode of evidence101.
Although not all objects are characterized by apodictic evidence like logical
formations, every object can fulfill this definition of evidence, which is inde-
pendent from the predicative structure of evidence in common sense. Indeed,
every object has its own mode of givenness (cf. [EU], §4).
Transcendental logic must deal not only with the form, but also with the
contents102, i.e. with judgments taken together with their objects. This is a
phenomenological elucidation of the genesis of the evident judgment:
100This passage is to be compared with FTL §59, where Husserl gives a similar definition:
“Evidenz bezeichnet, wie für uns durch die obigen Ausführungen schon sichtlich geworden
ist, die intentionale Leistung der Selbstgebung. Genauer gesprochen ist sie die allgemeine
ausgezeichnete Gestalt der „ Intentionalität”, des „Bewußtseins von etwas”, in der das in
ihr bewußte Gegenständliche in der Weise des Selbsterfaßten , Selbstgesehenen, des bewußt-
seinsmäßigen Bei-ihm-selbst-seins bewußt ist. [...] Doch muß hier gleich darauf hingewiesen
werden, daß die Evidenz ver schiedene Originalitätsmodi hat. Der Urmodus der Selbstgebung
ist die Wahrnehmung”([Hua XVII], §59, p. 166).
101According to this, intuition has its mode of evidence, the judgments have their own
mode of evidence (cf. the different degrees of evidence above) and the object of the acts
of knowledge have their mode of evidence. In particular the evidence of these latter calls
into question both the evidence of intuition and the evidence of the structure of judgments
(empty act of meaning).
102This was something that already Kant claimed. However, in Husserl, the sense of the
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So ergeben sich für die Problematik der Evidenz zwei Stufen von
Fragen: die eine betrifft die Evidenz der vorgegebenen Gegenstände
selbst, bzw. ihre Bedingungen in der Vorgegebenheit, die andere das
auf dem Grunde der Evidenz der Gegenstände sich vollziehende evi-
dente prädikative Urteilen. Die formale Logik fragt nicht nach diesen
Unterschieden in der Weise der Vorgegebenheit der Gegenstände. Sie
fragt nur nach den Bedingungen evidenten Urteilens, aber nicht nach
den Bedingungen evidenter Gegebenheit der Gegenstände des Urteilens
([EU], §4, p. 13).
Once more, the flaw of traditional logic was to neglect the subjective side
of logic that now takes the form of an investigation on the subjective condi-
tions of the evident judging, i.e. of a clarification of the genesis of the evident
judgment. By contrast, phenomenology takes this task very seriously. Not only
apodictic evidence is at focus, but also and above all the evident judging and
the subjective conditions of the evident judging. From here the transcendental
investigation can move on. And this will take the form of an investigation on
the formation and constitution of the subjective conditions of logic. Therefore,
transcendental logic has the form of the genesis of the operation of judging:
Für sie hat die Frage nach der evidenten Gegebenheit der Gegen-
stände des Urteilens, der Denkinhalte, als der Voraussetzung jeglicher
Urteilsevidenz, sowohl der des geradehin Urteilenden als auch der auf die
Formgesetzlichkeiten dieses Urteilens bezüglichen Evidenzen des Logik-
ers selbst, den Vorrang. Gegenständliche Evidenz ist die ursprünglichere,
weil die Urteilsevidenz erst ermöglichende, und die Ursprungsklärung
des prädikativen Urteils muß verfolgen [...] ([EU], §4, p. 14).
2.8.3 From Evidence to Evidence
A passage from the last quotation of the previous paragraph is particularly
meaningful: “objective self-evidence is the more original because it is what
first makes judicative self-evidence possible” ([EJ], p. 21)103. The evidence of
the object is therefore not only different from that of the judgment, but also
claim appears more clear. It means that transcendental logic must deals with the formation
of the evidence of logic. As a consequence logic as doctrine of science, which consists in the
union of formal logic and transcendental logic, deals with both.
103To be recalled that in that translation ‘Evidenz’ is traslated with ‘self-evidence’. Here I
use the simple word ‘evidence’.
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preliminary according to the originality. The Husserlian project becomes here
manifest: judicative evidence (Urteilsevidenz) must be taken back to objective
evidence (gegästandliche Evidenz), which is the starting point of genealogy of
logic as it is expressed for example in EU:
Es bedarf dazu eines Rückganges in mehreren Stufen, um wirklich zu
letztursprünglichen gegenständlichen Evidenzen zu gelangen, die dann
den notwendigen Ausgangspunkt für jede Ursprungsklärung des Urteils
bilden müssen. ([EU], §5, p. 15).
Both in EU and FTL, Husserl devotes a detailed analysis to the question
of the retrogression (Rückgang) from the evidence of the judgment to the
evidence of the object104. With this question, Husserl intends to elucidate the
relations between the different senses and degrees of evidence. Indeed what
Husserl has done until now (distinguishing the evidence of the object and that
of the judjment and claiming that the evidence of the object is more original)
is not enough. One question is left open: the objective evidence is more original
than the evidence judicative judgment, but in what sense does the first make
the second possible? Husserl’s idea is that all kinds of evidences, also evicende
of the ideal and abstract objects, are ultimately based on the evidence gained
in pre-predicative experience105.
In EU one finds an illuminating diairesis that arises from the difference be-
tween logical apodictical evidence and the evident judging (evidenten Urteilens).
According to this, the retrogression will be obtained accepting the second of
the following alternatives (cf. [EU], §5):
104cf. [EU] §§5-6; [Hua XVII], II Abschnitt 4. Kapitel. Here Husserl uses the term Rück-
führung. To be noticed that in FTL chap. 3, just before the discussion of the Rückführung,
Husserl shows how logical presuppositions (Voraussetzungen) must be converted into subjec-
tive operations. This is the second step of the analytic critique. Here the logical principles,
such as ideality of the meaning, non contradiction, middle excluded are showed to have a
subjective conversion. (Cf. [Hua XVII], II Ab. 3. Kap). Analysing the conversion in detail
would lead the present discussion too far away.
105To understand what this precisely means, it is necessary to look at the progressive
analysis of EU. In fact in this context Husserl is theorizing that bilateral method, whose
progressive (teleological) direction is the one of the analyses of EU. This is what I try to do
in the next chapter.
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a. non-evident judgments that cannot be made evident as opposed to evident
judgments that can be repeated in orignal evidence, in the mode of ‘being
the same again’
b. evident mediate judgments, as opposed to evident immediate judgments
c. judgments that have in themselves sedimentations of a previous judg-
ment with categorical forms as opposed to judgments that are original
substrates, i.e. ultimate substrates
With the second alternative of point c. the individuum is introduced, i.e. the
object toward which the judgment is directed and, consequently, the evidence
of the object is introduced, i.e. that evidence that finally brings to the evidence
of the pre-predicative structures of constitution.
The first distinction presents an alternative that was already mentioned,
although in a different form. This is the opposition between ‘merely alleged
knowledge’ and ‘real knowledge’ (cf. [EJ]). This is indeed an alternative way
to delimitate the spheres of theory of knowledge. On the one side, formal
logic with its characteristic technique of calculus; on the other side, theory of
knowledge with the analysis of subjective evidence.
Aber sobald wir dieses mannigfach vorgegebene Urteilen verschieden-
ster Form nach dem Unterschiede von Evidenz, wirklicher Erkenntnis,
und Nichtevidenz, bloß prätendierter Erkenntnis, bloßem Urteil befra-
gen, genügt es nicht mehr, die vorgegebenen Urteile bloß auf ihre Form
anzusehen, sie dazu bloß lesend nachzuverstehen, eigentlich urteilend
nachzuurteilen; sondern wir müssen sie dazu hinsichtlich der Erkennt-
nisakte nachvollziehen, in denen sie als ursprüngliche Erkenntnisergeb-
nisse geworden sind und jederzeit in Wiederholung neu werden können
— werden als dieselben, die schon geworden sind und doch im „wieder”
ursprünglich werden.([EU], §5, p. 15).
If one remains in the domain of logic, the judicative formations are con-
sidered as ideal and fixed objects to be analyzed according to their formal
features. Consequently, they are mere formations of judgments, syntactical
formations that, albeit valid, are only alleged knowledge. Only the connection
CHAPTER 2. METHODS AND LOGICS 145
to the evidence of the object (the state of affairs) can give rise to knowledge.
Moving from mere logic to theory of knowledge means to reproduce judgments
with the aim of comprehending which intentional acts provide the judgments
with the possibility of knowledge. In other words, Husserl appeals to the in-
tentional theory of judgment, in which the different degrees of evidence, that
finally bring to the judgment, are considered:
Suchen wir so die phänomenologische Genesis der Urteile in der Ur-
sprünglichkeit ihrer Erzeugung auf, so zeigt es sich, daß bloßes Urteilen
eine intentionale Modifikation von erkennendem Urteilen ist. Ein ur-
sprünglich evident erzeugtes Urteil, eine Erkenntnis, die einmal in Ein-
sichtigkeit ursprünglich erworben wurde, kann ja jederzeit uneinsichtig,
wenn auch in Deutlichkeit reproduziert werden ([EU], §5, p. 15)106.
Once one enters the sphere of knowledge, a further distinction is required,
i.e. it is necessary to distinguish between mediate and immediate cognitions.
Singling out an example in the domain of cognitions (evident judgments) is
not enough. Indeed, one can say that the distance between this domain and
pre-predicative experience is still too large:
Vielmehr stehen ja auch die evidenten Urteile unter dem Gegen-
satze der Mittelbarkeit und Unmittelbarkeit. Die mittelbaren, z. B. die
Konklusion eines Schlusses, sind Ergebnisse von Begründungen, die auf
unmittelbare Erkenntnis zurückleiten ([EU], §5b, p. 17).
Here comes the second dinstinction. Husserl singles out immediate cogni-
tions as the most simple form of knowledge, to which the most simple knowing
activities correspond. But there is still need for a further differentiation. In
fact, it might be that a cognition (even an immediate one) presents in itself a
sedimentation of a former judgment with categorical forms, for example it can
be the case that the substrate of the evident judgment has in itself the residue
of another judgment. The aim is now to single out a suitable starting point
106For the classification of the different forms of evidence of judgments cf. above. Once
more Husserl claims here that the most relevant form of evidence is the evidence of clar-
ity. The evidence of distinction is a modification of the first. The evidence of clarity, which
characterizes the logic of truth, represents the fundamental step toward the particular phe-
nomenological connection of judgment and pre-predicative experience (understanding and
sensibility).
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for the phenomenological analysis of the genesis of judgments. This means to
find out the most original forms to which the other forms must go back (rück-
gehen). Those judgments that have in themselves parts which refer to former
judgments do not provide a good starting point for this kind of analysis. They
are in a certain sense spurious, they are not ultimately original107.
By contrast it is necessary to start from judgments with original substrates,
i.e. ultimate substrates. It is necessary to start from judgments whose parts
are not derived from other judgments and do not have in themselves any
sedimentation of categorical forms obtained from other judgments:
Wollen wir also in den Bereich gelangen, in dem so etwas wie gegen-
ständliche Evidenz im Gegensatz und als Voraussetzung von Urteilsev-
idenz möglich ist, so müssen wir innerhalb der möglichen Urteilsgegen-
stände, Urteilssubstrate selbst noch unterscheiden zwichen solchen, die
selber schon Niederschläge früheren Urteilens mit kategorialen Formen
an sich tragen, und solchen, die wirklich ursprüngliche Substrate, erst-
malig in das Urteil als Substrate eintretende Gegenstände sind, letzte
Substrate. Nur sie können es sein, an denen sich zeigen läßt, was ur-
sprüngliche gegenständliche Evidenz im Gegensatz zur Urteilsevidenz
ist ([EU], §5c, p. 19)108.
At the end of the just described diairetic process, the evidence of the judg-
ments is taken back to the evidence of the object. To say it better, it is carried
back (Rückfuhre, cf. [FTL Engl.]) to the evidence of the ultimate substrate of
immediate cognitions. At this point, one finds the evidence of pre-predicative
constitution, i.e. of those costitutive operations that are the basis of the given-
ness of an object. The formulation of this passage is extremely clear:
Die Frage nach dem Charakter der gegenständlichen Evidenz ist
also Frage nach der evidenten Gegebenheit von Individue. [...]. Daher
107“Aber auch das genügt noch nicht, daß wir auf die ihrer Form nach schlichten und un-
mittelbaren Urteile zurückgehen. Nicht jedes beliebige Urteil solcher einfachen Form kann in
gleicher Weise dazu dienen, um an ihm die Fundierung der Urteilsevidenz in gegenständlicher
Evidenz zu verfolgen und zu verstehen, was eigentlich unter dem Titel gegenständlicher Ev-
idenz zum Problem steht.” ([EU], §5c, p. 18).
108Cf. FTL: “Es ist aber apriori einzusehen, daß jedes wirkliche und m ögliche Urteil,
wenn wir seinen Syntaxen nachgehen, auf letzte Kerne zurückführt, bzw. daß es letztlich
ein syntaktischer Bau, wenn auch evtl. ein sehr mittelbarer ist aus elementaren Kernen, die
keine Syntaxen mehr enthalten. ” ([Hua XVII], §82, p. 210). Once these kernels are singled
out, it is possible to consider the proper intentional side.
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sind die an sich ersten Urteile als Urteile mit individuellen Substraten,
Urteile über Individuelles, die Erfahrungsurteile. Die evidente Gegeben-
heit von individuellen Gegenständen der Erfahrung geht ihnen voran,
d. i. ihre vorprädikative Gegebenheit. Die Evidenz der Erfahrung wäre
sonach die von uns gesuchte letztursprüngliche Evidenz und damit der
Ausgangspunkt der Ursprungsklärung des prädikativen Urteils. Theorie
der vorprädikativen Erfahrung, eben derjenigen, die die ursprünglich-
sten Substrate in gegenständlicher Evidenz vorgibt, ist das an sich er-
ste Stück der phänomenologischen Urteilstheorie ([EU], §6, p. 21; Cf.
[Hua XVII], §§82 and ff.).
This is a very clear formulation of the need for the genealogy of logic as well:
the investigation on evidence leads from logical evidence to pre-predicative ex-
perience, showing that pre-predicative mode of givenness is the starting point.
Now, genealogy must intervene according to its characteristic teleological di-
rection. It must take from the basic level of pre-predicative experience up to
the ideal formations of logic, showing which the layers of constitution are and
what their meaning is.
Chapter 3
Genetic Constitution
In the first chapter of this work I discussed Husserl’s theory of knowledge as it
is presented in the Sixth Logical Investigation, where it is framed in a particular
idea of logic and developed through a particular method that Husserl himself
calls static phenomenology. Nonetheless, in the discussion of categorial intu-
ition there is already a sort (an attempt) of vertical analysis and the demand
for a deeper genetic account. In the second chapter, I tried to show which the
characteristics of static and genetic phenomenology are. I tried to explain them
in terms of two different forms of constitutional analysis, i.e. respectively, as
the analysis of a superficial and horizontal constitution and of a deeper con-
stitution of a second degree, a ‘constitution of constitution’. Then I tried to
show how the notion of logic has to change, once genetic phenomenology is in-
troduced, and how the new transcendental logic is essentially connected with
genetic phenomenology as a method. In this third chapter, I would like to dis-
cuss some of the concrete results (analyses) of the genetic approach. In other
words, I shall describe and discuss some portions of the ‘stratification of mean-
ing’ that is taken to light by genetic analysis. In particular, I will focus on two
moments of Husserl’s theory of genetic constitution, i.e. the moment of affec-
tion and that of explication (cf. 3.5 and 3.7)1. The first offers the possibility
to investigate the point where intentionality, as an accomplished and finished
1With particular attention to the way Husserl presents them in Experience and Judgment
and in the Analysis on passive synthesis.
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correlation, actually arires. In fact, this is a fundamental passage in genetic
constitution, since it ‘decomposes’ the static concept of intuition – of intuitive
act – and that of the givenness of things to consciousness. Furthermore, the
analysis of affection offers the possibility of distinguishing two important ele-
ments of consciousness: the presence of something for the consciousness and
the synthesis through which, with different level and degrees, consciousness
operates. It offers the possibility to see how these two elements occur in turn
being the two elements of a very particular and powerful dialectic movement,
to which only phenomenology can give access. The second moment here con-
sidered, that of the explication, is also quite crucial: on the one side, it gives
the general sense of what it means to pass from one layer of the constitution
to another, explicating the contents of the layer below in the one above. On
the other side, it allows to consider some of the topics of the first chapter from
a genetic perspective and consequently to complete the discourse on the conti-
nuity of the two phenomenological methods. In particular, the analysis of the
role of the synthesis of coincidence highlights the passage from the demand
for a vertical analysis (that we considered in the first chapter) to the proper
vertical analysis of genetic phenomenology.
Let me begin with some general considerations that can be useful for the
rest of the discussion: after a note on the history of consciousness (cf. 3.1),
which allows me to recall an important notion discussed in the previous chap-
ter, I will provide a brief account of the question of the relation between pas-
sivity and activity (3.2). Then, I shall make some remarks about the relation
between genetic constitution and knowledge (cf. 3.3.).
3.1 On the history of consciousness
We have now a more precise idea of what genetic constitution is and we can
define it as that constitution that takes into account the development and the
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formation both of the subjectivity (the constitution of acts) and of the objectu-
alities (the constitution of the noematic complex), with respect to the parallel
development of time constitution. This means, as I already tried to show, to
explore the history of consciousness, i.e. the development of consciousness it-
self2. Before considering affection and explication as two stages of this parallel
development, it may be useful to make one more remark. When we think of
history, we refer to a chronological succession of events, which are connected
to each other by means of motivational or causal connections. The effective
chronological order appears immediately to be fundamental for the historical
consideration of the world. In fact, things happen with a fixed order, that of
the objetive time, and the task of the historian is to go back through this
succession, in oder to rebuild it as a succession of events that lead to a deter-
minate one, which is taken as telos. In other words, the historian considers the
chronological succession of events and finds out within it the more meaningful
connections that can explain why something happens or has happened. For the
history of consciousness the situation is slightly different, because the chrono-
logical order is not so relevant as in the case of the history of the world. In
fact, genetic analysis brings to the light universal structures of consciousness
and not the effective natural development of something, as for example the
psychological genesis does:
[...] was zu Zwecken der Analyse getrennt behandelt werden muß und
genetisch als verschiedenen Stufen der Objektivation zugehörig erkannt
wird, faktisch in der Regel eng ineinander verflochten. Daß Rezeptivität
der prädikativen Spontaneität voranliegt, besagt nicht, daß sie faktisch
2It is important to stress that consciousness is not an accomplished already finished and
all encompassing entity. A sort of metaphysical, universal and eternal entity that apriori
contains all the possible forms of experience in the form of always suitable pre-constituited
models. By contrast, it changes according to the different acts and Erlebnisse that take
place in its own sphere. To say it more generally, it acquires its physiognomy according
to the different experiences to which it undergoes. What remains unvaried is the essential
act structure (from the perspective of static phenomenology) but also the essential original
conditions that make the act structure possible. These latter are taken to light by means of
genetic phenomenology. To make an example, we have a logical substrate not because we had
before some sort of sensible experience on which, by abstraction the substrate is founded.
By contrast, we can constitute the notion of substrate beacause it shares with sensibility a
similar (synthetic) structure.
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etwas Eigenständiges ist; als ob immer zuerst eine Kette von rezep-
tiven Erfahrungen abgelaufen sein müßte, bevor es zum Erwachen des
eigentlichen Erkenntnisinteresses kommt. Vielmehr können wir schon
von vornherein einen vorgegebenen Gegenstand thematisch machen im
Erkenntnisinteresse, nicht nur um ihn uns anzusehen, sondern um in
bleibenden Erkenntnissen „festzustellen”, „wie er ist” ([EU], §49, p. 239-
40).
Let me try to explain this important point. Whereas for the history of the
world it is important that something happens – and that it concretely happens
– before what is to be explained as a consequence of this something, for the
history of consciousness this is not the case. In order to apperceive something,
it is not necessary that I have all the succession from the lowest to the higher
layers of constitution. On the contrary, these layers are only the result of an
abstraction, of an abstractive analysis3. In the case of the real history, or also
in the case of the psychological genesis, the events are really causes of what
follows from them. By contrast, in the case of the genesis of consciousness,
we only deal with the general universal structures of consciousness. We have
to do with laws of constitution and not with particular processes of constitu-
tion. Furthermore, whereas the chronological order in history is given by the
objective time, in genetic constitution there is not such a unit of measure-
ment, because objective time itself is to be constituted. In this regard static
analysis and genetic analysis are not so different. Both deal with some sort of
structure: whereas static analysis deals with horizontal structures according
to the schema apprehension-apprehension content, genetic analysis deals with
the deep vertical structure that allows this schema to work, i.e. with those
structures that found this schema4. This is only to say that the moments of
genetic constitution do not develop in a chronological order, especially if we
3Also in the case of the separation between a predicative conceptual thought (begreifende
Denken) and the formation of the universalities (Allgemeinheitsformung) Husserl speaks of
“eine abstraktive Sonderung” ([EU], §49, p. 240).
4There might be a way to avoid to think of genetic phenomenology as a chronological
genesis. This is to adopt a different terminology for static and genetic phenomenology. Static
analysis could be defined as themacro-analysis of the structure of consciousness. By contrast,
genetic phenomenology could be thought of as a micro-analysis of the apriory conditions on
consciousness.
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intend with chronological the order of the objective time. On the contrary,
these moments are ‘coexistent’, they are a succession only by virtue of an ab-
straction. Therefore, the history of consciousness is not to be compared with
history in the common meaning, but rather with a discipline that within his-
tory aims to single out the universal structures of validity. In other words,
genetic phenomenology aims to the laws of constitution and not to the natural
genesis of an act or of an objectuality. Similarly, phenomenology is different
from psychology, for it is a philosophy that aims to the essential and universal
structures of consciousness and not to the description of a particular mental
event.
3.2 Passivity and Activity
The whole investigation on genealogy of logic can be seen as an innovative
way to present the relationship between passivity and activity, i.e. between
the combination of active/passive processes of Sensibility and the spontaneous
activity of the categorial operations of the Understanding.
Passivity and activity are notions present in many philosophical systems
concerning the relations between subject and object in theory of knowledge.
One can think for example of the contraposition that characterizes and leads
the critical approach of Kant’s theory of knowledge. On the one side, the spon-
taneity of the Understanding; on the other side the passivity of sensibility. The
first represents the highest degree of activity of the knowing subject, which can
operate on the presentations given passively through sensibility. By contrast,
sensibility is passive, although it is regulated by the pure forms of space and
time, is passive. It ‘receives’ the contents but does not operate any kind of
activity on them. This is the general frame in which the Kantian Critique is
developed and we find here the origin of a rigid dualism between sensibility
and understanding. Indeed the two are separate Stämme that never meet each
other, except through a middle faculty like that of productive imagination,
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which has, among other things, the task of presenting what is given in sensi-
bility to the understanding5. From the phenomenological perspective, the rigid
separation between sensibility and understanding – as well as the consequent
parallelism ‘sensibility/ passivity–understanding/ activity’ – makes no sense6.
By contrast, passivity is not a simple unique concept, limited to characterize
the status of the knowing subject in receptivity. On the contrary, it is neces-
sary to keep always in mind that passivity in Husserl means different things7
– from the passivity of the original sphere of passive synthesis to the passivity
of reception – and also that, at the different levels of the constitution, we find
different degrees of combination of passivity and activity. One could claim,
paraphrasing Aristotle, that ‘passivity is said in many ways’. Consequently,
also activity is said in many ways, and again there are many combinations
of passivity and activity. Indeed, in Husserl’s view, that of passivity is a very
complex notion, it is decomposed and it is to be analyzed at all the levels
of the constitution. The ‘decomposition’ of this concept, which was consid-
ered univocal in the philosophical tradition, has several motivations. Above
all, the fact that genetic phenomenology, going deep into the original structure
of perception, ‘decomposes’ the original hyle, in order to analyse it in terms
of its own internal legitimacy. This fundamental Husserlian move brings to
the light the levels of original perception and the respective levels of passivity.
Since perception was considered a ‘single and simple’ block in the philosophi-
5In Husserl this faculty appears to be ‘decomposed’ and its tasks are spread onto different
layers of the constituion (cf. below, 4.2).
6To be noticed that a further version of the parallelism is pure receptivity/sensibility-
synthesis-activity. We already saw, first with the discussion of categorial intuition and then
with the discussion of genetic phenomenology, that Husserl introduces the notion of passive
synthesis. This is of course an important element of the decomposition of the traditional
epistemological dualism. By contrast, how I want to argue with the present dissertation,
sensibility and understanding, although different in tasks, are on the same continuous plan,
since they appeal to the common synthesis-presence structure of the phenomenological con-
sciousness.
7The notion of passivity assumes in Husserl always different connotations. Steinbock sin-
gles out at least four meanings: 1) the original legality, the original genesis of the meaning;
2) the non-activity of the ego; 3) the perceptive, pre-predicative, aesthetic sphere of knowl-
edge; 4) the foundation of every categorial activity (cf. [Steinbock, 2004], p. 23). Cf. also:
[Steinbock, 1998]; [Montavont, 1999]; [Biceaga, 2010].
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cal tradition, the different meanings of passivity were left hidden. At the basis
of the whole discourse there is still the fundamental structure of the inten-
tional relation and the fact that both the object and the subject are located in
the phenomenological consciousness. Activity and passivity cannot be consid-
ered outside intentionality: neither completely a parte objecti nor completely
a parte subjecti8. In other words, the idea of a subject that is always active
in its proper function of being subject (especially in its categorial operation),
and the related idea of the object that is given in a purely passive way to the
subject must be refashioned. Let me try to explain this passage. The tradi-
tional idea was that the task of the subject in its proper function was that
of giving a particular order to the matter and content that were given in a
complete passive way through the senses. In other words the subject receives
passively something that has no proper legitimacy and provides this some-
thing with a particular order through its proper synthesis. In Husserl’s view
this schema does not work, because sensibility itself is the result of different
kinds of passivity, inactivity and also activity.
The knowing subject becomes subject only by virtue of its own initial ab-
sence, of its initial being a spectator without interest. On the other hand, the
thing itself before it becomes an objectuality (real or ideal) emerges with some
of its parts, affects and awakes the subject. Activity and passivity are not to
be thought of as separated notions. They are on the contrary relative notions,
always combined and co-present in some degree. These combination have dif-
ferent names, according to the particular level of constitution. For example,
affection is passive, but not in the same way as the original passive syntheses.
To say it simply, affection is ‘less’ passive than original association, but ‘more’
than receptivity that represents the lowest degree of activity of the ego (Cf.
[EU] §17). In turn, receptivity is ‘less’ passive than affection, but still more
passive than predication, and so on.
8As a metaphor, one can say that in Husserl’s view also the object is, in a certain sense,
active. For example, in affection it is the object that is seen as active, since the first step
toward the turning of the ego in made by the stimulus that the object exerts on the subject.
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The richness of the Husserlian notion of passivity is thus the result of the
enrichment of Husserl’s notion of experience. The underlaying idea is that
Husserl moves the investigation on the legitimacy of knowledge already in
experience9: a substantial instance of legitimacy is to be found already in
the structures of experience. Using the Kantian famous metaphor, there is a
tribunal of experience that judges experience itself: passivity itself has its own
rules that must be investigated and that are at work before all the egological
operation. As a consequence, every level of the constitution has its own rules
and the relation between two consecutive levels is to be thought of in terms of
explicitation of meaning.
In Husserl’s theory of knowledge we do not find, like for example in Kant,
two Stämme. By contrast, we find different planes of meaning, i.e. different
planes of the gradual development of different kinds of passivity, or, respec-
tively, of the gradual developing of the active ego. These planes begin with the
original rigid passivity of the synthesis of time and end with the active cate-
gorial acts of the logical subject. There is a particular continuity between the
different planes, a continuity that however does not challenge the diversity of
the respective tasks: on the basis of a common original synthetic structure, the
different planes confer meaning in different ways and with different modalities,
depending on the particular form of synthesis by which they are characterized.
A connection between the different layers of meaning is already implicit, we are
already in a transcendental sphere and there is not need for a particular plane
the has as task the connection between sensibility and understanding. Showing
how and why an upper level of constitution makes explicit the level below is
enough to justify the connection between the two macro-levels of knowledge
(sensibility and understanding). Instead of a middle faculty, one finds in Hus-
serl’s theory of knowledge a method, the genetic method, whose main task is
that of bringing to light the layers of meaning – i.e. the different levels of the
9This is somehow already implied in the discussion on categorial intuition (cf. above,
1.5.1).
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constitution – and the respective moments of the making explicit. The struc-
ture of time remains constantly at work, even though in different forms, at all
the levels of the constitution. In other words, time is, in its various forms, the
basis of the constitution (the most original form of synthesis from which con-
stitution starts) but also a connective structure, i.e. a structure that remains
in some forms in all the layers and that guaraties the connection (a sort of
homogeneity) between the different layers10.
3.2.1 Passivity of logic and logic of passivity
The motto of the present discourse, and perhaps of genetic phenomenology as
a whole, could be the following: ‘there is something logical before logic’, and
the task of the genealogy of logic is to investigate the characteristics of this pre-
logical ground, to discover and explain its structures and its own legitimacy.
This statement means at least two things: first, that also pre-predicative ex-
perience is characterized by an ordered structure governed by a proper logic;
second, that logic – logic as predicative and spontaneous activity of the un-
derstanding – finds its roots in the passivity of pre-predicative experience. In
other words, the motto expresses two questions: that of the logic of passivity
and that of passivity of logic11.
The first expression indicates that the most simple layer of experience is
already governed by a proper structure. According to this, a particular logic
of passivity, a canon that rules the organization of the passive structure of
experience, is already at work. Passivity has its proper organization and does
not need categorial logic, i.e. the rules of the understanding, in order to be
justified. The canon of passivity says exactly what can happen or not and
which are the synthesis that animate already this layer of simple experience.
10This is a question that should be investigated independently, since it requires a deep
analysis of the question of time in Husserl. In this context it can only remain a general idea.
Or better, a partially verified hypothesis, for both in the case of affection and explication
I try to show how these two moments of constitution involve the constitution of time, i.e.
how this moments behave with respect to the constitution (synthesis) of time.
11Concerning this terminology and this way of putting things cf. also [Dodd, 2006]
CHAPTER 3. GENETIC CONSTITUTION 157
Furthermore, one must notice that the logic of passivity is not only a mere
canon of different forms and degrees of passivity. By contrast – and this is
perhaps the most important innovation of the Husserlian perspective – it also
organizes the contents. The logic of passivity is a transcendental logic of pas-
sivity. In other words, Husserl’s aesthetics is really a transcendental theory of
experience and not only a transcendental aesthetics. To say it better, within
Husserl’s theory of knowledge the notion of transcendental logic encompasses
both transcendental aesthetics and transcendental logic (in a Kantian sense),
since formal logic finds its origin in pre-predicative experience. This is a great
step forward, the realization of the idea of transcendental itself. This is the
accomplishment of the Kantian revolution, i.e. the individuation of a unique
transcendental sphere of knowledge12. In experience itself, we find the lawful
structures that govern not only the formal side of sensibility (like for example
the pure a priori forms of space and time), but also the contents of sensibility
are already structured and organized according to a series of pre-logic syn-
thesis that announce the synthesis of predication, since they have the same
fundamental structure.
What does the second expression mean? What does passivity of logic mean?
This is a very interesting and important point. From the Husserlian perspective
the structures of passivity are the basis on which the categorial entities and
operations are re-built13. This means that logic is, in a certain sense, passive,
i.e. passive at its origin: in particular transcendental logic – as already said
– is an investigation on the passive roots of formal logic, i.e. on the original
structure of passivity where the logical entities originate.
12To be noticed that the word ‘transcendental’ has for Kant different interconnected mean-
ing.
13A very good example is that of the explication (cf. below 3.7.
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3.3 Predicative, Pre-predicative and Knowl-
edge
One of the purposes of this work is to show what happens to the theory of
knowledge presented in the Logical Investigations in the frame of genetic anal-
ysis. Husserl seems never to renounce or refuse the empty-fulfilled schema that
we analyzed in the first chapter14. This is in fact a fundamental Husserlian dis-
covery and it still holds in genetic phenomenology, albeit in a different form.
Now the schema is analyzed according to a vertical direction and the way
of intending knowledge is slightly different. Whereas in the static framework
knowledge was considered in terms of union of an empty act and an act of
intuition, now it is considered in terms of the inner development of an act of
consciousness. This point deserves to be developed a little further.
In the first chapter we saw that knowledge is, to say it in general terms,
the unification of an act of meaning and an act of intuition, which provide the
two important characteristics of knowledge. The act of meaning confers the
characteristic communicability and repeatability without which one could not
have knowledge. The second act provides the effective ‘reference to the object’,
without which the act of expression would remain merely empty. We already
said a few things about this definition and its advantages. But it is a defini-
tion developed in the context of acts analysis. Within the genetic perspective,
things are considered from an inner perspective. In other words, the object
of investigation is now the act of knowledge itself and it is also the starting
point of the analysis. The task is now to explain all the stages of its evolution
taking to the light all the passages from the lower stage of perception – per-
ception decomposed in all its micro-stages – to the act of judgment. Now, the
question is: how is an act of knowledge constituted? The answer will display
a stratification of different layers, in which the one below gives the motivation
for the passage to the one above. As a result, Husserl is able to show all the
14cf. [Hua XI], §2; §16 s.
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passages that take from the basic structure of time to the act of knowledge
itself. In the first approach the act of knowledge is ‘decomposed’ in the two
terms relation ‘empty-fulfilled’, now it is decomposed in all the fundamental
passages. Nonetheless, the sense of knowledge remains the same: knowledge
is the union of an act of meaning and an act of intuition. But now the aim
is to identify those structures that remain unvaried through all the layers of
constitution and the motivational nexus that allow the passage from one layer
to another. Also the terminology used by Husserl is slightly different. Indeed,
knowledge is now the ‘union’ – the gradual passage from – pre-predicative ex-
perience to predication. To say it differently, Husserl is now preoccupied with
the deep analysis of an act of knowledge. In the first chapter, we saw that it is
the intentional essence that assures the coincidence between an act of meaning
and an act of intuition. Now Husserl shows in detail why this can happen: in
the act below there is already the fundamental structure that only needs to
be explicated by the layer above. This does not mean that the stage above
is a mere repetition, neither of the structure nor of the meaning of the layer
below. By contrast, as we will see, explication means something more than a
simple repetition, but it works because of a common structure. For example
the logical category of substrate is the explication of a certain kind of struc-
ture of receptivity (cf. [EU], §24; infra 3.7). What is important is the fact that
the notion of knowledge remains basically the same. Whereas in the first ap-
proach the synthesis of coincidence was analyzed as a horizontal movement, it
is now analyzed in its vertical dimension. Again, whereas previously Husserl
was preoccupied with the fulfillment of an act of meaning, now he deals with
the continuous passage from the pre-predicative experience (intuition) to pred-
ication (meaning), taking always as reference those structures that motivate
the passage.
It is important to stress this idea in order to avoid a common misunder-
standing. Husserl’s genetic constitution is neither a mere theory of experience
nor a theory of the preeminence of experience (pre-predicative experience) on
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understanding. By contrast, it is still an investigation on theory of knowledge,
i.e. an investigation on how sensibility and understanding combine in an act
of knowledge. Sensibility in Husserl’s analysis has of course a much more im-
portant and decisive role than in the tradition. The result is an independent
sphere of pre-predicative experience that has its own rules as well as its own
syntheses. However, this does not mean that knowledge is achievable in mere
sensibility. In the same way that an intuition alone cannot provide knowledge,
because it is unstable and cannot be ‘reproduced’, the pre-predicative experi-
ence, although it is a well organized and well defined sphere, is not knowledge.
Consequently, Husserl’s theory is not a reduction of understanding to sensibil-
ity. The logical entities find their presuppositions in pre-predicative experience
in so far as there is a common synthetic structure. But they still have the im-
portant role of explicating the structure of sensibility. In a few words, although
the category of substrate finds its origin in pre-predicative experience, it is not
located in it: the synthesis of the understanding, which brings from the im-
plicit level of pre-predicative experience to the proper category of substrate,
has a decisive role and is independent of experience. In Husserl’s genetic con-
stitution, sensibility and understanding appear to be on the same plane, and
this is true because they have a common original structure. But they are by
no means the same thing and both are essential for knowledge and essentially
irreducible to each other. This means to negate those interpretations that con-
sider Husserl a mere empiricist. By contrast, Husserl in much more Kantian
in so far as he is still aiming to explain how sensibility and understanding are
two inseparable sources for knowledge.
The very important §47 of EU, seems to confirm this reading:
Feststellung des Seienden, wie es ist und was es ist, ist der Sinn
aller Erkenntnistätigkeit. Sie erreicht ihr Ziel noch nicht in dem bisher
ausschließlich untersuchten Bereich der Rezeptivität. Gegenstände als
identische Einheiten in einer Mannigfaltigkeit auf sie bezogener, sie er-
fassender und explizierender Schritte der Zuwendung konstituieren sich
auch schon in ihr. [...] Aber alle diese Leistungen sind an die unmittel-
bare, sei es selbstgebende, sei es reproduktive Anschauung der Substrate
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gebunden ([EU], p. 23).
3.4 Pre-predicative constitution
In this paragraph I shall offer a sketch of Husserl’s genetic constitution as it
is presented in EU 15. As a whole it can be thought of as a stratification to be
covered from the bottom to the top, i.e. from the lowest strata of receptivity
to the highest of predication and universalization. To use an image, Husserl’s
genetic constitution could be represented as one of those images that are used
to exemplify the inner structure of the earth, or better the structure of the
geosphere. At the centre there is the constitution of time, then the various
strata of the constitution of the experience (the pre-predicative sphere). At a
certain point, there is a passage to the surface, where one can find an inten-
tional correlation in the usual two-terms form. This correlation can be that of
the mere perception, of a subject perceiving an object, but can also be that
of the predication or of the judgment about something. Depending on what
kind of objectuality is constituted (ideal, real, perceptual or ideal) we are at
a determinate level of the schema. A peculiar characteristic of this kind of
constitution is the double-influence of the strata.
Let me make a consideration on the use of this metaphor. First of all, one
should not be surprised, or annoyed, by the use of this kind of images. In fact,
the use of scientific images regarding the earth and the universe is common
in philosophy and is sometime illuminating. Let us only think of the famous
Kantian use of the Copernican revolution.
Second, this particular geological image brings to the light an important
characteristic of the ‘sphere’ of consciousness. Like the earth, consciousness
seems to have a ‘flat surface’ that can be investigated (measured) through
a horizontal method, in terms of the intentional relation of an ego-pole and
15I will also follow the order of this Husserlian work and I will focus on the first two
sections of the book. This matter is very complex and articulated and it would deserve to
be treated in full details. Here I just mean to describe the main passages in order to have a
reference point for what we are going to analyze in the next paragraphs.
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a objective pole. However the apparently horizontal surface is not the real
structure of consciousness, which instead can be represented in terms of the
succession of different spheres of different compositions. Once the method of
investigation is changed and the genetic method is introduced, a deep structure
is revealed and the surface is discovered to be only relative.
The lowest layer of pre-predicative experience is that of time. Time gives
the general form of the synthesis, i.e. it provides the general fixed form of how
a synthesis works, of the structure of a synthesis. Husserl considers time the
universal and most formal synthesis of consciousness. In other words, time, as
it is conceived at the lowest stratum of the constitution, is a pure synthesis,
i.e. what remains of a synthesis once all the contents are taken away: a pure
form of synthesis16.
In pre-categorial constitution four main levels to which different kinds of
synthesis correspond. First the temporal synthesis of time. Second, associa-
tive original passive synthesis. Through this synthesis, which is the result of
a purification of the traditional Humean notion of association, the data are
unified on the basis of three (transcendental) principles: likeness or homogene-
ity, contrast and contiguity17. The third level is that of affection in the living
present. This produces the awakening (Weckung) of the data in retention and
protention. When affection motivates the turning of the ego, one enters into
a further level, that of receptivity in which the apprehension of the object as
object is founded. The apprehension (Auffassung), on the one side is motivated
in a passive way, on the other side makes possible some sort of activity. At the
next level, the object is formed as object and is comprehended (Erfassung) and
the explication (Explication) can take place. Whereas in the retaining-in-grasp
that is typical of affection the objectuality was mantained in apprehension, in
16That of the constitution of time is an extremely complex topic. In [EU] the discussion
is not really developed. The same holds for the present work.
17I cannot discuss the whole structure of pre-predicative constitution, and consequently
of the purification of association, but just provide a sketch of the framework within which
the two following analyses fare to be considered. On pre-predicative constitution see:
[Lohmar, 1998]. cf. my attempt to explain these topics, [Lanzillotti, 2010].
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receptivity the interest is in the perception of the object as a whole with its
parts. The comprehension of the object is what Husserl calls also apperception
(Apperzeption).
3.5 Affektion
In this section, I would like to provide an analysis of the phenomenon of af-
fection18. As I will argue, this is a quite crucial micro-moment of receptivity
and consequently of knowledge itself: if, according to the static analysis, sen-
sibility (intuition) as a whole represents the place of the presence of the thing,
according to genetic constitution, affection represents that ‘micro-moment’ of
receptivity where this properly happens. In other words, affection is first of
all the layer of the formation of meaning in which the object is offered to the
ego. To say it from another perspective, affection offers in its original form the
typical phenomenological ‘duality’ between synthesis and givenness (presence)
of the something. Synthesis is the universal form of consciousness (cf. [Hua I],
§17), but it must be somehow combined and coordinated with the presence
of something. The place where this articulation originates is affection, with
its very interesting internal combination of a moment of presentation and a
moment of synthesis.
3.5.1 Affection in general
Let me start with an example to be used as reference during the following
discussion. I am working at my pc trying to write a paper on Husserl’s theory
of genetic constitution, I am concentrated and everything I actually perceive
is limited to a frame in which I see the screen of my computer, some parts of
the table, the letters that I am typing. I am in the middle of a natural flow
of apperceptions and thoughts, since I am also thinking what I am writing.
18The question of affection is taken into account in the most contributions devoted
to Husserl’s theory of pre-predicative experience. However, dedicated studies are the fol-
lowing: [Depraz, 1994]; [Montavont, 1994]; [Montavont, 1999]; [Bégout, 2000]; [Lotz, 2002];
[Steinbock, 2004]; [Bégout, 2007]; [Behnke, 2008]; [Biceaga, 2010].
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Other events can happen around me, for example on the background or on the
opposite side of the room, and I can become aware of these new phenomena or
not. I am an active-passive subject with respect to what I am perceiving and to
what I am doing and thinking, but I am in a certain sense completely passive,
almost absent, with respect to what is happening, for example, behind me. But
if there is a stimulus, for example a noise, which is intense enough to attract
my attention, I can stop whatever I am doing and I can turn to the noise, or I
can just notice it and continuing with my previous activity. In the first case, a
new course of experiences and thoughts about the noise can now begin, while
in the second not. In both cases however I am “affected” by something. In
both cases there is something that contrasts with what I am doing and that
calls for my attention, i.e. some kind of allure hits me and puts me before an
alternative: either I can ‘follow’ the new stimulus or I can simply ignore it. Of
course this is an example of something occurring in the natural attitude and
therefore it can be thought of only as a metaphor of what happens in the living
present, after the reduction is operated. However, it may be useful to keep in
mind some features of this sort of affection in broader sense: affection awakes
the subject; it calls for the attention of the subject creating an expectation, it
may originate a new course of experiences and it is originated through some
form of contrast.
3.5.2 Meaning, moments and structure of Affection
Affection is first of all a moment of transition (cf. [EU], §17) that brings from
the purely passive realm of original association to the realm of receptivity,
where the ego, although not spontaneously, plays a certain active role. Affection
is, in Husserl’s words, the capacity of an object of exerting a stimulus on the
ego-pole and to provoke some kind of reaction in it:
Wir verstehen darunter [under the title affection] den bewußtseins-
mäßigen Reiz, den eigentümlichen Zug, den ein bewußter Gegenstand
auf das Ich übt – es ist ein Zug, der sich entspannt in der Zuwendung des
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Ich und von da sich fortsetzt im Streben nach selbstgebender, das gegen-
ständliche Selbst immer mehr enthüllender Anschauung – also Kennt-
nisnahme, nach näherer Betrachtung des Gegenstandes ([Hua XI], §32,
p. 148-9).
To affect (affizieren) means to hold some allure for the ego and a following
possible reaction that later can give origin to the proper perceptual process. In
other words, it means to emerge from a context which is always co-present and
to attract an interest, in certain cases also an interest in knowledge ([EU], §17].
In the Analyses, one finds a more precise definition of affection, where Husserl
distinguishes between two meanings of the term that are strictly connected,
but still distinguished:
Hier haben wir zunächst unter dem Titel Affektion zu scheiden 1)
Affektion als jene wechselnde Lebendigkeit eines Erlebnisses, eines Be-
wußtseinsdatums, von deren retaliver Höhe es abhängt, ob das Datum
merklich im besonderen Sinn und dann eventuell wirklich aufmerktes
unf erfaßtes ist; 2) dieses Merklichsein selbst. Hier hat Affektion den
besonderen Sinn der spezifischen Affektion auf das Ich, und zwar die
das Ich trifft, exitiert, zur Aktion sozusagen aufruft, wekt und eventuell
wirklich aufweckt ([Hua XI], §35, p. 166).
This quotation makes clear a distinction, which is important to understand
the rest of the discussion. In a first sense, affection is the characteristic vivacity
that animates all the living experiences. As it will be clear with the discussion
of the graduation of affection, this vivacity is in some degree always at work
because all the data and the living experiences are vivid. The more something
is vivid, the more it can strike the ego pole. On the other hand, affection
means the process of the excitement of the ego, i.e. the fact that the vivacity
effectively reaches the ego-pole and calls for a further possible process in which
the ego becomes the protagonist.
Original affection – affection in the living present – is the capacity of the
prominences, which originate in a purely passive manner, to stimulate the
ego-pole:
Alle Abgehobenheiten im Felde, seine Gliederung nach Gleichheiten
und Verschiedenheiten und die daraus entstehende Gruppenbildung,
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das Sichabheben einzelner Glieder von dem homogenen Untergrunde,
sind das Produkt assoziativer Synthesen von mannigfacher Art. Es sind
aber nicht einfach passive Vorgänge im Bewußtsein, sondern diese Deck-
ungssynthesen haben ihre affektive Kraft. Wir sagen z.B., das durch
seine Unähnlichkeit aus dem homogenen Untergrund Herausgehobene,
sich Abhebende „fällt auf”; und das heißt, es entfaltet eine affektive
Tendenz auf das Ich hin ([EU], §17, p. 79)19.
Once the stimulus strikes the ego-pole, there can be different reactions
that lead to different courses of Erlebnisse, to different realizations of the phe-
nomenon of affection. But not all the stimuli are able to reach the ego pole,
because the affective stimulus of a particular prominence has to overcome the
stimuli of the other prominences, i.e. the competition (Konkurrenz) of other af-
fections20. What actually hits the ego pole is what emerges from the relativism
of the affective tendencies21. Indeed, Husserl distinguishes between affection
and the tendency to the affection. All the stimuli that finally could not hit the
ego pole, because they are not strong enough to overcome the concurrence of
the other stimuli, belong to this second group (cf. [Hua XI], §32).
However, as Husserl himself observes, the contrast is not the only crucial
element for affection (cf. [Hua XI], §32), at least for those that find a realiza-
tion, i.e. for those affections that actually give origin to a perceptual course
of experiences. Other significant elements to be considered are the feelings
(Gefühle)22. These properly concern the complex Affektion-Zuwendung and in
19The continuation of this passage is extremely meaningful. As it often happens in EU,
the most important features of affection are condensed in a few lines: the relativism of the
affective tendencies, the graduation of affection, the fact that also the thoughts can exercise
a stimulus on the ego, the fact that with affection one can finally distinguish between what
is given to the ego and the ego to which something is given, the fact that affection can lead
to the tendencies of the ego (Cf. [EU], §17).
20“Es gibt also etwas wie mögliche Konkurrenz und eine Art Verdeckung von affektiven
Tendenzen durch besonders starke” ([Hua XI], §32, p. 149).
21“Was macht für ein einzelnes abgehobenes Datum den Vorzug der Affektion? Aber das
einzelne in seinem Zusammenhang ist in seiner affektiven Kraft von den übrigen abhänging,
wie diese von ihm. Wir stehen in einem Relativismus der affektiven Tendenzen, und es fragt
sich, was für Gesetze und letztlich Wesensgesetze hier walten mögen” ([Hua XI], §32, p.
150).
22“Einerseits ist die zustande lommenende Affektion funktionell mit abhänging con der
relativen Grösse des Kontrastes, anderseits auch von bevorzugenden sinnlichen Gefühlen, wie
einer dirch das Abgehobene in seiner Einheit fundierten Wollust” ([Hua XI], §32 p. 150).
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particular the possibility to amplify or inhibit a particular stimulus and con-
sequently the motivation of the turning of the ego toward the stimulus. Here,
I am mainly interested in the first proper moment of affection, that is in the
moment where the ego comes originally in touch with something external. As
a consequence, mine is to be thought of as an abstract analysis and not as
the analysis of the concrete affection, which, by contrast, comprehend always
the complex Affection-Zuwendung and consequently cannot exclude the con-
sideration of the feelings and of the other elements of the sphere of the feelings
(Gemütssphäre)23.
In sum, affection is a three-terms-relation: the affectant (something on the
side of the objectuality) hits through a particular affective force (affective
Kraft) an affected subject (something on the side of the ego). The peculiar
moments of original affection are developed in this three-fold structure: the
awakening (Weckung) of the ego-pole; the origin in the present, the orienta-
tion toward the future.
The affectant
What is that exercises the stimulus? The answer to this question seems to
be quite simple, since Husserl is clear when he says that the prominences are
not simply passively organized but they also have an affective force. It is the
prominence that, emerging (contrasting) from a homogeneous background, has
23For this direction of investigation see [Lotz, 2002]; [Behnke, 2008]. However it must be
noticed that althought according to the analysis the feelings are co-present with the stilmu-
lus, it is never the case that the last is founded or dependent on the first (Cf. [Bégout, 2000],
p. 178). The elements from the sphere of the feelings can inhibit or amplify the stimuli,
influencing the turning and the reaction of the ego. For this reason I consider them as char-
acteristic of the complex affection-turning of the ego. Futhermore, one must consider that
Husserl himself is working here in the frame of a necessary abstraction (cf. [Hua XI], §32
where Husserl speaks of a notwendige Abstraktion). Finally, the theoretical abstractive in-
vestigation on affection is often considered accomplished and complete. By contrast, there
are many attempts of investigating in the direction of the relations with feelings and values,
in order to confer to phenomenology a particular systematic structure starting from the
“practical” questions. On the contrary, I think that the theoretical investigation can still
offer some new elements that can show how phenomenology is intrinsically systematic. In
this particular case, I am trying to show how synthesis and presence work at the level of
affection.
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the capacity of striking the ego-pole. But it is important to notice that, even
if the prominence belongs to the sphere of the objectuality – the sphere of the
Gegenstand Überhaupt – it is not properly an object, since the object requires a
form of unity that comes out only at the level of receptivity (cf. [EU], §17). Of
course an already formed object can affect a subject. In this case we deal with
an affection in broader sense that works through different kinds of association
and is different from the original affection. Original affection takes places in
the living present (lebendige Gegenwärtigung) from the Abgehobenhaiten that
originate by homogeneity and contrast. It is always ‘hetero-affection’, affection
of something external to the ego-pole, because it is a stimulus that something
emerged in a purely passive way exercises on a asleep ego-pole. In this case,
affection is the process in which what is ‘only implicitly objective’ becomes
‘explicitly objective’, i.e. objective for the ego pole. In other words, what is
‘latent’ becomes now ‘patent’ (cf. [Bégout, 2000]); the ego-pole comes for the
first time into contact with the external sphere of the objectuality, in the
modality of the ‘there is something other from the ego that hits the ego and
can be further explored’.
The affected
We have now to consider the second extreme of the relation of affection, i.e.
the ego-pole. As well as in the case of the objectual pole, we do not find here an
already formed structure, such as, for example, the active/passive subject of
receptivity. Indeed, in the constitutive systematic neither the subject nor the
object are already given, but all the layers of their respective constitution are
taken to light. In this case the ego-pole is reached by the stimuli, but it does
not operate in any way. On the contrary, it is awakened, where ‘awakened’ does
not mean that it is actually awake, but that the being awake can now start. In
other words, we have here only the first step toward an awake ego, be it active
of passive. We do not have a proper subject, but a pole whose power is limited
to be reached by the allure and then, in a following layer of the formation of
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meaning, can follow the stimulus and turn its attention and interest to it. At
this level the subject is completely inactive, but it is also passive in a different
way than in the case of passive association and of receptivity. Whereas at the
previous level the ego is completely absent, now there is an interplay of presence
and absence of the ego. In order to clarify the situation, one can look at the
different degrees of passivity and the respective series of the formation of the
ego: the Ur-Ich at the level of the passive associations, the Vor-Ich at the level
of affection and the Ich, from the proper level of receptivity on. At the level of
the Vor-Ich the ego is not properly present, but has nonetheless a role. This is
not an operating ego, but following Husserl’s metaphor the Vorzimmer of the
ego ([Hua XI], §35, p. 166). This metaphor gives an idea of the combination
of presence and absence of the ego at this level.
The affective Kraft
We can now turn to the middle element of the three-fold relation, i.e. to the
relation itself. Husserl speaks of affection using terms like Reiz, Zug, Kraft, Im-
puls. Affection was immediately defined as the “bewußtseinsmäßigen Reiz, den
eigentümlichen Zug, den ein bewußter Gegenstand auf das Ich übt” ([Hua XI],
§32). We have already seen how to understand the fact that an object excites
the ego. Now we have to look directly at the moment of the excitement. The
‘protagonist’ of original affection is the prominence passively detached from
the homogeneous background. However the being detached (Abgehobensein) is
only a necessary condition of affection, it is neither the unique nor the sufficient
one. The fact that something emerges from the background is not sufficient,
even in the case that this something has actually overcome the concurrence of
the other affective tendencies. There is need of another element, a property,
that allows to ‘transmit’ the stimulus (the impulse) from the object to the
ego. This is the peculiar task of the affektive Kraft in a narrower sense. In
other words, the fact that a prominence can emerge from the background and
provoke a stimulus is a necessary condition to be completed with the sufficient
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condition that the ego can actually be the target of that stimulus, i.e. that the
ego can somehow receive the stimulus and be the subject of the allure. How is
this force to be considered? The first temptation is to consider it as a natural
force, as something physical that belongs to the object and hits the subject.
But this is not the right way of interpreting the phenomenon, because it – as
usual in genetic phenomenology – is based on a motivational nexus that does
not have anything to do with any causal or psychophysical connection. The
affective force is not something that has its origin in the object and then hits
the ego. By contrast, Husserl is clear when he says that it is an excitement
conform to the consciousness (bewusstseinsmässig), i.e. a force that has sense
only insofar as it expresses a fundamental characteristic of consciousness. The
affective force is a ‘status of consciousness’, a “modus excidandi of the ego”,
i.e. the capacity of consciousness of being excited, of being the target of the
stimulus and of propagating it to the ego. In order to illustrate the situation,
I would like to use an image. Consciousness is not to be thought of as an
isolated kernel waiting for a stimulus that comes from afar. On the contrary,
consciousness continuously expands, it adheres to things constantly striving
to give them a sense. In other words, consciousness is like a force field that
touches, comprehends always some horizon of things, permeates it and – so to
say – tends to take its forms, to expand according to the prearranged paths
of these horizons. Consciousness is always adherent to a certain portion of
the sphere of what is pre-given. When consciousness meets something that
contrasts enough with the established course of adhesion to the horizon, it is
stimulated and a particular excitation moves toward the ego pole. Now the old
process is called into question. The capacity of consciousness of adherence is
guarantied by the affective force, i.e. by the affectivity of consciousness, by the
condition of initial and constant openness of the consciousness to the world
and the corresponding vivacity of the living present. Consciousness follows the
prominences up to the point that if finds a particular contrast, an obstacle,
that is strong enough. When this does not happen, it adheres to the things in
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a manner that Husserl himself defines unconscious.
The peculiar moments of affection
I already mentioned the peculiar features of affection: the awakening of the ego-
pole; the origin in the present; the orientation toward the future. Unfortunately
I can not analyze all of them in detail. The first two are a variation on common
themes of association, adjustments at the level of affection of some common
features of original associations. Indeed, also affection is a form of association24.
By contrast, the orientation toward the future comes into play with affection.
Whereas the previous passive syntheses fulfill the formal emptiness of the now-
instant and of retention with the contents, affection transforms protention
creating an expectation on the basis of those contents that now are “presented”
to the subject25. In other words, the future is the very characteristic moment of
affection. Whereas the passive synthesis operates on the first two dimensions of
the formal synthesis of time, affection operates also on the third. Associations
are mainly addressed to the past, something that happens in the present recalls
something that is sinking in retention (Vernedelung) motivating some sort of
reproduction. Instead affection, although it also operates in the retetional past
(cf. [Hua XI], §§36 and ff.), is mainly directed toward the future.
3.5.3 Affection and intentionality
The birth of intentionality The previous discussion puts affection in a
very particular position: it ‘comes from’ the very original passive associations
and ‘goes towards’ (it brings to) receptivity, which is the first concrete form of
24“Die Lehere von der Genesis der Reproduktionene ind ihrer Gebilde ist die Lehre con der
Association im ersten und eigentlichen Sinn. Daran schließt sich aber untrennbar bzw. darauf
gründet sich eine höhere Stufe con Assoziation und Assoziationslehre nämlich eine Lehre con
der Genesis der Erwartungen [this starts with affection] und der damit nah zusammehängen-
den Genesis der Apperzeptionen, zu denen Horizonte wirklicher und möglicher Erwartungen
gehören” ([Hua XI], §26, p. 119). Cf. also [Hua XI], §33.
25To be noticed that this is not yet the phenomenon of expectation (Erwartung) that
Husserl describes in the following paragraphs (cf. [Hua XI], §40 and ff.) but the very original
manifestation of it. The connection between affection and future emphasized several times
in the text: cf. [Hua XI], §33 p. 158, 10 and ff; [Hua XI], §33, p. 156
CHAPTER 3. GENETIC CONSTITUTION 172
knowledge, where the ego has its first lowest role. Affection is a real moment
of transition between the pure and rigid passivity of the original associations
to the passivity of receptivity, which implies that the ego, although not spon-
taneously, plays a role.
As I will argue in detail later, the main task of affection is to ‘make present’
to the ego what is previously only ‘pre-constituted’. In other words, affection
is a particular sort of relation (a synthesis that put together and not an uni-
fication) between something that is emerging on the side of the object and
something that is ‘becoming’ a subject. Affection re-binds the connections of
the elementary forms of unity and, by doing so, it awakes the subject.
Affection is the explication of the previous level of passive the rigid passive
synthesis. In this case to explicate means to put in contact the passive syntheses
with the ego: thanks to affection what was pre-constituted through passive
synthese becomes suitable for the ego.
From another perspective, affection is the first moment of the constitutive
systematics where one can properly speak of the intentional correlation. In fact,
here one can find the first real manifestation of the two poles of the correlation
(the pole of the ego and the pole of the object)26.
The analysis of the phenomenon of affection is in fact the description of
the passive genesis of the objectifying act, i.e. of the proper intentional act par
excellence.
It is important to stress that affection is neither the place of the formation
of the objectuality, nor the place where there is a real activity of the ego: by
contrast, it is only the first necessary passage for the activity of receptivity. But
from affection on, one can properly speaks of intentionality and experience.
26 It is meaningful that in a passage of the C-Manuscripts, Husserl refers to affection in
terms of the schema noesis-noema: “Die Affektion ist noetisch ein Modus der konstitutiven
Intentionalität und noematisch ein Modus der intentionalen Einheit bzw. des Gegenstandes,
der eventuell als seiender in einem Seinsmodus bewusst ist” (cf. [Hua Mat. VIII], p. 193).
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The direction of intentionality From the discussion on the affecting it
should be easy to guess that even though in affection is the objectual pole that
gives origin to the contact with the ego – even if the object is the protagonist
of affection – there is nothing like a counter-intentionality, i.e. like an inten-
tionality with an inverse direction. In fact, intentionality is a correlation, i.e.
a relation that puts in connection two poles: the ego pole is always in rela-
tion with something given and the object is always object for the a subjective
pole. However the direction of intentionality, as the static analysis shows, is
always directed from the subject to the object. In other words, is the act of
consciousness (noesis) that gives a sense to the object – producing a noema.
This means that the act (the ray) is always directed from the ego-pole to the
world. In affection, it could seem that the direction is the opposite and that
an intentional ray (a ray of sense) is directed from the object to the subject.
3.5.4 The problem of the formation of the Unity
Already in §33 of the Analyses, Husserl raises the question concerning the
nature of the effective formation of the unity in the original field of passive
associations27: is not the product of passive syntheses operating in the living
present only the precondition of the unity that rather depends on affection
and association in a broader sense? In other words, it Husserl is asking here
whether the unity that characterizes an objectuality originates already at the
level of the purely passive association or needs a further level of synthetic
operation, that of the affection (and ordinary association). The question can be
reformulated as following: assuming that the effective formation of the sensible
object comes out only at the level of receptivity, where do we find the first
forms of sensible unity? Where do we find the kernel of the objectuality, of
that Gegenständlichkeit, that will represent the realm of sensibility?
27“Drücken nicht am Ende die Wesensgesetzmäßigkeiten der immanenten Einheitsbildund,
die wir beschreiben haben, die der Bildung für sich abgeschlossener einzelner Gegenstände,
Ganzer, Gruppen, Konfigurationene bloße Bedingungen der Möglichkeit solcher Einheiten –
wärend das wirkliche Zustandekommen dieser Einheiten selbst von Affektion und Assoziation
abhängr?” ([Hua XI], §33, p. 153).
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There can be two answers to this question. Either the unity is already the
product of the pure passive associations, or it comes only when affection is
operated. Both the answers however bring to some paradoxical consequences.
If the unity is already the product of the original synthesis, what is new with
affection? Which is the real task of affection? On the other hand, if there is not
any kind of unity before affection, what is that can be unified in affection? In
order to have something to be presented in affection, is there no need of some
previous forms of unification also in this case?28 At the beginning of [Hua XI],
§34 Husserl recalls the fact that the essential condition for affection is the
emergence of the pre-given data. Then, he develops and immediately tries out
a theory according to which there is a strict distinction between two different
kinds of formation of unity: the rigid formation of unity and the formation
in general. According to this theory, affection and original passive syntheses
have as product two different kinds of unity, or better two different typologies
of formation of unity. The original passive synthesis would have as product
the fusion in the co-existence, affection, by contrast, a fusion par distance.
This means that the two would give origin to two different kinds of unity
corresponding to these two different kinds of fusion. The two processes would
be completely distinguished and an important separation between pre-affective
and affective syntheses would follow as consequence. But Husserl, instead of
going on with this theory, though in a quick way, makes a new distinction
between a formation of the unity on the side of the data (Für-sich-sein) and
a formation for the ego (Für-mich-sein). On the basis of this distinction he
develops the alternative theory of the gradation of affection (cf. [Hua XI], §35;
Gradualität der Affektion). Given this distinction, the problem of the formation
28In other words, are the pre-given data a form of unity or not? If the answer is negative,
how can the ego be the target of something that does not have any form of unity? One runs
here the risk of the paradox. I already showed that affection presupposes the emergence of
some pre-given data. In the AzpS Husserl also claims that the connections always presuppose
affection: “Wirkliche Verbindung, wirkliche Einheitsbildung setzt immer und notwending
affektive Kraft voraus, bzw. affektive Unterschiedenheit” ([Hua XI]; §36, p. 172). It can
seems here, as some scholars notice, that we have to face a vicious circle of passivity (cf.
[Bégout, 2000], p. 190).
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of the unity seems to have a solution that is coherent with the whole Husserlian
theory of genetic constitution. At the level of passive synthesis we do not find
a unity (objectual unity) but a pre-condition of this unity, i.e. an unification
obtained in a purely passive manner. This precondition presents already the
path of the objectual unity, but it is all on the side of the data. In order to
start the process that brings to the concrete objectual unity, there is need of
a formation for the ego. This kind of unity is possible only within affection
and finds its accomplishment with the possible realization of affection. The
synthesis of affection does not operate on the contents, but rather on the
original forms of unification of these contents. Affection does not bind the
hyletic contents, but re-binds them at a different degree, presenting to the ego
the possibility of the unity of the object. On the other hand, it is also true that
affection operates always at the level of the purely passive synthesis. But not in
the sense that here we do not have any unification without affection, but in the
sense of the affectivity and of the vivacity of the living present. Let me try to
explain this passage in detail. First of all, it can be worth keeping in mind that
Husserl adopts here a very interesting form of reasoning: formulation of strong
hypothesis, negation of the hypothesis, new less extreme hypothesis deriving
from the negation and so on, up to the point that the whole theory has to be
rejected. In this case, the first hypothesis is that the unity is only provided with
affection and that passive syntheses are only a precondition for a form of unity.
The last hypothesis is that affection provides the fusion-at-a-distance, while
the rejected theory is that the unity depends entirely on affection. Instead of
this theory, Husserl will propose the theory of the gradation of affection. At
the beginning of this sort of theoretical experiment, Husserl asks himself if the
laws of original associations are not to be considered as simple presuppositions
(conditions of possibility) for the formation of unity:
Man kann versuchsweise sagen: Affinität, Kontinuität, Kontrast, das
sind Verhältnisse, die noch nicht angesehen werden müssen als wirkliche
An-sich-Verschmelzung, Einheit unter Abgehobenheit wirklich machend.
Es kann sich wirklich verschmelzen nur das, was gewisse Formen solcher
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Verhältnisse innehält (HU [Hua XI], §34, p. 159).
But this theory is incoherent with the first part of the investigation on
passive associations. As a consequence, Husserl has to mitigate the hypothesis.
In fact, the second step consists in distinguishing between two different modes
of the fusion that are to be assigned respectively to the purely passive syntheses
and to affection. Affection cannot be the protagonist of the very original level,
but it might be possible to distinguish between two formations of unity in the
living present, with the second one depending on affection:
Aber da ist vielleicht zu scheiden zwischen a) unbedingt notwendigen
Verschmelzungen, die sich in starrer Gesetzmäßigkeit unter allen Um-
ständen vollziehen, und zwar so, daß einzusehen ist, daß die Affektion,
selbst wenn sie überall in irgendwelchem Grade mit dabei wäre, keine
besondere Leistung für die Einheitsbildung üben könnte; und b) Ver-
schmelzungen, Einheitsbildungen, die erst der Affektion zu verdanken
sind. Sehen wir zu, ob sich eine solche Theorie durchführen ließe ([Hua XI],
§34 p. 159-160).
According to this distinction, the first group contains the purely passive or
rigid passive fusions that are the fundamental structures of the living present.
This means that both the temporal form and the form of the local field are
independent of affection. Paraphrasing Husserl, one can say that as well as af-
fection does not play any role in the original flowing of the immanence, in the
same way it does not have any role regarding the flowing hyle (cf. [Hua XI],
§34). These are respectively the fusion in the succession and the fusion in
the coincidence. Both belong to the group of those necessary fusions that do
not need affection. When does affection comes into play? Husserl gives im-
mediately an answer, claiming that it is perhaps with the constitution of the
particular unities (Sonderneinheiten) that we approach the domain of affection
(cf. [Hua XI], §34, p. 160). In other words, in the living present we have two
layers that are strictly distinguishable: at the first we have the formation of
the local field as product of the rigid (starr) synthesis of pure passivity (with-
out affection); at the second, the formation of the particular unities that are
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constituted in that field (with affection). But Husserl immediately refuses this
position, showing that also in the case of the formation of particular unities
affection presupposes an already accomplished work (cf. [Hua XI], §34). As a
consequence, also the formation of these particular unities is proper of the rigid
fusion. Here Husserl comes already to a very important result of his investiga-
tion, on which I would like to return later: “Natürlich, die in der Besonderhait
der Gehalte gründenden Verhältnisse macht Affektion nicht” ([Hua XI], §34, p.
161). Which is then the new hypothesis concerning the role of affection? To an-
swer this question Husserl has to move to the upper level of the objectivation.
According to the new position, affection plays a role in the formation of the
unity in the synthesis at-a-distance (Fernsynthese). However, Husserl imme-
diately declares this theory untenable (unhaltbar), since the division between
the contitution of object of a higher level as opposed to the object constituted
in an original singularity appears to be unjustified (cf. [Hua XI], §34, p. 161).
This is the blind spot that Husserl was seeking with his series of hypothesis
and confutations. The whole theory according to which the original unities
depends on affection – or it is the same to say that affection operates already
at the rigid level of the constitution of the living present – has to be rejected.
This means that the first sensible unities are on the side of the object and
do not require any contact with the ego. However, this unity is not properly
an objectual unity, which instead requires affection. On the other hand, it is
also true that the unities of the living present are always affective. Husserl
is now able to introduce a new theory according to which the hyletic unities
constitute per se at a pre-affective level and then are effectively posed for the
ego:
Einheiten für sich konstituieren sich verständlich nach den aufgewiese-
nen Prinzipien von Konkreszenz und Kontrast – als Einheiten für sich
sind sie eo ipso auch für das Ich, es affizierend ([Hua XI], §34, p. 162).
From this point on, Husserl develops the theory of the graduation of af-
fection, but with regards to the question of the formation of the unity the
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situation can perhaps be sketched in the following way: 1) the role of affection
in the formation of the unity is that of giving a unity for the ego. By contrast,
original associations provides a unity (unification) per-se; 2) every data and
every emergence exercises an affective stimulus on the ego; 3) the theory of the
graduation of affection. On the basis of this argumentation, one can explain
an important passage of the Analyses:
Vielmehr ist es nicht ausgeschlossen und sogar sehr nahegelegt, daß
Affektion schon in der Konstitution aller Gegenständlichkeiten ihre we-
sensmäßige Rolle spiele, so daß ohne sie überhaupt keine Gegenstände
und keine gegenständlich gegliederte Gegenwart wären ([Hua XI], §34
p. 164).
Without affection there would not be objects, because the formation of all
the objectualities requires the characteristic moments of affection. Affection
as formation of unity provides the first real form of objectuality. On the other
hand without affection, without the excitement typical of affection, there would
not be any present. Present, living present is always affective. This is the typical
vivacity of living present.
3.5.5 Synthesis and presence in Affection
Finally, I would like to focus on two things from the previous discussion. The
first is that affection – original affection – requires that the affectant is actually
given, i.e. it is actually present during the process of affecting the ego-pole. The
second is that affection is also a particular kind of synthesis that does not bind
the contents but re-binds them. It is important to highlight that this is the
original place where these two elements come to light in a particular form of
co-operation. All the moments of genetic constitution are necessary to achieve
knowledge, but the moment of affection is in a certain sense the place where
one can find the two conditions of knowledge in their original form. Before
affection, the prominences (Abgehoneheitein) are ‘present but not presented’
to the ego-pole, since the ego is absent and completely passive. In other words
the objectuality is there, but it is not a ‘presentation’ (Gegenwärtigung) of
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any kind. What transforms the mere presence in ‘presentation’ is actually the
moment of affection. The prominences are only implicit, they are the mere
product of a passive synthesis. In this case there is not a real intentionality,
but only a pre-condition (a pre-structure) of intentionality itself. With respect
to the schema empty-fulfilled acts we have in this case only the fullness of
the prominences, what is absent is some kind of synthesis on the side of the
meaning. Indeed passive synthesis are lawful mechanisms through which the
hyletic data are pre-formed for the consciousness, since they are all ‘on the
side of the object’.
By contrast, affection is the first place where one finds an articulation of the
two moments of knowledge, i.e. the moment of the presence of something and
the moment of the meaning. Donating meaning means to perform some kind of
empty intention that refers to an object. Of course the emptiness of affection
is different from the emptiness of a proper act of meaning, for example of an
act of expression through which we intend an object in a purely empty way.
In affection emptiness is connected to some intuitive expectation, nonetheless
this emptiness is the original form of the emptiness of the categorial acts. This
emptiness can be retraced in first place in that characteristic feature of per-
ception which, in Husserl’s words, “pretends to do what according to its own
nature it cannot do”. In the previous layer of genetic constitution we have a
different kind of emptiness which is only and purely formal, i.e. the emptiness
of protention as empty instant. Affection opposes the disappearing of the con-
tents in the oblivious retention and donates to protention a new dimension of
expectation, i.e. a not purely formal dimension. Affection opposes the inertia
of consciousness, the inertia of the continuous disappearing. In the retentional
process the objectuality tends to disappear (cf. [Hua XI], §35). In this case
we have a form of emptying of the hyletic contents. However, this is not the
emptiness connected to the donation of meaning, but the result of a process
in which the emergences disappear in the past. In this case the emptiness is
given by the disappearing data and not by any anticipating intention, like in
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the case of protention after affection is operated. This is the first instance of
empty intention in the proper sense, i.e. the first instance of meaning. From a
macro-perspective we deal with the duality understanding- sensibility: on the
first side the empty act of meaning; on the second, the intuitive act. Then,
acquiring a middle point of view, we can restrict the field of investigation to
perception and discover that perception itself is the result of a combination
of empty and fulfilled acts. From this perspective, affection is the original and
essential moment of the presentation. Furthermore, we can restrict the field of
investigation to the moment of affection and discover that affection itself is the
combination of some sort of presence – the original presence of a prominence
presented to the ego pole – and a particular synthesis that rebinds the contents
and confers a first instance of meaning. This gives the opportunity to bring
to light a very interesting and powerful property of the phenomenological con-
sciousness: the moments of consciousness have a structure which is similar to
the consciousness as a whole.
3.6 From affection to receptivity
From the layer of affection one passes to the layer of receptivity, where the ego
is somehow aware of its proper thematizing interest through which it turns
actively toward the objectuality. At this level, as Husserl clearly says, one finds
the lowest degree of activity of the ego29. In this higher sphere, both the pole
of the object and the pole of the subject have a definite character. We can now
properly speak of a subject whose intention is directed toward an object, i.e. an
object of perception or of another intuitive act: now the intentional correlation
is ‘mature’, i.e. put in its proper form. From this layer of constitution onwars, it
29cf. [EU], §17. Under the title receptivity (Rezeptivität), especially as it is used in Er-
fahrung und Urteil, one should understand a broad spectrum of operations of sensibility that
are characterized by a minimal degree of activity of the ego. The moments of Explication,
that I will take into consideration in the next sections, goes under this term. In §17 of EU,
Husserl also makes a sort of explanatory distinction between two senses of the term per-
ception: on the one side, perception as the “simple having-in-consciousness of the original
appearances”; on the other side, “active perception, the active apprehension (Erfassen)”.
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is possible to perform static analysis, since the ontological entities (the beings,
the knowing subject and the object) are formed and put into relation to each
other30.
Between affection and receptivity one finds the proper border of passivity
and activity31. On the other hand, receptivity gives a more precise idea of how
the explication from one layer of the constitution to another works32.
So far we have considered the first block of the analytic of experience. This
is divided in two parts: associations and affection. And the second is the middle
term between two different kinds of passivity: the original and rigid passivity of
associations and that of an ego which is not spontaneous but somehow active
in the act of apprehending (the ego of receptivity). Receptivity represents the
second middle term that brings out of sensibility, i.e. it brings to the spon-
taneity of the knowing subject with its categorial and predicative operations.
On the other hand, receptivity has the proper function of making affection
explicit. In the general frame of constitutive systematic, some explicitations
30Let me explain this statement. Static phenomenology, as I already tried to show, needs
that its object of analysis is already given, as a unity, in one blow. From this point of
the constitution we find the minimal form of unity that can be object of static analysis,
or, as I tried to define it, macro-phenomenology. In this case, the use of this language is
particularly meaningful. Indeed, one can say that, whereas up to this point the ‘objects
of phenomenology’ (the knowing subject and the object) were ‘too small’ to be analyzed
from a macro-perspective, with the passage to receptivity, we found two unities that are ‘big
enough’ to be the subject of a macro-analysis.
31The border between activity and passivity is always relative. But according to the present
reading, we have two moments of transition. First we have affection as a sort of transition
internal to sensibility. In other words, affection brings from a pure passivity to another kind
of passivity in which activity is presupposed. By contrast, receptivity, can also bring outside
sensibility, since the object of receptivity can become the object of categorial activity.
32As already argued, receptivity represents a broad field of operations of sensibility. In this
paragraphs, I just mean to show how in receptivity all the moments of affection are made
explicit. Here, I will not discuss in detail the different passages that carachterize receptivity
and then perception (Wahrnehmung): Aufmerksamkeit, Interesse, Modalizierungen (Nega-
tion...), schlichte Erfassung and so on (cf. [EU], §§18 and ff.). Only in the next section, I will
discuss the phenomenon of Explikation. In other words, we have sensibility (pre-predicative
experiece) as a whole. In this sphere we can distinguish different degrees of passivity. Original
associations, affection, receptivity in a broad sense. From affection to receptivity, we have
the turning of the ego towards an object and consequently a low form of activity. Again,
receptivity in this context is the transition from affection – the presentation of the object
to the ego – to the proper perception (Wahrnehemung) – a first form of registration of the
presented object; i.e. the apprehension (Erfassung).
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were already mentioned. For example, passive associations make explicit the
formal synthesis of time. In this case, to make explicit means to fill with con-
tents something that at a lower level was a mere formal structure. In turn,
affection makes explicit simple associations. Now, making explicit means to
make explicit for the ego a unity that was before only implicit, i.e. to make a
unity per se a unity per the ego. In this way both the structure of the passive
syntheses and the contents are presented to the ego in a different light. Now,
what does it mean that receptivity makes affection explicit? I will try to an-
swer this question through a comparative analysis of the different moments of
affection (cf. above, 3.5.2) and the correlative moments in receptivity.
The first moment (feature) of affection to be taken into consideration is
the awakening (Weckung) of the ego, i.e. the fact that the passively organized
prominences stimulate the ego pole and awake it. In receptivity this moment
becomes the actually being awake of the ego, i.e. it produces a first form of
awake and aware subjectivity. Whereas in affection the ego was awakened by
the objective pole, now the ego is actually awake (cf. [EU], §20). The second
moment of affection concerns its origin in the present (cf. [Hua XI], Ch. II,
§32). Here the structure of what is pre-given develops according to the impres-
sional present as a moment of the flow of the temporal horizon. The unity is
a unity in the duration and a synthesis of unification according to continuity
can take place. There are no objectualities that have a duration in time, but
rather pre-givenness that are continuously located in time flowing. This sec-
ond moment is made explicit, at the level of receptivity, by the restyling of
the passive temporal structure (cf. [EU], §§23-24). In the ‘active’ Erfassung of
the object, the subject grasps those phases of perception that fall in retention.
Time becomes independent of the identity of the object. In other words a syn-
thesis of identification takes place, through which the object is identified as
an object perceived in a given time. The third feature of affection is the par-
ticular status of orientation towards the future. In receptivity, this particular
orientation becomes real and concrete interest in the object and in the future
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phases of the perception, In other words, the phases of perception that in affec-
tion were mere orientations toward pretentional moments are now actualized
in the form of the interest of the subject for the next moment of perception,
they become the aim of an active tendency of the subject. A further feature is
connected with this orientation toward the future. This is the ‘expectation’ of
some determined contents in the next phase. In receptivity this becomes the
real donation of meaning to those phase that are not yet perceived and that are
consequently empty. In other words, this is the real expectation of something,
for example a part of the object, that is not yet given in perception, when the
object is apperceived.
This general framework is meant to give an idea of how in receptivity the
moments of affection are made explicit. Let me now turn to the moment of
explication, which is in fact the fundamental moment of receptivity as a whole.
3.7 Explication
Among other things, the study of the phenomenon of affection allowed me to
analyze from an unusual perspective the two fundamental moments of phe-
nomenology (the moment of the presence and the moment of the synthesis).
Now I will focus on the moment of explication (Explikation). Although often ne-
glected in secondary literature, this moment is extremely important, because
here the fundamental characters of genetic constitution can be appreciated.
First, the analysis of this moment offers the possibility of understanding what
it actually means that an upper layer of constitution is an explication of a
layer below. Second, it offers a concrete example of how the constitution of the
objectuality is parallel to the constitution of time33. In other words, it shows
concretely what was said in the previous chapter about genetic constitution
and time. Furthermore it offers a concrete example of the transition from a
macro to a micro analysis of something, in this case of the synthesis of coin-
33Another concrete example of this was already described in the discussion of affection,
with concerns to the particular orientation of affection toward the future.
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cidence. Third, it shows what it precisely means for Husserl to claim that the
idealities of logic find their origin in pre-predicative experience.
3.7.1 Obstructions and Negation
We enter now into the domain of what is commonly thought of as perception.
Affection is an essential condition of perception. Indeed, it is the moment in
which the ego comes into touch with an object and consequently can turn its
attention and then its interest toward the object, its properties and parts. In
affection there is the origin of those tendencies toward the ‘possession’ of an
object that characterize perception. In other words, whereas affection repre-
sents the moment of the constitution where the ego meets something for the
first time, independently of its own active side – so to say, of ‘its will’ – with
the turning toward that object and the interest in it, the tendency to perceive
the object as an accomplished object begins. At the beginning of EU §21, one
finds an illuminating and meaningful definition of perception as the working-
out (Auswirkung) of a progressive striving, of a tendency to attain new modes
of givenness of an object and the parts of it. These tendencies (the course of
perception) can be obstructed or unobstructed34. According to this, perception
is a potentially infinite complex and composed process through which a per-
ceiving subject tends to acquire something in sensibility in all its aspects and
sides and also with new perceptions (re-perceptions) of the same thing. In or-
der to make this definition more effective, one must specify, as Husserl in fact
does, that the tendencies are not blind striving toward new modes of the giving
of the object. By contrast, these tendencies are accompanied by intentions of
anticipations, i.e. a particular kind of empty intentions that intend the sides
of something that are not yet directly given, i.e. that are not yet apprehended
in perception. To be noticed that these are to be thought as empty inten-
34“In der Auswirkung seines tendenziösen Fortstrebens zu immer neuen Gegebenheits-
weisen desselben Gegenstandes kommt die konkrete Wahrnehmung zustande. Diese Ten-
denzen können sich ungehemmt oder gehemmt” ([EU], §21, p. 93). This definition is to be
compared with that of Analyses on passive Syntheses.
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tions, although they are not empty intentions in the real sense of the word,
i.e. meaning (signitive) intentions. In fact, these are anticipations of something
that can be concretely perceived in a successive phase of perception. They do
not intend a meaning, which, as already said, is something that has a reference
outside the proper object of perception. By contrast they intend a part that
belongs to the object of perception. In other words, they are a particular kind
of empty intentions that are never completely empty and are often a product
of imagination or remembering. The interplay of empty and fulfilled here at
work is very different from the one described in the first chapter, i.e. the one
between intentions of meaning and intuitions that was at the basis of Husserl’s
theory of knowledge. These anticipations are located in the domain of intuition
and are the result of the complexity of the phenomenon of perception. Here a
particular kind of the dynamic ‘empty-fulfilled’ is at work and it develops all
inside intuition:
Die Tendenzen sind nicht bloß blindes Fortstreben zu immer neuen
Gegebenheitsweisen des Gegenstandes, sondern sie gehen Hand in Hand
mit Erwartungsintentionen, mit protentionalen Erwartungen [...]. So ist
jede Wahrnehmungsphase ein Strahlensystem von aktuellen und poten-
ziellen Erwartungsintentionen. Im Normalfalle der Wahrnehmung, im
ungehemmten kontinuierlichen Ablaufen der Phasen, in der gewöhn-
lich schlechthin so genannten Wahrnehmung, findet ein kontinuierlicher
Prozeß der aktualisierenden Erregung, dann der stetigen Erfüllung der
Erwartungen statt, wobei Erfüllung zugleich immer auch Näherbestimmung
des Gegenstandes ist ([EU], §21, p. 93).
According to this quotation, the complex process of perception, can be
either obstructed or unobstructed. This means that a process of perception can
either proceed without any obstacle that prevents it to ‘possess’ the object
of perception, or that some obstacle that interrupts the normal perception
intervenes. In the first case, the process of perception goes from phase to
phase, from side to side, form detail to detail, up to the point where the
object is momentarily perceived (possessed) as an object. Then a new interest
can intervene as consequence of another affection, or the interest in the object
now perceived can be directed toward one of its parts intended as parts of
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the object. Or yet a categorial operation, for example a particular judgment
on the perceived, can be performed by the knowing subject. By contrast, in
the second case, perception can stop or be modified according to the kind of
obstruction that intervenes, to its degree and power. In order to comprehend
the phenomenon of obstruction and its consequences, it is fundamental to
distinguish between two general kinds of obstructions that bring to completely
different results in perception. The first case of obstruction is that in which the
whole process of perception is interrupted, i.e. it fails as a whole process. In
this case, all the perceptual tendencies are interrupted and, as a consequence of
this interruption, also the interest in the object disappears. In this context, the
interest in the object is interrupted either because the object disappears from
the perceptual field or because the object is hidden by another. In this latter
case the interest in the new object overcomes the interest in the first object.
For example, if we are perceiving this red apple here on the table and at some
point for some reason the apple falls down and goes out of the perceptual field,
then not only the phase of perception that consists in anticipating the backside
is interrupted, but also the whole perception of the object, simply because the
object is not in the perceptual field anymore. The situation is the same if
some other object in the perceptual field, for example a big book, is placed
between the perceiving subject and the apple, in such a way that it covers
the apple. In all these cases the perception of the object ceases because none
of the perceptual tendencies can find fulfillment. To be sure, other intuitive
acts can intervene, if the interest in the object is strong enough. One can for
example imagine the apple, remember another apple or also with a practical
action, look for the apple and perceive it again. However there is a ‘radical
and total’ interruption of the perceptual tendencies that, as a result, stops the
whole process of perception.
A second and more interesting case of obstruction occurs when not all the
tendencies are interrupted, but only some of them. In these case, there is a
partial disappointment (Entäuschung) of the perception, but the general inter-
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est in the object, which animates perception as a whole, still holds. In other
words, there is a disappointment of one or more tendencies, i.e. one or more,
but not all, of the expectations that form the complex network of the process
of perception. For example, in the process of perception of our apple, we are
expecting that the back side, which at the moment is not directly perceived, is
spherical conforming to the front side, which is actually perceived. Then, the
apple suddenly falls down and its back side becomes available for our direct
perception, but instead of being spherical it is dented. This means that our
expectations cannot be fulfilled, i.e. confirmed by a perception whose inten-
tional essence coincides with that of our expectation. Our expectation is then
disappointed, as a consequence the normal course of the whole perception has
to change although it can continue in some of its variation. To be noticed that
the conflict (Widerstreit) is given by the fact that in this case the obstruc-
tion generates a sort of doubling (Verdoppelung) of the perceptual process,
according to which two opposite tendencies are present at the same time. At
a certain point the ‘stronger’ one, the one that by virtue of its vivacity (Leib-
haftigkeit) reveals the disappointment, overcomes the first (the expectation)
which however remains in the perceptual course in the form of the null (mit
dem Charakter des ‘nichtig’, [EU], p. 95). Once the disappointment occurs, not
only the new expectation will change, but also the whole process in a retroac-
tive way. The whole process is now considered in light of the new perception
and of the disappointed perception that remains present in the process as not
fulfilled.
The difference between the first and the second case of obstruction consists
precisely in this, that in the second case the general interest in the object is
maintained and that a particular conflict between the expectation (the empty)
and the fulfilling arises. The important element is not the fact that an expec-
tation ceases or is disappointed, but that it is disappointed in the frame of an
interest that is maintained and that this disappointment generates a conflict
that can motivate a change, also a retroactive change, in the course of percep-
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tion: I am perceiving a red spherical apple, I do not see the back side but I
‘expect’ that this side is red and spherical. Then I perceive the back side, which,
differently from what I was expecting, is not red nor spherical. But the inter-
est in the apple still maintains, I am still perceiving an apple, although in the
form ‘not a red spherical apple, but a dented one’ (cf. [EU], §21a). Within the
framework of this kind of obstruction the phenomenon of negation (Negation)
originates. This is a very important moment for Husserl’s theory of constitu-
tion, because for the first time one can see how something that concerns the
logical sphere, in this case negation, originates in pre-predicative experience35.
To say it better, in pre-predicative experience, in this case in a particular case
of obstructed perception, Husserl individuates the original structure of nega-
tion, i.e. the original syntactical structure, the original form, of negation. The
negation of a judgment, i.e. the negation typical of the logical field, which is
different from this one and has another field of application, finds its origin in
this moment of receptivity. This means nothing else that in perception we find
the original (the transcendental condition) for negation:
Damit ist das ursprungliche Phänomenon derNegation, der Nichtigkeit
oder der ‘Aufhebung’, des ‘anderes’ beschrieben. [...]. Es zeigt sich also,
daß Negation nich erst Sache des prädikativen Urteilens ist, sondern daß
si in ihrer Urgestalt bereits in der vorprädikativen Sphäre der rezeptiven
Erfahrung auftritt ([EU], §21a, p. 90).
In the doubling of the perceptual process, in the fact that the new tendency
overcomes the old disappointed one and that this latter remains in the percep-
tual process as the null disappointed expectation, Husserl finds the origin of
the phenomenon of negation. But the doubling of the perceptual process and
the conflict between the two tendencies can also have different results than the
substitution of the old tendency with the old one. In this case, according to the
degree of the conflict and to its results, different kind of modalizations of the
perceptual process can take place, such as the doubt or the possibility. Like in
35This will also be the case for the logical idealities substrate and determination within
explication. In fact, the obstructed perception and unobstructed perception (which bring to
explication) are two parallel processes and require each other.
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the case of negation, this is the place where the logical forms of modalization
find their origin36.
3.7.2 Levels of contemplative perception
Negation comes out from an obstructed course of perception. Although in
EU Husserl deals with negation before dealing with explication and in fact
deals with obstructed courses of perception before unobstructed, these ones
latter are a condition of the first. In fact, obstructed perceptions presuppose
a normal (simple) unobstructed perception, or at least a piece of it. They
presuppose at least that the tendency to the explication of the interest starts
in order to be at a certain point disappointed. As Husserl himself notices in
§22 of EU, modalizations (that derive from obstructed perceptions) presuppose
explication (that derives from unobstructed courses of perception)37. Let me
show, following EU §22, what the general sense of the discourse is.
Even in the case of unobstructed perceptual processes, the explicative pene-
tration, through which the perceptual interest in the object finds its fulfillment,
is not simple, but complex and organized in levels. In particular, three different
and consecutive levels (Stufen) can be singled out (cf. [EU], §22).
First, the level of the simple apprehension and contemplation (schlichte
Erfassung und Betrachtung). This is the first and simplest form of apprehen-
36I am not going to discuss in details the question of modalization. For this, cf. [EU], §21b
and ff. [Hua XI], Erster Abschnitt. It is worth noticing that negation is to be considered a
particular kind of modalization, one could say a simple one, in which the conflict is solved
in favor of one of the tendencies of the competition: “Negation ist eine Bewußtseinsmodi-
fikation, die sich selbst ihrem eigenen Wesen nach als das ankündigt. Sie ist immer partielle
Durchstreichung auf dem Boden einer sich dabei durchhaltenden Glaubensgewißheit, let-
ztlich auf dem Boden des universalen Weltglaubens” ([EU], §21a, p. 91).
37“Mit einem Worte, vorausgesetzt ist für diese Vorkommnisse der Modalisierung schon
ein Stück Explikation des Wahrnehmungsgegenstandes. Und eine solche ist ja zumeist schon
durch die Tendenz des Wahrnehmungsinteresses gefordert. Die aktive Erfassung des Gegen-
standes wird in der Regel alsbald zur Betrachtung; das Ich, auf Kenntnisnahme gerichtet,
tendiert in den Gegenstand einzudringen, ihn nicht nur allseitig, sondern auch in all seinen
Einzelheiten, also explizierend zu betrachten” ([EU], 103). EU §22 is a transition paragraph
with which Husserl opens the second chapter of the first section on pre-predicative consti-
tution. As often in this Husserlian work, one can find here a clear presentation of the aims
of the next part of the text. Furthermore, Husserl works here under a general hypothesis,
i.e. that he only deals with unobstructed processes of perceptions.
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sion, which comes before all other forms of intuition and explication (vor jeder
Explication). In other words, this is a very simple form of intuition (Anschau-
ung) through which the perceiving subject is directed toward the object “taken
as a whole” (im Ganzen). As Husserl specifies, this level is the simplest level
of common objectifying activity. This means that at this level, with the first
form of apprehension, all the data that were previously organized in pure pre-
predicative passive experience, become now data for a perceiving subject that
possesses an object as an object, as a whole object, i.e. in a simple form. At
this level, passive syntheses find a fulfillment and the subject becomes some-
how active. The object is perceived as a unitary entity and it is not different
from its parts, which are not yet perceived as parts. There can in fact be differ-
ent forms of this simple intuition, according to the perceptual features of the
object, to the distance and to all the different factors involved in perception. I
see this apple as an apple, but I do not focus on any part of it, nor on a par-
ticular side. I just take it as an apple standing on the table in front of me. The
perceptual tendencies and the interest, which came from passive syntheses and
affection, find a preliminary simple fulfillment in the simple apprehension of
this object as an apple on this table. From this moment on, one deals with an
object, since the first level of the objectification occurs. The perceptual process
becomes now, so to speak, more aware. The subject intuits now an object as
focus of its interest. If until now the subject dealt with the products of passive
syntheses (it is affected by the prominences), now another synthesis put these
together in the form of an object which is perceived by the subject38.
Second, one finds a higher level of the exercise of the interest, i.e. the true
explicative contemplation (Explizierende Betrachtung) of the object. The first
simple case of apprehension represents an ending and a starting point at the
same time. And in fact this is typical of all the layers of constitution, which
38Let me refer to the schema of categorial intuition in the first chapter (cf. above
1.5.1, figure 1.3). Then the simple apprehension just described coincides with the Gesamt-
wahrnehmung, i.e. with the first step in the constitution of the fulfillment of the categorial
act.
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can always be thought of as a middle term between two other levels. In this
particular case, simple apprehension is an end with concern to the product of
passive syntheses, that is now somehow actively possessed by the subject. As a
starting point, this is the place were new expectations originate. The perceived
object awakens new expectations of an higher level. This means that once the
first exercise of interest finds fulfillment within simple intuition, other empty
intentions originate, which will find fulfillment in the apprehension of those
elements that belong to the internal horizon of the object initially perceived as
a simple object. This means first of all that the dynamism empty-fulfilled never
ceases. By contrast, from the fulfillment of an expectation – i.e. the fulfillment
of the general expectation concerning the object as a whole – new expectations
of a different type arise, and so on, from the lower to the higher levels of the
constitution39. At this second level, the interest, and the new expectations, are
directed toward the parts of the object, its hidden sides, its properties. In other
words, not only the object is at focus, but the object with its internal horizon,
with its properties, with the parts as belonging to the object. Looking back to
the schema of categorial (cf. figure 1.3), this moment correspond to the second
and the third moment of the constitution of the fulfillment of the categorical
act40. Now particular perceptions of the parts of the object take place and then,
39I already tried to show how in affection there is a particular occurrence of a particular
kind of expectation. In that sphere it was not really an expectation, but a modification of
the protentional phase. Now, in perception, we deal with proper expectation, the subject
is, so to say, the protagonist of its expectation, which wind fulfillment or disappointment in
new perceptions. Although in affection
40In fact, the composed perception at the third level of that schema is a form of explication
that gives as result a complex structure that can fulfill a categorial act, an act of meaning.
From a genetic perspective, Husserl can also explain why this is the case. Indeed, as we will
see explication is the place where the logical categories of substrate and determination find
their origin. This means that in explication we deal with the formation of a complex structure
in perception that has a ‘similar form’ (a common original form) to the logical categories.
By virtue of this common form, that in this case is the original appearance of the form, the
complex structure can fulfill the categorial act, because in perception there is a corresponding
form, in the words of the first chapter, there is already a form of substrate to which the
logical categories can be applied. Once again, the fact that logical categories find origin in
perception does not mean that substrate and predicate are already in sensibility, but that
here there are some analogous original structure that correspond to those of understanding.
This is the real sense of Husserl’s genetic constitution, and now it can also be explained why
the complex expressions of meaning can find fulfillment in complex structures of sensibility.
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by virtue of a particular occurrence of the synthesis of coincidence, this part is
perceived as belonging to the object, as part of the object. In true explication,
not only the general interest in the object is maintained, but there is also a
particular interest in a part of the object. This two combine in a complex act
of perception:
Explikation ist ein Hineingehen der Richtung des Wahrnehmungsin-
teresses in den Innenhorizont des Gegenstandes. Im Falle der unge-
hemmten Auswirkung des Interesses erfüllen sich dabei die protentionalen
Erwartungen, der Gegenstand erweist sich in seinen Eigenheiten als das,
als was er antizipiert war, nur daß das Antizipierte jetzt zu originaler
Gegebenheit kommt; es erfolgt Näherbestimmung, eventuell partielle
Korrektur, oder – im Falle der Hemmung – Enttäuschung der Erwartun-
gen, partielle Modalisierung ([EU], §22, p. 115).
At this second level, the perceptual process find a second kind of fulfillment.
Not only the object as a whole, but the object with its properties and the
elements belonging to the internal horizon fulfills the expectations. But there is
still an additional level of perceptual operations. This occurs when the interest
is not yet satisfied with the explicative penetration of the internal horizon,
i.e. with the explication of the parts of an object as belonging to that object,
but considers also other objects that are co-present in the external horizon of
the initially perceived object. In this manner, together or in contrast to the
explication of internal properties or determinations, relative determinations
(relative Bestimmungen) arise, which show how the object is in relation to
other objects. Let me consider an example, in order to make clear the difference
between these three degrees of the perceptual process. In the first case, the
subject perceives something as a unitary undifferentiated simple object, for
example an apple. In the second case, the perceiving subject deals not only
with the apple but also with its properties. For example, it perceives this red
apple, the spherical apple, the apple with the dented side and so on. To be
noticed that the different expectations regarding the internal horizon of the
object can be not only fulfilled, but also disappointed. In fact, explication,
perception and modalizations always function together and they are separable
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only in an abstractive way. At the third level, the subject perceives not only
the object with the inner properties, but also the external relation. In other
words, the subject perceives the red apple besides the ink-pot here on the desk.
At this level, it is also possible to establish – always in the sphere of sensibility
– relations and consequently to perceive, for example, the red apple as bigger
than the ink-pot on my desk. These are the different levels of perception. In
what follows I shall analyze the first two in details, but before that, since this
is a crucial point for this work, let me make few remarks.
First, whereas in the first chapter this same structure was intended to
explain the constitution of the fulfillment of a categorial act, in genetic phe-
nomenology it becomes the universal structure that describes the constitution
of perception. In other words, the constitution of the act itself is now at focus,
while this was in the first chapter only implicit. In fact, the structure of the
retaining in grasp, which is connected to the question of time and to a particu-
lar modification of the synthesis of time, is the reason why in the first chapter
this structure could only be implicit. Second, the role of the synthesis of coin-
cidence is important. Indeed, whereas in the first occurrence of this structure
the focus was on the synthesis between empty and fulfilling acts, since the
main question was that of knowledge as the relation between two acts of a
different kind, now the focus is on another synthesis of coincidence, the one
that makes the subject able to recognize a part of an object as part of that
object. Third, if one considers the schema of categorial intuition (figure 1.3),
there is a possible transformation that gives a good idea of how genetic consti-
tution works. In particular the left side and the right side of the schema, which
represents two different kinds of acts, are to be represented one over the other
and not side by side, like in that schema. In particular, the left side, that of
the meaning intention, is to be represented over the right side, which describes
the act of intuition. As a result, also considering the complete passive levels of
constitution, one has a description of the whole structure of genetic constitu-
tion: the basic level of time, associations, affection, attention, interest, simple
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explication, true explication, judgment as meaning intention, other forms of
categorial objectualities to be obtained by abstraction, universalization and so
on. I shall now turn to a more detailed analysis of explication.
3.7.3 Modes of the retaining in grasp
The passage from the realm of pure passivity to perception, but also the dif-
ferentiation between the three layers of apprehension, is possible on the ba-
sis of the different forms of the structure of the retaining-in-graps (im-Griff-
behalten). In general terms, this is a particular ‘modification’ of the threefold
structure of time according to which we have retention, now instant and pro-
tention as the basic structure on which passive syntheses work. This is a crucial
point of Husserl’s analysis, since time is involved in the analysis of the con-
stitution of different modes of perception. As Husserl himself notices in EU,
even if time is not the focus of these particular analyses it is likewise necessary
to refer to it, in order to grasp the real meaning of the passage between two
different modes of perception and, in a broader sense, between two layers of
the constitution:
Sollen auch die Probleme der Zeitkonstitution – die elementarsten
im Aufbau der konstitutiven Systematik – hier nicht in ihrem vollen
Umfange behandelt werden, so müssen sie doch so weit in Betracht
gezogen werden, als es nötig ist, um den Unterschied zwischen schlichter
Erfassung und Explikation in seinen Wurzeln zu begreifen ([EU], § 23a,
p. 116).
This quotation is extremely important, because it conveys one of the leading
theses of this work; time is the fundamental problem of Husserl’s theory of
genetic constitution – and consequently of Husserl’s theory of knowledge as
well. Time is, one could say, the fundamental apriori condition of Husserl’s
transcendental philosophy. Not only is it the basis, the most original and formal
synthesis of consciousness, but it also remains in some form through all the
layers of constitution. At every level there is a particular form (variation)
of the formal synthesis of time and the differences between these variations
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are the measure (the markers) of the passage from one layer to another. In
this case, the structure of the retaining-in-grasp, which is built up on the
structure of time, is the particular modification that characterizes perception41.
Furthermore, the difference between retention and retaining in grasp – which
is to be thought of as a higher, more active type of retention, in which the
subject plays an important role – enables the passage from the pure passivity
of passive syntheses and affection to the ‘passive activity’ of perception42.
Let me now turn to the analysis of the different modes of the retaining-
in-grasp. First, following Husserl’s analysis in EU, I will show what retaining
in grasp is and how it works. Then I will focus on the different forms of the
retaining in grasp and on the difference between them and retention. Then,
in the next paragraph, I will focus on the origin of the logical idealities of
substrate and determination.
The example that Husserl uses to explain how retaining in grasp works is
that of the perception of a melody or sound (cf. [EU], §23a). Husserl refers
to the constitution of a temporal objectuality because with this it is easier to
show how the objectuality constitutes with reference to the three phases of
time flowing, i.e. retention, now and protention. The argument is based on the
41In order to fully demonstrate this thesis, one should show what kind of temporal forma
remains at the higher levels of constitution. And this seems in fact to be possible. For
example, the atemporality of logical idealities is directly connected to their properties of
being infinitely repeated without change or loss of meaning. Atemporality means that the
idealities of logic are ‘disconnected’ from the constitution of time, or, say it, that they are
considered as if they were disconnected from the constitution of time. This because until
a certain level, time constitution is connected to the constitution of the contents, i.e. to
the richness of intuition. Since logical idealities must be repeatable in their meaning, it is
necessary to abstract from the contents, and consequently from time constitution, i.e. from
that constitution of time from which, oppositely, perception can never be separated.
42As alredy the title of § 23a shows, the discovery of the relativity of actvity and passivity is
an extremely important result for phenomenology. Indeed in phenomenology one always deals
with particular combinations of activity and passivity. As I will show, in simple apprehension
there are two moments. First, a ray of perception that is directed toward the grasping
of the original springing perception. Second, a ray directed toward the past, a ray that
maintains in grasp what otherwise would simply sink in retention. Husserl’s idea is that the
second moment represents a passive component in the composed and complex phenomenon
of perception (cf. [EU], §23a; below).
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distinction between the (purely) passive constitution of the unity of duration
and the perception of that unity. In fact, perception is an immanent-temporal
unity (immanent-zeitliche Einheit), i.e. it is the unity of duration constituted
in passivity apprehended by the perceiving subject. In fact, in spite of its name,
simple apprehension is not simple at all. By contrast, it is constituted from
the multiplicity of structures of the previous merely passive constitution and
its task is to bring to another level of constitution (that of the perceptual)
this multiplicity of the structures that characterize the most original level.
We have already seen how affection works. It has the task of re-binding a
unity and making it available for the ego. Then the ego can turn its interest
toward the affecting prominence becoming a real subject (a perceiving subject).
Once the ego has interest in the object (in this case the passively constituted
duration) perceiving tendencies are directed to the objectual pole. These are
the tendencies that, once they are fulfilled, will make the objective pole an
object. In simple apprehension, something analogues to affection takes place.
Now, the duration passively constituted not only awakens the ego pole, but,
through a new synthesis is apprehended by the subject. All this gives a precise
idea of how phenomenological constitution works: it is a continuous repetition
(re-application) of analogous syntheses, which have a common original root in
the formality of the synthesis of time. They are syntheses that in turn apply
to the product of the previous syntheses in the order of the constitution and
produce a form of unity to which a next form of synthesis will apply. It might
be useful to insist on this point, since here an important feature of genetic
constitution is clearly visible. The first synthesis is that of time. Then on the
basis of this, we have associations that work through similarity or contrast
of the hyletic data given in time flowing. The products of these synthesis are
the prominences. These are made present to the ego in affection, where a new
synthesis intervenes, which re-binds the contents and make them available for
the attention of the ego. At this point, the tendencies of the ego originate
and the real perceptual process begins. The prominences made present to the
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ego (the product of affection) are transformed in an object through a new
synthesis that makes them not only ‘present for the ego’ but also ‘of the ego’,
i.e. possessed by a perceiving subject.
Let me go back to the example of the sound. First of all, there is the
formation of the duration in the living present. The single parts of the sound are
experienced in the now-point and then, on one side, sink in retention (without
any intervening activity of the subject). On the other hand, they open the
possibility of an expectation, i.e. as the discussion of affection shows, the purely
formal phase of protention is now provided with contents. But until this point
the subject does not exercise any activity, the hyletic data simply spread – and
doing so they are pre-constituted – according to the form of the original flux.
As a result, one finds at this level the sound as a passively pre-given unity of
duration. If we come to the perception of the sound – of the pre-given duration
– then we need a particular apprehension, which is itself continuously enduring
“as long as” the sound itself. In other words, we need a particular apprehension
that follows the pre-constituted duration and intervenes on the phases of the
original flux. This apprehension originates in a particular now point and is
directed toward the sound that is ringing, but not merely at the phase sounding
now, in a particular now-point. By contrast, it is directed through all these
phases and beyond this present. To say it differently, in the apprehension of
a duration, one has two rays, two components of the perceptual process. The
first, the more active, is directed toward the sound which is presently vivid, that
is sounding now. This is a direct ray and follows the flux, grasping the sound
through all the present moments, it is directed toward the original springing
perception. But there is also a second ray, a more passive one, that has the
task of connecting the now-points that in turn become past. This second ray,
is transversal to the flux and aims to the unity not of the flux, but of the
apprehension of the flux, i.e. to the duration of the apprehension itself. This
second component has two directions. Toward the past, the modified activity
of the ‘still in grasp’ has the function of maintaining vivid the present moments
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that are sinking in the past. On the other side, on the side of the future, this is
characterized as a anticipatory grasping activity, i.e. as an activity that makes
it possible for the subject to immediately grasp the sound of the next now
point of the flux. We have then two activities of the perceiving subject. The
first through which the subject possesses the sound now sounding, the second
that traverses the pasts and opens to the future. These two activities, these
two rays, come then to coincidence, producing the simple act of apprehension:
So geht die modifizierte Aktivität des Noch-im-Griff durch das Kon-
tinuum der Vergangenheiten, wie es an das lebendige Jetzt angeschlossen
ist, stetig hindurch; und die modifizierte Aktivität in eins mit der urquel-
lenden neuen ist eine fließende Einheit der Aktivität und als solche in
diesem Fluß in Selbstdeckung ([EU], §23, p. 119).
The case of the perception of a sound shows how the retaining in grasp
works with its simplest occurrence. And this because the temporal object is
constituted as always the same, even if the single sound-unities of every now
points are different. In this case the general interest for the perceived object re-
mains and leads the process of perception. Indeed there is a proper coincidence
between the main active flux of the springing perception and the modified ac-
tivity of the retaining in grasp, which differently from the first, applyes on
elements that are not vivid anymore. But there can also be different forms of
the in grasp. For example instead of a sound, the subject can perceive different
objects that have no connection with each other (object that are not in series,
like a succession of streetlights). In this case, after turning to a further object
the subject retains the previous one, it is still in grasp after the turning-toward
takes place. Indeed, the old perceived object does not merely sink in retention,
even if in this case there is no total overlapping between the two rays of the
apprehension. Whereas in the example of the sound the modified activity coi-
cided with the original grasping in regard to the object, in this second case
this does not happen, because the object is a different one.
As a consequence, according to the interest in the perceived object and
to the course of perception, different kinds of in grasp can occur. In general,
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Husserl distinguishes between two of them (cf. [EU], 23b): 1) the impressional
retaining in grasp and 2) the non-impressional retaining in grasp. The first
case is that of the perception of the sound, or also of the retaining of an object
that is still given also when the interest is turned toward a new object. In other
words, in the first case it is important that the perceived object, be it temporal
or not, continues to endure during the perception, even if the interest and the
apprehending activity are directed toward a new object or a new phase of the
sounding. By contrast, the second kind of in grasp presents two cases: 2a) an
object no longer given is still retained in grasp although the perceiving subject
turned toward a new one; 2b) the givenness of the object ceases and the ego is
still turned actively toward it in its retentional reverberation. In this case there
is a coincidence between the apprehending activity directed in retention and
the in grasp of the duration which was given in impressional mode. Husserl’s
example is that of the perception of a sound that is already faded away but
toward which the subject is still attentively directed. The grasping activity
functions here in retentional reverberation, making it active. In other words,
the attention of the subject is not directed toward a new object, but still on
the one whose givenness ceased. This means that the two rays of perception
are both directed in retention, not only the more passive one, but also the
one that normally is directed toward the original springing perception. I was
hearing a sound and the sound fade away. Then I do not turn toward a new
sound, but I am ‘still concentrated’ on the sound that faded away. I retain it
in grasp and my attention is directed toward the duration of this retaining in
grasp, the two rays coincide in this sense. As a result, I am trying to recall
(reconstruct) the sound and maybe to finding out “what kind of sound it may
have been” (cf. [EU], p. 120).
Given this analysis, it is already clear that the retaining in grasp cannot
coincide with simple retention. By contrast it is something that function on
the general structure of retention, but it is a sort of active modification (acti-
vivation) of it:
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Aus dieser Beschreibung geht hervor, daß das Im-Griff-behalten als
eine modifizierte Aktivität, als Passivität in der Aktivität, unterschieden
werden muß von dem Behalten der Retention, der öfters auch so genan-
nten „frischen” Erinnerung. Diese ist eine intentionale Modifikation im
Rahmen der puren Passivität; sie spielt sich nach einer absolut starren
Gesetzmäßigkeit ohne jede beteiligung der vom Ichzentrum ausstrahlen-
den Aktivität ab. Sie gehört zur Gesetzmäßigkeit der ursprünglichen
Konstitution der immanenten Zeitlichkeit, in der jedes impressionale
Bewußthaben eines originalen momentanen Jetzt sich stetig wandelt in
das Noch-bewußt-haben desselben imModus So-eben (soeben gewesenes
Jetzt) [EU], §23b, p. 121-2).
To conclude, the retaining in grasp, which is different from retention but
still functions on the same structure, is a necessary moment for simple ap-
prehension that is in fact a complex and composed process. The retaining is
a modification of the original fixed laws of the constitution of time. It is not
the case that these laws change, but the contents are now object of an active
subjective operation. In the spirit of Husserl’s genetic constitution, one can
say that retention is a transcendental condition of the in grasp and conversely
the in grasp makes retention explicit. Analogously, protention was a condition
for the expectations that are fulfilled in perception and these make the first
explicit. This is in fact the general sense of Husserl’s theory of constitution:
the layer below is a condition of the one above. This latter in turn makes the
one below explicit. This is the double direction of Husserl’s genetic constituion:
the layer above has a sense only because of the condition of the one below, but
once the making explicit occurs, the sense of the one below also changes.
3.7.4 Substrate and determination
The next, upper level of constitution is that of the explicative contemplation
(explizierenden Betrachten). This was provisionally defined as the penetration
of the perceptual process into the internal horizon of the object, i.e. as the
apprehension of the determinations of the object as determinations of the ob-
ject. Assuming the case of the unobstructed exercise of perceptual interest, the
subject does not remain long with the simple apprehension of the object as a
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whole, in which the properties remain unperceived (unexplicated) in the indef-
initeness of the complex of properties merely perceived as the internal horizon.
If this was the case, as already mentioned in the discussion of categorial intu-
ition, we could only perceive mere objects and not their properties and objects
with their properties43. Simple apprehension, despite its complexity, generates
always a monothetic unity. The object is apprehended as a mere unity, as a
simple unity. By contrast, the same tendency that finds fulfillment in simple
apprehension, once it finds fulfillment, pushes beyond simple apprehension,
toward the apprehension of the parts of the object. In this way a polythetic
act is required by means of which one can apprehend the object with its prop-
erties and determinations. In fact, this is the real richness of the perceptual
process, its characteristic vivacity. It is only by means of explication that our
perception becomes so rich and acquires a complex structure, in which there
is a certain lawfulness independently form the rules of understanding.
The apprehension of the parts of the object is different from the apprehen-
sion of a new object. To say it differently, the passage from the apprehension
of this apple in front of me to the apprehension of the red as property of this
apple is not like the passage from the apprehension of this apple and the ap-
prehension of this ink-pot in front of me. Generally speaking, in the perception
of the determinations of an object, the main object is mantained as theme of
the perceptual process:
Nehmen wir einen Gegenstand, S genannt, und die inneren Bestim-
mungen a, b...., so liefert der von dem Interesse an S hervorgetriebene
Prozeß nicht einfach die Folge: Erfassung S, Erfassung a, Erfassung b,
usw., als ob die eine und die andere Erfassung miteinander nichts zu
tun hätten, als ob ein Wechsel der Themata erfolget. [...] Vielmehr in
dem ganzen Prozeß von Einzelakten, die von der Erfassung S zu den
Erfassungen a, b.... führen, lernen wir S kennen. Der Prozeß ist eine
entfaltende Betrachtung, eine Einheit gegliederter Betrachtung ([EU],
§24, p. 125-6)44.
43The same holds for the explication of plurality. In this case the subject enters into the
external horizon of the perceived object. Only in virtue of this new penetration the object
can perceive the object in relation with other objects.
44Once again, I would like to stress the fact that explication was already recognized by
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In the complex and articulated perceptual process, S remains the theme,
it has the character of the main object of perception. But now I am also
perceiving something that refers to this object as a property of it. And this is
possible because a particular synthesis occurs between the content (matter) of
the perception of the main act and that of the part.
In der Erfassung der Eigenheiten lernen wir ihn [the object, S] ken-
nen und sie nur als die seinen. Das unbestimmte Thema S wird in
der Entfaltung zum Substrat der hervorgetretenen Eigenheiten, und sie
selbst konstituieren sich in ihr als seine Bestimmungen ([EU], §24a, p.
126).
In explication we have the composition of two perceptions and their coin-
cidence: a main perception of the object, a partial perception of some parts of
the object and a synthesis that indicates that the part is a part of the object.
In this process, the object first given in its simplicity, without characterizing
details and properties, is brought to real intuition in its complexity and with
its determinations. This process is a twofold constitution of sense [zweifache
Sinnbildung]. Indeed, this is a polythetic act by means of which, on the one
hand, the subject perceives the main object as substrate, on the other hand,
the determinations a, b, ..., as determination of the object.
As in the case of negation, we are not considering here the logical idealities
substrate and determination, but more precisely the place of their origin:
Wir stehen damit an der Ursprungsstelle der ersten der sogenan-
nten „logischen Kategorien”. Im eigentlichen Sinn kann von logischen
Kategorien freilich erst in der Sphäre des prädikativen Urteils die Rede
Husserl in the Sixth Logical Investigation. Indeed this already called for a kind of genetic
analysis. However in that case explication was studied in the framework of the constitution
of the fulfillment of categorial acts. The main difference is that, in that context, Husserl
remained on a macro level of analysis. By contrast in genetic constitution Husserl provides a
real micro analysis of explication. The question of time is now uncovered and explication can
be explained through the retaining in grasp. This is also the factor that makes explication
different from simple apprehension. The result is a micro analysis by means of which the
whole process of perception is analyzed in terms of the continuous development of apprehen-
sion. Also to be noticed that in RL VI, this analysis is in terms of the part-whole language of
the Third Investigation. By contrast, now the development and function of the synthesis will
be at focus. This is to be seen as a difference due to the diversity of the phenomenological
analysis, the static and the genetic.
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sein als von Bestimmungsstücken, die zur Form möglicher prädikativer
Urteile notwendig gehören. Aber alle dort auftretenden Kategorien und
kategorialen Formen bauen sich auf die vorprädikativen Synthesen und
haben in ihnen ihren Ursprung ([EU], §24a, 127).
This is a very crucial passage for the present study, but also for genetic
phenomenology in general. The syntheses that characterize explicative con-
templation (the twofold grasping and the coincidence) have already in them-
selves something that belong to those syntheses that in predication generate
real judgments, such as “the apple is red”, i.e. judgment that says something
(make assertions) about a state of affairs and that can be true or false. It is
important to notice, as Husserl himself does in the previous quotation, that we
do not find here the occurrence of logical categories, which provide a different
form of synthesis, a synthesis that brings outside the constitution of immanent
time and consequently makes the judgment always identical in all its repeti-
tions. By contrast, logical categories only find here their origin. This means
that syntheses in pre-predicative experience are transcendental conditions for
the syntheses of predication: I can make the judgment “the apple is red” only
insofar the structure of my perception allows me to perceive something like
an apple with the property of being red. What is important is not that this
particular perception occurs or has ever occurred in my experience. On the
contrary, what is important is the ‘possibility’ of the structure of this percep-
tion, since this, say it, remains in the structure of the predicative synthesis.
In other words, the two syntheses have a common structure, i.e. the predica-
tive synthesis, which is different from the perceptual one and says something
more, is built on the perceptual one and both ultimately refer to the com-
mon root represented by the original synthesis of time45. Here the sense of
45The retaining in grasp, which is a modification of time synthesis is what allow in
perception to have substrate and determination. In the conclusions, where I indicate fur-
ther directions of investigation of time, I suggest that the permanence of time in different
forms through the whole constitution provides phenomenological schemata in Kantian sense.
Schematism is a crucial and difficult matter in Kant’s theory of knowledge. In a few words,
schemata are determinations of time, i.e. form of time that, from the sensibility to the un-
derstanding, allow to apply concepts to phenomena. I will suggest that in Husserl it since
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Husserl’s constitution and the importance of his theory of knowledge can be
fully appreciated: without sensibility there is not the primordial structure on
which the syntheses of understanding are built. By contrast, these latter are
not a mere repetition of the first kind of sensible syntheses. Finally, both are
required to achieve knowledge. Even if in a vertical framework this is substan-
tially the schema empty-fulfilled act. The difference is that now all the passages
from sensibility to understanding are described and the common structures,
that finally refer to the common root of the synthesis of time, are brought to
light. Now, let me draw attention to two fundamental points: first, the char-
acterization of the coincidence between the partial and the main intention in
explication; second, the particular kind of retaining in grasp that characterizes
explication.
Explicative coincidence. The act of explicative contemplation is composed
by two apprehensions46. But these are not disconnected, as if the subject was
passing from the perception of an object to the perception of another one. By
contrast there is a sort of mental overlapping (Überschiebung) that indicates
that one perception is dependent on the other. This is a particular synthesis by
means of which two different apprehensions can be taken in a unitary way and
function when the ego, although a new perception has a more vivid privileged
position, is still directed to the old object. The two objects, the main and the
part, are taken together, the ego is in both. In this case the succession of the
rays of attention and apprehension has become a single double ray. According
simpler, since time is not merely a form of sensibility, but it became a synthesis with a def-
inite threefold structure. Given this, the determinations of time are forms of the synthesis
of time that characterizes the different levels of constitution. This is what I would call a
phenomenological schema
46We already mentioned that, despite its name, simple apprehension is also somehow
complex, i.e. it has a complex structure. To be more precise, simple apprehension was the was
the result of the combination of two rays (interest/attention and grasping) that, according
to the particular case of apprehension, could coincide or not. The explicative act is complex
in another way, since it is the result of the combination of two apprehension. It is really a
polytheistic act, because in it two unities come to coincidence and not only two moments of
one same act, like in the cake of simple apprehension. In this sense, as I will discuss in what
follows, Husserl talks of a twofold constitution of sense.
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to this, we have in fact an act with a double apprehension, one toward the main
object and one toward the part, in which the attention of the ego is shared by
the two. The two acts of apprehension are bounded together by a synthetical
operation whose result is a partial identification, i.e. an identification of an
object and one of its part. This explicative coincidence says that something
is a part of a perceived object and is always to be distinguished from the to-
tal coincidence of identity that by contrast brings to the identification of two
perceptions. In this case we recognize two perceptions as two perceptions of
the same object. By contrast, in the case of explicative coincidence we identify
something as part of an object. Through this synthesis, continuity (the fact
that something belong as part to an object) and discreteness (the fact that as
part something is different from the object to which it belongs) are connected
in a dynamic and peculiar way. In fact, substrate and determinations are con-
stituted as correlative and only abstractly separable members of this synthesis
of coincidence:
Indem das a als Bestimmung bewußt ist, ist es nicht schlechthin
als dasselbe bewußt wie das S, aber auch nicht als ein schlechthin an-
deres. In jeder das S explizierenden Bestimmung ist das S in einer seiner
Besonderheiten, und in den verschiedenen als Explikate auftretenden
Bestimmungen ist es dasselbe, nur in verschiedenen Besonderheiten als
seinen Eigenheiten ([EU], §24b, p. 128).
Explicative retaining-in-grasp. In the paragraphs above, we saw that the
different degrees and levels of simple apprehension are produced by different
modes of the retaining in grasp. This is true also for the passage from simple
apprehension to explication. In other words the difference between simple con-
templation and explication can be really appreciated only when the difference
between the respective mode of the retaining-in-grasp is brought to light. I
already tried to characterize the retaining in grasp that function in simple ap-
prehension and also the particular alternation between the two coexistent mo-
ments that animate simple perception, the retaining in grasp and vivid original
grasping directed by interest and attention. In explication we have a two-fold
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retaining in grasp, it is like we had two different but coinciding perceptions at
the same moment. Generally speaking, the situation can be described as fol-
lows. The partial perception, the perception of the part of the object, functions
likewise simple contemplation by means of the articulation of the two moments
just mentioned. But in addition to this, there is an extra perception, a per-
ception still holding on the background. This is the apprehension of the main
object as theme of the perception as a whole. Also this apprehension, as the
first one, is characterized by two moments, but here the retaining-in-grasp has
the form of the still-retaining-in-grasp (Noch-im-Griff-behalten). This means
that the activity of the retaining-in-grasp that characherized the first origi-
nal apprehension of the total object, after the determinations are perceived, is
modified. The result is a modification of the retaining in grasp, an enduring
activity that takes the first retaining-in-grasp as its reference and transforms
it in a still-retaining-in grasp that preserves the main object as theme of the
perception. In this case the object is given in the particular mode of the same
but always with different determinations. It is the same object as substrate,
but not the same perception. In fact, by means of partial perceptions we also
perceive the main object in a different way at each stage of the explication.
It is the secondary modified retaining-in-grasp in the mode of the ‘still’ that
make it possible to perceive something as substrate, as invariant through the
series of different perceptions. Just to make an example, let me consider the
perception of a red apple. According to Husserl’s theory, the first component
of the whole act of perception is the simple apprehension of the object. By
means of this act, which is composed by the retaining-in-grasp and the orig-
inally springing activity, the subject perceives something as a unitary object,
for example the apple. Then, in explication, the subject perceives the apple
with its properties, for example the red apple. In order to achieve this com-
plex perception, to the first simple apprehension of the apple a further one
is added. This is the perception of the red, which works exactly like a simple
perception. But when the synthesis of coincidence between the apprehension
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of the red and the apprehension of the apple intervenes, the retaining-in-grasp
of the first simple apprehension of the apple is modified into a new secondary
still-retaining-in-grasp that works now together with the retaining of the red,
which has become the primarily retaining in grasp. However, as a result of the
synthesis of coincidence, the retaining-in-grasp of the properties (of the red)
is not independent of the still-in-grasp of the object (the apple). We ‘know’
(perceive) the object through the determination and we ‘know’ the object as
a different object at every stage, but always as the same substrate. In fact, it
is the structure of the modified still-in-graps that make the perception of the
main object as substrate possible47.
47The next level, a further development of the phenomenon of explication is that the
penetration of the external horizon, i.e. the relational explication of the object. In this
case the object is perceived also with regards to other objects of the same perceptual field.
Unfortunately, I cannot not discuss the question in details here. I was mainly interested in
two things. First, to show that the different level of perceptions are described with reference
to different degrees of the retaining-in-graps, which in turn is a modification of the synthesis
of time. Second, It is now clearer what it means that logical categories originate in pre-




4.1 Phenomenology and theory of knowledge
This chapter is conceived with a different style than the previous ones. There,
I analyzed in a technical way Husserl’s theory of constitution with reference
to the most important Husserlian texts. The result was not a mere reading or
repetition of Husserl’s theories, but an attempt to interpret them, to explain
obscure passages, to seek for internal connections and to read the development
of Husserl’s theory of constitution as a development of his theory of knowl-
edge. In this chapter, I will adopt a very different approach. The reference to
the texts will be abandoned – in a certain sense the reference to Husserl him-
self will be abandoned – and some general ideas will be presented as leading
ideas for new possible investigations. In the first chapters, even where I try
to suggest original readings and solutions, as I do in the case of categorial
intuition, I always refer to important passages of Husserl’s texts. Now I want
to move a step forward and to present what I consider to be the natural devel-
opment of those results. First, I will sum up what I consider the most relevant
achievements of this work. Then I will focus on two items that stem from the
technical analysis. The first item concerns the question of time. Although time
constitution was not the central point of my work, I tried to show that it is
impossible to understand genetic constitution without any reference to time
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and the forms of time. My claim was that time has a different form at every
level of the constitution and that this means that time is the ‘measure’ of con-
stitution. Now I want to suggest that these forms of time are to be thought
of as ‘phenomenological schemata’. i.e. particular determinations of time that
make constitution possible.
The second item concerns the relation between the idea of constitution
and that of reason. In parts of his work, Husserl himself dealt with the idea
of reason. However, here I am not interested in taking into consideration the
Husserlian attempts to define phenomenological reason or to compare it with
other models of reason, for example with the Kantian one. By contrast, I would
like to raise, and at least to indicate a way to answer, the following question:
What model of reason comes out from Husserl’s theory of constitution? Hus-
serl’s theory of constitution, as presented in this works, is a theory of knowledge
in strict sense. The answer to the question about what we can know, and how
(on the basis of which conditions) we can know it, is a fundamental step for
outlining theoretical reason and consequently for reason as a whole. I suggest
that the model of reason that stems from Husserl’s theory of knowledge is a
very dynamic one. All the classical divisions within the realm of reason, be
they expressed in terms of faculties or sources, fall down. By contrast, reason
is characterized by two basic moments: the moment of entering in touch with
something (the moment of the presence) and the moment of the synthesis.
These two moments give origin to a particular ‘dialectic’ of phenomenological
reason. In other words, I suggest that the Husserlian theory of constitution
reveals also the basic structure of reason. In this work, I started from an in-
vestigation on the notions of sensibility and understanding in Husserl’s theory
of knowledge. The last answer to the question about their relation is to be
found here. They are not faculties or distinct sources of knowledge anymore.
They are, say it, fields of reason, which are characterized in turn by different
articulations of the two basic moments of consciousness. Also the answer to an-
other basic question that animates the present study can be found here. What
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is really Husserl’s theory of genetic constitution? It is a ‘vertical’ theory of
knowledge that investigates the deep transcendental conditions for knowledge,
but also for evidence and truth. In doing so it also shows to be the foundation
of a very particular model of reason, in which there are not real but only rela-
tive boundaries between the faculties, and what really counts is the particular
kind of objectuality the subject is dealing with and the particular mode of
synthesis that applies to this objecuatlity.
In the first chapter of this work, I focused on Husserl’s theory of knowledge
as it is presented in the Sixth Logical Investigation. In the first part, I tried
to explain Husserl’s theory of empty and fulfilling act with respect to those
characteristic notions of phenomenology that Husserl discovers in the Fifth In-
vestigation. Knowledge is for Husserl a particular kind of coincidence between
the intentional essences of two acts of a different kind: on the one side the act
of meaning, on the other side the act of intuition. This schema remains domi-
nant within phenomenology, even where Husserl seems to abandon it. Indeed,
in this work I suggest that the passage from static to genetic phenomenology
is to be thought of as the passage from a horizontal reading of this schema to
a vertical one. Phenomenology is in a certain sense twofold: on the one side
static phenomenology, on the other side genetic phenomenology. But both the
interest in knowledge and the basic structures of phenomenology remain the
same. The discussion about the question of categorial intuition was intended
to show that the need for a deeper genetic analysis was already required in
the framework of the Sixth Logical Investigation. Furthermore the particular
role of the synthesis of coincidence is a good example of two things. First, of
how static analysis differs from genetic analysis. Second, it shows a particular
articulation of the dialectic between presence and synthesis. Indeed, at differ-
ent levels, we find different modes of the coincidence. The coincidence between
the intentional essences of two different acts that produces knowledge and the
explicative coincidence – between an act and a partial act – that gives percep-
tion. What is interesting is that, although knowledge and perception are two
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very different processes and the first presupposes in fact the second, they have
a similar structure, i.e. that of coincidence.
The discussion of categorial intuition in the first chapter is different from
the classical discussions on this topic. My concern here was to stress that Hus-
serl was investigating the constitution of the fulfillment of a categorial act and
not the constitution of the categorial act itself, as it may sometimes seem in
Husserl’s argumentation. Moreover, I stress the importance of the double di-
rection of the synthesis of coincidence. This confers an important feature to
Husserl’s theory of knowledge. Not only the act of meaning finds fulfillment
in intuitions but, conversely, from an act of intuition one can pass to an act
of meaning. Only when the two of them are given in coincidence one can have
knowledge, but none of the two has primacy on the other and both can be a
starting point in the process of knowing something. This way of reading things
was made possible by an important paragraph of LU VI that is often neglected.
Indeed in §42 an important parallelism emerges from the distinction between
form and Stoff, both within the sphere of categorial and intuitive acts. Not
only Husserl asserts that we do not have knowledge without the union of these
two kinds of acts, but he also explains how this is to be intended and why we
cannot have knowledge outside this framework.
The results of the Sixth Logical Investigation were achieved within a very
precise idea of logic and through a particular phenomenological method. The
first is the idea of pure logic presented in the Prolegomena, the second is what
commonly goes under the name of static phenomenology. The idea of pure
logic was described in the first chapter of this work as the starting point of
the analysis, whereas the analysis of phenomenological methods is the topic of
the second chapter, where I also present the Husserlian idea of transcendental
logic. The first two chapters of this work are characterized by a very interest-
ing movement: analysis of the idea of pure logic and the connected theory of
knowledge, analysis of static phenomenology, analysis of genetic phenomenol-
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ogy, analysis of transcendental logic. As I already claimed, in phenomenology
logic and method are not the same thing, though they are intrinsically and
necessarily connected. In the second chapter, I try to explain the main differ-
ences between static and genetic phenomenology. These are two methods, two
ways to investigate constitution. Although they might appear different, I try
to show that genetic phenomenology is a deepening of static analysis. The two
methods do not have as object two different ideas of constitution, on the con-
trary they have different perspectives on the same idea of constitution. Static
analysis deals with already constituted objectualities and an already consti-
tuted subject: it investigates the way in which an objectuality becomes an
object within consciousness. It investigates constitution in a simple way, pro-
ducing an ontology and a network of acts. By contrast, genetic phenomenology
investigates constitution in a deeper manner. According to the definition that
I proposed, genetic constitution takes into account both the constitution of
the object and the constitution of the subject with reference to the parallel
constitution of time. An important element of the second chapter is the at-
tempt to show that genetic phenomenology requires as counterpart a notion
of logic that, although it is a development of the logic of the Prolegomena,
does not coincide with it. Genetic phenomenology is more dynamic than static
phenomenology, because it goes deep into the origins of constitution. For this
reason, it requires a notion of logic that has to be more dynamic than the
pure logic of the Prolegomena. This is the case for the notion of transcendental
logic in FTL. Here, on the basis of a vertical (deep) analysis of evidence, the
entire subjective side of logic is not only revealed but also explained according
to its essential conditions. Another important element I introduced the second
chapter – although just as a suggestion – was the use of a different terminol-
ogy. Instead of the terms static and genetic, which in my opinion could lead
to a psychological misunderstanding, I respectively used the terms ‘macro’
and ‘micro’ phenomenology. However, the central point of the chapter was to
present genetic phenomenology and transcendental logic together. The two are
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not often discussed together in literature. As a consequence, methods and logic
run the risk of being considered either as two completely different things or
as the same one. By contrast, in phenomenology, logic and method do have
an intrinsic connection. Genetic phenomenology could not be developed in the
framework of a mere pure logic. This would be too a rigid framework, because
it does not take into consideration the subjective side of logic. In other words,
subjectivity, the constitution of subjectivity – and the consequent constitution
of evidence – that characterizes genetic phenomenology requires that the sub-
jective side of logic is discovered.
The third chapter deals with two particular moments of genetic constitu-
tion. They are in my view among the most important moments of Husserl’s
constitution, because in them the fundamental features of genetic phenomenol-
ogy, and also of Husserl’s philosophy as a whole, can be appreciated. A lacuna
of this chapter was the lack of a complete discussion of the question of associa-
tion, which could be here only presupposed. Indeed, only with such an analysis
the frame of Husserl’s theory of genetic constitution, and in particular his the-
ory of pre-predicative constitution, can be fully understood. However, my aim
was not to provide such a complete framework, but to focus on some moments
of the constitution. My concerns were: 1) giving a concrete example of what
genetic analysis is; 2) showing what it means that the constitution of time is
parallel to that of the subject and the objectuality; 3) showing that in genetic
constitution the moment of the presence and the synthesis can be isolated.
This is in fact a particular mode of the general schema of empty-fulfilled act;
4) showing what it means that an upper level of constitution makes a lower
level explicit; 5) showing how something, in this case the synthesis of coinci-
dence, can be studied both from a macro and a micro perspective; 6) finally,
I wanted to explain in which sense the idealities of logic (such as negations,
substrate and determination) find their origin in pre-predicative constitution.
In the third chapter, I did not mean to describe Husserl’s theory of genetic
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constitution as a whole, but to describe and analyze some of its most pregnant
processes. The moment of affection is that in which for the first time in the
progression of the constitutive stages one finds the two poles of phenomenol-
ogy in a proper form: the ego-pole and the objectual-pole. In affection, the
prominences touch the ego and awake it, giving it the possibility of starting
its proper process of formation. In affection, the prominences, which were pre-
viously mere passive formations deriving from associative syntheses, are made
present for the ego. From this initial entering in touch, the double process of
formation of the perceiving subject and perceived object can start.
On the other hand, explication is the fundamental moment of perception,
i.e. the moment where the process of perception finds its complement. This is in
fact the moment in which something is apprehended as an object in sensibility.
Explication shows that the process of perception is very complex and explains
in full details a Husserlian insight that already animated the discussion of the
Sixth Logical Investigation: the structure of sensibility is complex and has an
internal lawfulness which is independent from the laws of the understanding.
Furthermore, the different modes of explication give as result different modes of
perception of the object. What is important is that the structure of explication
is the one in which we find for the origin of the logical notions of substrate
and determination.
Let me now try to briefly sum up these results in a slightly different form.
4.1.1 Presences and Absences
As Sokolowski stresses, phenomenology is a philosophy that has the important
feature of dealing with the absence1. In fact, as the description of the whole
process of explication shows, not only what is directly given in perception is
important for the apprehension of the object, but also what is not actually
and directly given, what still remains hidden. For example, the hidden side
1[Sokolowski, 1974][Sokolowski, 2000]. According to Sokolowski the couple present–absent
is to be considered together with the couple part-whole.
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of a perceived apple is the focus of particular tendencies of expectation that
find fulfillment in new and correlative processes of perception. I think it is
important to notice that the structure presence–absence can be considered the
general name of a class of diverse oppositions, all of which are related to the
main one, that of empty and intuitive act. In this work, we dealt with some of
the most important oppositions of Husserl’s phenomenology: empty-fullfilled
act; given–not given; presintified (Gegenwärtigung) –purely meant; presence–
absence (Anwesenheit–Abwesenheit). Phenomenology is a philosophy that can
explain well the articulation of what is given and what is not, i.e. the continu-
ous passage from the presence to the absence and vice versa. This is in fact the
movement that characterizes the macro level of knowledge, i.e. when we con-
sider the horizontal relation of fulfillment between an act of meaning and an
intuition. But it is also characteristic of the micro levels of genetic phenomenol-
ogy, i.e. when we have to describe the vertical constitution of perception or
of an act of meaning themselves. In the first case, we move from the empti-
ness of the act of meaning to the fullness of an act of intuition (or viceversa).
By contrast, in the second case, we take into consideration micro-fulfillments
(for example the apprehension of the parts) that characterize perception. It is
clear that phenomenology deals with oppositions and dualisms. This feature
of phenomenology comes from the very nature of the intentional correlation
that makes phenomenology from the beginning a philosophy devoted to the
dualisms. Only to make some examples from the present work: subjective side–
objective side of logic; static–genetic phenomenology; meaning–intuition. It is
important to notice that phenomenology never stops with these dualisms. On
the contrary, the final aim is to explain the articulation of these and to show
how in it objectualities of consciousness constitute. The poles of the diverse
oppositions give the frame in which phenomenological analysis proceeds. The
most meaningful example of this is the solution to the opposition of sensibility
and understanding that was at focus in this work.
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4.1.2 Micro and Macro Phenomenology
In this work I used the terms macro and micro phenomenology instead of (to-
gether with) the classical terms static and genetic phenomenology. In my view,
this terminology might be more appropriate for the following reasons. First,
it makes clear that static (macro) and genetic (micro) phenomenology are not
two different methods – or even worse, two different philosophical approaches
– but the same method that works at different levels of detail. In particular,
since it considers the problem of time, genetic phenomenology considers the
constitution in all its micro details, i.e. with respect to all the conditions of the
constitution of an act and its object. Second, using micro phenomenology in-
stead of genetic phenomenology can help to avoid some misunderstanding due
to the use of the word genesis. In fact, genetic phenomenology does not deal,
for example, with the psychological development of an act or an object in an
empirical subject. Furthermore, the layers (moments) of constitution are not
chronological stages of the formation of something. By contrast they are co-
present moments (micro-moments) to be intended as transcendental conditions
of knowledge. Third, as a consequence of this, consciousness does not have a
history in the real sense of the words, but only in a metaphorical way. Fourth,
a continuous passage between the two phenomenological methods is possible.
Indeed, from a certain perspective genetic phenomenology presupposes static
analysis, but this latter is possible only insofar something is already constituted
according to the rules of genetic phenomenology.
4.1.3 Transcendental Logic
An important point of this work was that the new genetic phenomenological
method also means the passage from one notion of logic to the other. In par-
ticular, the introduction of genetic phenomenology coincides with (requires)
the introduction of the notion of transcendental logic, i.e. the passage from
pure logic to transcendental logic. But what does transcendental logic means
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in light of what has just been discussed? In my view, in Husserl, this is not a
univocal term but has a series of correlated and very close different meanings.
First, transcendental logic is the logic that investigates the ultimate validity –
the foundation – of formal logic. In other words, it is the discipline that studies
the validity and foundation of formal logic, the place where the most impor-
tant notions (the basis) of formal logic (truth, evidence and those that derive
from these) are justified. Second, in a broader sense, transcendental logic is the
whole system of logic, once the subjective side of logic is discovered. In other
words, it consists in the union of formal logic, pure logic as doctrine of science
and subjective side, i.e. justification of evidence. Third, in a narrower sense,
transcendental logic is the justification of the evidence of formal disciplines
on the basis of subjective evidence. In this sense, transcendental logic tends to
coincide with the study of the subjective side of logic and is properly genealogy
of logic. Fifth, transcendental logic can be identified with the discipline that
takes into consideration not only the logical questions but also their relation
with the original synthesis of time. In this case, it is defined as the discipline
of the most original conditions and laws of knowledge.
4.1.4 Constitution and the ‘making explicit’
In genetic phenomenology, every level of the constitution has two ‘functions’;
it aims, say, in two directions. From the bottom-up direction, every level has
the task of making the lower level of constitution explicit. By contrast, from
the top down, it is the level itself that will be made explicit in a new upper
level and in a certain sense will make the next level possible. This confers to
genetic phenomenology a very powerful dynamism. In the first case, the prod-
uct of the level below is brought to a higher degree in which a new synthesis
can be applied with the consequent production of new contents. For exam-
ple, the prominences, which are produced through associative syntheses, are
made explicit for the ego at the level of affection. Then a new synthesis, which
has a partially common structure with the previous one, applies. In turn, the
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product of this synthesis (in this example the affective synthesis that re-binds
the contents) will give start to the proper process of perception, where new
syntheses apply, up to the point that the subject properly perceives something
in the wise of an objet. To say it differently, ‘making explicit’ in genetic phe-
nomenology means to bring the contents to a higher level of constitution where
a new synthesis intervenes on these2. This synthesishas something in common
with the synthesis that produced the contents at first, but is not identical to
it. As one can see, genetic constitution can be seen as ‘chain’ (a repetition) of
contents and syntheses, where the first contents are given in original presence.
4.2 Husserl and the place of synthesis
Let me present now the first of two general ideas that could represent a pros-
ecution of this work3. This is an attempt to single out the most significant
move of Husserl’s theory of knowledge. The question to answer is now: what
differentiates Husserl’s theory of knowledge from those theories that lead to
the dualism according to which sensibility and understanding are two separate
sources for knowledge? In the present work, it is possible to find the key to
answer this question: it is the full recognition of the role of the synthesis and
the synthetical nature of consciousness, both with regard to the ‘low’ and to the
‘high’ sphere of consciousness. In other words, it seems to me that the most
significant Husserlian move in theory of knowledge consists in admitting and
explaining the possibility of a synthetic sensibility. Not only Husserl introduces
the concept of passive synthesis (the characteristic synthesis of the lower strata
of sensibility), but he also explains and shows in details how these syntheses
work. Doing so, Husserl moves the axis of synthesis from the categorial oper-
ations of the understanding to sensibility itself. Indeed, sensibility itself has a
2In this work I used “to make explicit” in order to describe the passage from one layer
of the constitution to the other. On the other hand, “to explicate” and “explication” were
used to speak of perception and explication.
3As already said, these are two general ideas for a further possible investigation. I do not
intend to provide here a complete discussion, but just to present two ideas that could make
phenomenology less technical and more philosophical in a general way.
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clear and evident synthetic structure, in which different syntheses work on the
contents produced by previous ones.
Let now me try to put this in different terms, with a quick reference to
Kant4.
In spite of the different structure and results of their respective theories,
both Kant and Husserl claim for a necessary interplay (interconnection, Ver-
flechtung) of sensibility and understanding in gaining knowledge. Kant’s the-
ory of knowledge is a ‘horizontal’ one and is based on the idea that knowledge
emerges from two original sources, which are side by side and have perhaps
a common unknown origin (Stämme, Grundquellen; cf. KrV, A15-B29; A50-
B74). Both provide a proper peculiar kind of representation (Vorstellung).
Whereas sensibility provides intuitions, understanding provides concepts. Only
by applying the concepts of understanding to the appearances of sensibility
knowledge can be gained. By contrast, Husserl’s theory of knowledge, as we
saw with the analysis of genetic constitution, is ‘vertical’. As I tried to show,
sensibility and understanding are now on the same continuous plane. Unlike
Kant, the operations of spontaneous understanding are not separate, albeit
4To be noticed that in what follows, as well as in the previous references to Kant, I
do not really refer to Kant, but to a particular ‘Kantian theory of knowledge’, i.e. to a
particular ‘reading’ of the first Critique. According to this, which is a legitimate reading
but not the only possible, in Kant we have two different separate sources of knowledge: on
the one side sensibility (receptivity); on the other side understanding. And a fundamental
role is played by the synthesis of imagination that has the task of ‘joining’ and making
homogeneous the two sources. In other words, I constantly refer to what at the beginning
of this work I called the ‘epistemological dualism’. I am aware that in Kant there is space
for different interpretations and that the problem of a not synthetic sensibility is still open.
Even if not in a clear way, for example, there are passages in which Kant refers to the forms
of intuition in terms of synthesis. However the possibility of reinterpreting Kant does not
change the sense of the present discourse for the following reasons: 1) even if Kant’s theory
of knowledge was in fact different and also sensibility had a synthetic structure, he never
explained so clearly as Husserl does which this synthetic structure is; 2) the fundamental
role of the transcendental deduction testifies that Kant always thought of sensibility and
understanding as two essentially different things. By contrast, I am arguing that in Husserl
they differentiate only according to the kind of synthesis, to the forms of synthesis, that take
place in them; 3) In Husserl it is clear what it means that sensibility has a synthetic structure
and time is clearly defined as the most formal and basic synthesis of consciousness. It is this
condition that makes Husserl able to eliminate every separation between sensibility and
understanding and, through the theory of constitution, to show that they are two different
although not separate conditions (fields) of knowledge.
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still distinct, from those of sensibility. This means that they are different with
regard to their tasks and matter but not with regard to their essential nature.
i.e their essential synthetic structure.
An important feature of the Husserlian vertical theory of knowledge is that
there is no need of anything like the Kantian transcendental deduction. For
Kant the argument of the deduction was aimed to fill a gap between two het-
erogeneous separate sources: on the one side sensibility (a source that presents
its objects directly – in an immediate way – and that is not synthetic (cf. A95-
B139) but synoptic (A94; A97); on the other side, understanding (a source
that is synthetic but only mediate). The question of the objective validity (ob-
jecktive Gültigkeit, cf. A90-B122) of the categories of the understanding can,
therefore, be posed in terms of the passage from a source that is not synthetic
to one that is synthetic, and whose syntheses have to find their proper ob-
jects independently of experience. Another aspect (direction) of this problem
is what brings Kant to the doctrine of schematism. In fact, the formality of
pure intuition and the ‘mediation’ of schematism are the two answers to the
problem regarding how to explain the action (the application) of the laws of
the understanding on the multiplicity of sensibility.
Already in the schema empty-fulfilled intention that animates the theory of
knowledge presented in Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation, there are impor-
tant elements (for example the role of the synthesis of coincidence) for a change
of paradigm. However, a decisive step in the passage from a horizontal to a
vertical theory of knowledge consisted for Husserl in recognizing the possibility
of passive syntheses. In fact, for Kant pure intuitions (reine Anschauungen)
are only pure forms of sensibility through which a phenomenon is given with
a certain order. They are neither syntheses nor the product of syntheses, al-
though they make possible synthetic a priory judgments (cf. B73)5. In Husserl,
5As I already claimed in the previous footnote, this is a particular reading of Kant and
the problem remains open. For example, one should explain what it means that something
provides an order but is not synthetic. However, even if pure intuitions were in Kant somehow
synthetic, there is nothing similar to the whole detailed complex of the Husserlian passive
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the notion of synthesis (the synthetic structure of consciousness) becomes the
transcendental condition of knowledge and in particular, as Husserlian genetic
constitution shows, the synthesis of time is to be thought of as the most origi-
nal transcendental condition. From another perspective, one can say that such
a common origin of the two ‘sources’, which Kant only posed as an hypoth-
esis, is now really at focus and is ‘explained’ in genetic phenomenology. The
synthesis of imagination is in Kant a very important one (both in A and B,
cf. B151 ff.; A123 ff.). It has different tasks and is also the one that performs
schematism (cf. B180-A141). In a passage of the Analyses on passive syntheses,
where Husserl discusses affection, he claims that he is presenting there what
for Kant was the figurative synthesis (cf. [Hua XI], p. 164). How is this to be
interpreted in light of the present paragraph? In other words, given the impor-
tant role of the notion of synthesis in Husserl, is something like the synthesis
of imagination required? Or is it necessary that there is something that has
the same task and function? The answer, which would deserve a indipendent
and new investigation, is that the tasks and performances of this synthesis are
phenomenologically ‘distributed’ – and so clarified – onto different syntheses
of sensibility: time, original associations and affection. Indeed, Husserl’s new
transcendental aesthetics is synthetic and what in Kant was a third middle syn-
thesis (third source, faculty to use the words of the first edition) is in Husserl
all within sensibility, distributed onto different aspects and field of sensibility
itself. Since time is the most formal and fundamental synthesis of genetic con-
stitution and remains (operates) in some forms at all the layers of constitution,
one can say that at each level of constitution one finds a particular determi-
nation of the synthesis of time, i.e. a sort of phenomenological transcendental
schema.
I can move now to the second suggestion of this conclusion.
syntheses, nor to the analysis of the synthetic nature of time. In particular moving the axis
of synthesis to sensibility means for Husserl explaining the original synthetic structure of
time. Although time is fundamental for Kant as well, he never discovers its detailed synthetic
structure.
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4.3 From Constitution to Reason
What is really Husserl’s theory of genetic constitution? This was one of the
leading questions of this study and I already gave a partial answer to it: Hus-
serl’s genetic constitution is a ‘vertical’ theory of knowledge, which consists in
a deepening of the theory of knowledge expressed in the Sixth Logical Inves-
tigation. Whereas the first was a theory of knowledge strictly connected and
devoted to ontology, the second is an investigation on the transcendental con-
ditions of knowledge. Again, whereas the object of static phenomenology is the
horizontal constitution, i.e. the investigation on the superficial conditions of the
combination between different kinds of acts, the object of genetic phenomenol-
ogy is the discovery of the conditions of possibility of the single act itself, i.e. of
every act of consciousness. In this sense genetic phenomenology, is the discovery
of the most fundamental and ultimate transcendental conditions of knowledge
and in particular of the synthesis of time as the most original and formal of
the syntheses that characterizes consciousness. In other words, genetic consti-
tution is the discovery of the very inner structure of consciousness, it is the
discovery of the essential synthetic structure of consciousness: consciousness
is synthetic from the beginning, also in those spheres that were considered as
mere receptive in the tradition. In light of the genetic phenomenology, con-
sciousness assumes a very characteristic form. At a macro level, consciousness
is the place were the different acts of meaning and intuition combine together
in order to achieve knowledge. At a micro level, consciousness is the stratifi-
cation of meaning, i.e. the field where the series of the layers of meaning are
stratified, step by step, from the purely formal synthesis of time to the cat-
egorial syntheses of the understanding. There is a common element between
the two approaches. At the macro level, at the level of the relation of acts, the
relevant element is that of the relation between the empty purely synthetic
act, for example the act of meaning that does not have a direct reference to
the object, and the act of intuition that is full and can fulfill the empty act, in
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virtue of the presence of the object (of a certain degree of presence according
to the kind of act: perception, imagination, remembering) . By contrast as the
discussion of affection shows, at the micro level we have a micro-articulation
of this two moments, i.e. of the moment of the synthesis and that of the pres-
ence of the thing. In this sense, these elements become two very characteristic
movements (functions) of consciousness. At the macro level, Husserl speaks
of intentions (purely empty acts) and intuitions. This is a dualism that, al-
though different from the classical one, is still strictly connected to that and
makes phenomenology unable to develop. Indeed, intuitions are to be found
in sensibility, whereas meaning intentions are categorial acts, i.e. acts of the
understating. Even if expressed in terms of empty and fulfilling acts and even
if in the Sixth Logical Investigation there is space for an account of the internal
lawfulness of the state of affair, Husserl is still tied to a classical form of dual-
ism. It is as if Husserl had discovered the key for the solution of the dualism,
but he did (could) not go any further. By contrast, genetic phenomenology
completes the discussion and offers the possibility to move a step forward: the
two characteristic movements (elements) of consciousness are not represented
by means of the couple act of meaning–fulfilling intuition, but by means of the
couple presence–synthesis. In particular, genetic phenomenology shows clearly
that intuition itself is synthetic and not merely the place where something is
given immediately (without mediation). Once the synthetic side of intuition is
discovered and analyzed in details in genetic phenomenology also the nature
of the dualism has to change. The opposition can no longer be expressed in
terms of act of meaning–intuition because both are characterized by a synthetic
structure. Furthermore, genetic phenomenology also shows that the syntheses
of the upper strata of constitution find their origin in the lower synthesis of
pre-predicative constitution. This entails the impossibility to accept the epis-
temological dualism, indeed sensibility and understanding are just the field
of two different modes of the synthesis. In sensibility we have syntheses that
are not completely repeatable, i.e. syntheses that are repeatable only in the
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mode of the similarity, but that function in the presence of the objectuality.
By contrast, categorial syntheses are repeatable in the mode ‘of the same’,
but do not work with the presence of the objectuality and consequently lose
their fullness. But the essential structure of these two classes of syntheses is
the same and they both ultimately refer to the structure of the synthesis of
time. This framework offers the possibility to single out those elements that
are the real protagonist of a dualism that does not bring to any presupposed
separation between sensibility and understanding: the moment of the pres-
ence of the object and the moment of the synthesis. The first is the moment
through which consciousness enters into contact with the world. The second
is the proper function of consciousness, through which consciousness modifies
and elaborate the contents. From a certain perspective, these are the two mo-
ments which give rise to the particular dialectic between object and subject
that characterizes the intentional correlation. The moment of the presence is
on the side of the object. In this sense, to explain an expression that Husserl
uses in different parts of its work, phenomenology goes back to the things them-
selves. By contrast, the second function, that of the synthesis, is on the side
of the subject. In fact, although it does not coincide either with the knowing
subject or with the ego, but it is broader than both of them and is the field
where they develop, yet consciousness is on the subjective side. As genetic
constitution shows, consciousness is that field in which both the ego-pole (and
consequently the subject) and the objectual pole constitute. One of the great-
est discovery of phenomenology is that consciousness, although it is on the
subjective side, would have not sense without an object that can be given in
its presence. In a certain sense, consciousness must be ‘activated’ by means of
the presence of something. Then the different syntheses of consciousness (and
in a second moment the syntheses of the subject) can function, producing new
objectialities to which, later, new syntheses apply. In this manner, it is possible
to explain the original position of phenomenology, which is neither a form of
idealism nor a form of strict realism. It is the articulation of the two moments
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of consciousness that makes the constitution both of the object (as perceived or
known object) and of the subject (as perceiving or knowing subject) possible.
The intentional correlation, which is at the centre of static phenomenology,
shows from the beginning that phenomenology is a dual philosophy and that
both the pole of the object (object of the act) and the pole of the subject (the
act itself) are equally important: it is a certain mode of their encounter that
makes knowledge possible. From the vertical perspective, this dualism is due to
the moments of consciousness that are brought to light in genetic constitution.
We saw that the general structure of synthesis, originally embodied in the
synthesis of time, is the essential structure of consciousness. There are syn-
theses that are purely passive and syntheses that, being built on the previous
passive syntheses, are performed by the subject, with a different degree of ac-
tivity. Now, another element is to be considered. This is in fact the moment of
the presence of the object. Without this moment consciousness could not enter
in touch with the external transcendent world and the syntheses operating in
consciousness could not apply, they could not start to work. This moment of
the pure presence of the thing could be called pure intuition6.
The presence of the thing can also be thought of in terms of a condition
of openness of the consciousness to the world. In fact, synthetic consciousness
cannot produce by its own the original contents to which the syntheses, first
above all the syntheses of time, apply. By contrast, it needs the presence of
the object, i.e. that some object enters (comes in touch with) into the sphere
of consciousness. This presence would then be guaranteed by a transcendental
condition of openness of the consciousness to the world. If consciousness was
merely synthetic, but closed and ended in itself, none of the processes exposed
6As already showed, intuition is for Husserl a kind of act in which the object is directly
given. Among these acts, we find for example perception. But thes are no more simple acts
of reception. They are complex and articulated and work through particular syntheses. The
word intuition is then used to refer to these complex acts, in which we find some syntheses
but also the presence of the object. I suggest that ‘pure intuition’ could refer to presence
isolated from the synthesis. To be noticed that I use the term pure intuition differently than
Husserl does in LU VI.
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in genetic constitution could take place.
The moment of the synthesis, in this case the original synthesis of time,
is the keystone of the whole constitution. The other transcendental condition
is that of the openness of the consciousness to the world. These two are es-
sential for knowledge, as both the micro and the macro analysis in fact show.
The first represents the inner apriori structure of consciousness, the second
represents the apriori condition of the being in touch of the object with con-
sciousness. If one raises again the question at the beginning of this paragraph
– what is really Husserl’s theory of genetic constitution? – a further answer is
now possible: genetic constitution is transcendental philosophy, namely, it is
the discovery of the two conditions of transcendental philosophy: the synthetic
structure of consciousness and the presence (the degree of presence) of the ob-
ject for consciousness7. The first, the synthetic structure of consciousness that
derives from the synthesis of time, could be called the ‘internal transcendental
condition’; the second, the condition of the presence of the object, could be
called the ‘external transcendental condition’.
To conclude this work, I would like to raise a question, which is also a
suggestion for the further pursuit of the analysis: is Husserl’s theory of con-
stitution just the analysis of the inner nature of consciousness with respect to
the internal and external conditions of the constitution? Phenomenology is in
a certain sense the science of consciousness. Unlike other philosophies, phe-
nomenology focuses on consciousness as the field where both the subject and
the object constitute. There is no prominency of the subject in phenomenology,
by contrast both the poles of the intentional correlation are equally important.
From this perspective, phenomenological subjectivism could be defined as a
‘moderate’ one, in which the subject is a fundamental condition of the consti-
7If one thinks of the Kantian system, time and synthesis, although they were conceived
in a different way, were already the conditions od transcendental philosophy. From this
perspective, it is as if Kant had already the elements to develop such a transcendental
theory of knowledge, but he could not because he did not recognize the intrinsic synthetic
structure of time.
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tution, but not always the centre of it8. In other words, genetic constitution,
as a new deep theory of knowledge, presents a very peculiar relation between
the object and the subject, i.e. between the world and the knowing subject.
Now consciousness is the centre of the discourse, and consciousness, although
on the side of the subject, does not correspond to it. The question is now:
What kind of rationality corresponds to such a theory of knowledge? In other
words, what kind of theory of reason can be developed on the basis of genetic
constitution?9 In this question, there is also a hidden criticism to phenomenol-
ogy. In fact, phenomenology runs a double risk, and this is perhaps due to
the number of repetitions, approaches and always new beginnings that Husserl
himself sought during his life. On the one hand, the risk of being limited to
be a mere theory of knowledge (epistemology). Indeed, it is true that phe-
nomenology is above all epistemology, i.e. that the analysis of consciousness
was primarily devoted to theory of knowledge. But this cannot be the end of
phenomenology, otherwise it would be a mere ‘technique’ of knowledge, which
would be in contrast with the proposal of the Prolegomena and Formal and
transcendental Logic. What Husserl is seeking there is really a theory of rea-
son. In the frame of static analysis this theory of reason could not be fully
developed, because theory of knowledge was limited and partial. The result
could at best be a formal ontology. Now, genetic phenomenology unveils the
transcendental conditions of knowledge and makes it possible to move a step
forward and develop a theory of reason. On the other hand, there is the risk of
losing the philosophical value of phenomenology and to transform it in a gen-
eral method to be associated with other sciences or philosophies. This would
mean that phenomenology does not have an internal aim. By contrast, Husserl
8There are moments of the constitution, for example the moment of affection, in which
the objectual pole is the protagonist of the relation.
9Looking at Kant, the first part of the first Critique aims to answer the question about
what we can know and on which basis. But answering this question, through an analysis of
transcendental aesthetics and analytic, is the first step for an analysis of the whole system of
pure reason. It is neither a mere theory of knowledge or epistemology, nor theory of sciences.
What I am asking now is whether Husserl’s theory of genetic constitution, which is a deep
theory of knowledge, can represent the first step toward a theory of reason.
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was always aiming to a model of rationality, but never developed a theory of
reason on the basis of genetic constitution. Then, the question with which I
want to close this work is the following: Is it possible to make phenomenology a
theory of reason on the basis of the result of genetic phenomenology? And how
would this theory be characterized? I cannot provide an answer to this ques-
tion in this context, however this seems the next step for everyone who takes
seriously Husserl’s theory of genetic constitution. Genetic constitution cannot
be a self-enclosed system. It is transcendental logic, since it unveils the two
transcendental conditions of knowledge and shows how the basic structures of
consciousness work. But if phenomenology wants to be philosophy, and not a
mere technique of consciousness or a mere theory of knowledge, it has to take
into consideration reason, which is different than consciousness and broader
than knowledge. In particular, reason requires an operation of reflection on
consciousness and is the broader framework within which our knowledge is
valid.
Appendix
Note on the Appendix. The two following tables are intended to offer an
overview on some topics that, albeit extremely important for the present work,
could not be here fully developed.
The first is a schema of the most important results of the Fifth Logical
Investigation, in which Husserl describes the different meaning of the notion of
presentation (Vorstellung) and presents the basic insights of his theory of acts.
These are important to fully understand the theory of knowledge presented in
the first chapter of the present work.
The second in a schema of the logical disciplines as they are presented in
FTL10 and is intended to offer a general framework for the discussion of the
second chapter.
These two tables cannot of course be exhaustive, but they help to frame
the discussion of the present work into a more precisely.
10Cf. [Lohmar, 2000]. p. 80. Where Lohmar presents a similar table.
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